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Abstract
The Master Thesis "Multi-modal substitution in airline recovery operations.
ASIANA crash case study" offers a detailed view of the consequences of ASIANA
crash in the network, and proposes the implementation of an inter-modal rerouting
of the diverted passangers in order to enhance a faster and cost-effective recovery
from the disruption.
The thesis is introduced by a description of the research project in which this
study is circumscribed, as well as the data sources. Then, Chapter 2 presents
the ASIANA crash factual summary, along with the impact of the crash in the
schedules during the following days. Chapter 3 shows an estimated cost evaluation
of the crash impact on schedules, followed by the argumentation in Chapter 4 of
the research motivations.
Once the research focus is narrowed, Chapter 5 discusses in detail all the issues
related to the implementation of inter-modal operations in the airline industry.
The chapter starts explaining the state-of-the-art of inter-modal operations in the
airline industry, then assesses the two possibilities of implementation of an inter-
modal rerouting to SFO, and finally discusses secondary aspects of inter-modal
operations, such as safety issues, motor-coaches service handling or how passengers
may respond to an inter-modal rerouting.
After discussing how an inter-modal rerouting should be operated for ASIANA
crash case, Chapter 6 offers a mathematical model to optimise the rerouting costs
by applying inter-modal substitution of diverted flights, and Chapter 7 shows the
model implementation over the busiest airports involved in the diversions triggered
by Asiana Crash, computing the results and comparing them to non-inter-modal
reroutings.
The thesis is closed extracting the conclusions of the implementations, and
offering possibilities for further research in this field.
xi
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Disaster Project background
On the morning of 6th of July 2013, the Boeing 777-200ER aircraft operating
the Asiana Airlines flight 214 crashed on final approach into SFO, with 307 people
aboard. Two passengers died at the crash scene, and a third died in a hospital
several days later. Additionally, 181 passengers were injured, 12 of them critically.
The crash had direct consequences in the air traffic network, as two of the San
Francisco International Airport (SFO) runways were temporary closed. Incoming
flights had to be diverted to other airports, and outgoing flights could not take-off.
Such impact triggered severe costs of delays, diversions and cancellations, that
perhaps could have been more efficiently handled.
As a result of similar situations as the one ASIANA crash triggered, "disrup-
tions management" is a recurrent topic in aviation operations. Due to the great
expense of purchasing and maintaining aircraft, airlines are pressured to maximize
their fleet utilization by creating aircraft routings with as little embedded idle time
as possible. Therefore, when schedule disruptions occur, either as a result of bad
weather, mechanical problems or flight accidents, the consequences are extremely
costly for airlines.
The difficulties in handling efficiently such disruptive situations have raised
the willingness of the authorities to investigate the indirect consequences that
they concatenate. The Asiana Crash Disaster Project, in which this Master Thesis
research was circumscribed, is a joint research project between the Daniel Guggen-
heim School of Aerospace Engineering, at Georgia Institute of Technology, and the
Civil and Environmental Engineering School at University of California Berkeley,
1
1 – Introduction
that aims to cover this need of explaining the crash anatomy, quantify how the
coupling between the air and ground traffic network impacts, and finally try to
propose measures that enhance an efficient disruption recovery.
Particularly, the research performed in this Master Thesis has focused on defin-
ing the optimal cost-efficient inter-modal rerouting of diverted passengers. A thor-
ough analysis of the crash impact in the network and its cost consequences for
the actors involved has been performed. Furthermore, this thesis proposes a more
cost-efficient handling of the rerouting of diverted passengers by implementing
inter-modal operations. The main subjects that will be covered along the thesis
are:
• Analysis of the network impact of the crash; in terms of delays, cancellations
and diversions.
• Cost evaluation of the crash impact in the air network. Focus on rerouting
costs.
• Is there a more cost-effective way of rerouting passengers by implementing
inter-modal operations?
• Development of mathematical optimization model of the diverted passengers’
reaccomodation costs.
• Implementation of the linear programming developed in Asiana crash case
study.
1.2 Data sources available for analysis
This section will first discuss the two data sources available, secondly will
explain the data that each database provide, as well as the differences between
them. Finally, the section will expose the decision on which database would be
used as input for the preliminary analysis and mathematical modeling.
Two databases are available, the first one provided by the Bureau of Trans-
portation Statistics (BTS), and the second one is provided by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA).
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1.2.1 BTS Airline On-Time Performance Database
This first database is maintained by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics,
part of the Research and Innovative Technology Administration (RITA), from
the United States Department of Transportation (DOT). The database is called
TranStats, and provides statistics on all transportation modes supplying the United
States. Particularly, the data concerning this research is displayed in the Airline
On-Time Performance Data [1].
The Airline On-Time Performance Database provides detailed information
about air carrier on-time performance key indicators. Specifically, the database
contains on-time arrival data for non-stop domestic flights, sorted by major air
carriers. It is actualized with monthly frequency, with records starting on 1987.
The data covers the following information:
• Scheduled and actual departure times.
• Scheduled and actual arrival times.
• Departure and arrival delay times.
• Taxi-out and taxi-in times.
• Wheels-on time and wheels-off times.
• Origin and destination airports per flight.
• Flight number and tail number assigned.
• Carrier code.
• Cancellation or diversion confirmations, with updated destination and arrival
times in case of diverted flights.
• Airbone times.
• Non-stop flight distances.
1.2.2 Avation System Performance Metrics Database
The Aviation System Performance Metrics (ASPM) database is maintained by
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). This online access system provides
data on flights to and from the ASPM airports (currently 77); and all flights
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by the ASPM carriers, including flights by those carriers to international and
domestic non-ASPM airports. All IFR traffic, and some VFR traffic for these
carriers and airports is included. The table can be accessed in the FAA Operations
& Performance Data website [2].
ASPM flight records are divided into two groupings: Efficiency and Metrics
counts. The Efficiency Counts are intended to capture all traffic handled by con-
trollers. They include the full set of ASPM records, including some that are missing
one or more pieces of key data. In contrast, ASPM Metrics counts, the basis of
delay calculations displayed in the Analysis and Individual Flights modules, only
include complete records, and records for which accurate estimates are possible for
the few pieces of missing data. Metrics counts also exclude records from General
Aviation, Military flights and International flights missing data on the non-U.S.
portion of the flight.
The data relevant for the study proposed in this thesis is included in two mod-
ules of the ASPM database, the Taxi Times module and the Individual Flight mod-
ule. The first module, Taxi Times Module, contains data on actual and unimpeded
taxi times by airport. The second module, Individual Flight Module, provides in-
formation on aircraft departure and arrival times, as well as on flight delays for
individual flights compared to the schedule and flight plan times. The content of
both modules relevant for this study can be summarized in the following list:
• Scheduled and actual departure times.
• Scheduled and actual arrival times.
• Departure and arrival delay times.
• Origin and destination airports per flight.
• Flight number and tail number assigned.
• Diversion confirmations, avoids cancelled flights.
• Taxi-out and taxi-in times, and the unimpeded taxi times.
• Wheels-on time and wheels-off times.
• Gate-in and gate-out times.
• Season of the flight departure.
May one remark that the unimpeded times report of taxi times provides in-
formation on unimpeded Taxi Out and Taxi In times compared to the average,
median, and 10th percentile times for a selected airport or group of airports. These
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Taxi In and Out Times are estimated times by airport and by carrier under op-
timal operating conditions (when congestion, weather, or other delay factors are
not significant), and may serve as a theoretic reference for analysis.
1.2.3 Comparison between ASPM and BTS database
After analysing the content provided by both databases, one can conclude that
the information provides is similar. The differences distinguished between the
previously mentioned databases are summarized in the following table:
Figure 1.1: Comparison of BTS and ASPM databases content.
The database that has been selected as input for the crash schedule conse-
quences analysis and the mathematical programming is the Airline On-Time Per-
formance Database from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS), described
in table 1.1 in the column "BTS database".
The information provided by this database is narrowed to the 20 major air
carriers, as well as to the major national airports in terms of domestic operating
service. Furthermore, it provides detailed information about diverted and cancelled
flights, which was crucial for the research performed in this master thesis.
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1.3 Master Thesis workflow
The following workflow scheme aims to clarify the structure and consistency of
this research. The scheme displays the consecutive tasks that have been performed
in order to ensure a coherent research flow:
Figure 1.2: Master Thesis workflow scheme.
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Asiana Crash Consequences
2.1 Asiana Crash description
2.1.1 Crash factual Summary
On January 17th 2014, the City and County of San Francisco submitted the
report on the Asiana accident investigation [3]. The accident investigation pro-
vides detailed information of the crash incidents as well as on the protocols of
emergency response performed by the San Francisco Fire Department - Airport
Bureau (SFFD-AB) and the San Francisco Police Department (SFPD), that were
the parties involved in the handling of the accident.
The accident was registered to happen on Saturday July 6th 2013, at 11:27:48
Pacific daylight time, when the Boeing 777 registration HL7742, operated by
Asiana Airlines as Flight 214, struck the seawall short of Runway 28L at SFO.
The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and fire. The flight was a regu-
larly scheduled passenger flight that originated in Shanghai Pudong International
Airport, Shanghai (China), with a stop in Inchon International Airport, Seoul
(Republic of Korea).
The aircraft impacted the approach end of Runway 28L and progressed into
the level dry dirt infield between Runway 28L and Taxiway Foxtrot. The impact
sequence severey damaged the tail assembly, or empennage, shearing it off the
aircraft. The aircraft rotated counterclockwise approximately 330 degrees, creating
a heavy cloud of dust and debris before crashing onto the infield or safety area
approximately 2300 feet from the seawall. Aboard the aircraft were 307 individuals:
4 flight crew members, 12 cabin crewmembers and 291 passengers. The evacuation
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started 90 seconds after the final impact, primarly out the back of the plane and
by slides deployed at the forward two left doors. Three of the 291 passengers were
fatally injured.
Figure 2.1: Asiana crash parts distribution in 28L SFO runway.
As it can be seen in the figure 2.1, both engines, reprinted from [4], the main
landing gear and the tail section separated from the aircraft. The vertical and
both horizontal stabilizers fell on the runway before the threshold. The remainder
of the fuselage and wings rotated counter-clockwise and slid westward, stopping
at the left side of the runway, 2,400 feet (730 m) from the initial point of impact
at the seawall.
Due to emergency vehicles and cleaning tasks, runway 28L remained unavail-
able on the 6th of July, and stayed also closed for some hours on the 7th of July.
Furthermore Runway 28R remained also closed for some hours during the 6th of
July to ensure the correct removal of the accidented aircraft.
2.1.2 San Francisco International Airport
San Francisco International Airport (SFO) ias an airport owned by the county
of San Francisco. The airport is a department of the City and County but is
located outside of San Francisco’s geographic boundaries. The airport is located
in an unincorporated area of San Mateo County, approximately 13 miles south
of downtown San Francisco. A five-member Airport Comission, appointed by the
Mayor, oversees the operation and management of the Airport.
SFO is the largest airport in northern California. It has been the 7th busiest
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airport by total passenger boardings in 2013, with 21,706,567 boardings and an
average of 1,163 daily flight operations to and from locations all over the world (last
recorded 2012). The distribution within air carrier operations is 89% domestic and
11% international.
Figure 2.2: San Francisco FAA airport diagram
As one can observe in the Federal Aviation Administration airport diagram of
SFO, displayed in figure 2.2, San Francisco intl. airport is bounded by the San
Francisco Bay to the north and east and by land to the west and south. It has two
sets of parallel and intersecting runways: 1/19 parallel Left and Right and 10/28
parallel Left and Right. The approaches to runways 28 Left and Right are over
water.
2.1.3 Alternative airports in the San Francisco Bay Area
A part from San Francisco International Airpoirt, there are two additional
international airports in the Bay Area: San Jose International Airport (SJC) and
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Oakland International Airport (OAK). These two airports are recurrently used
to absorb arrival diverted flights when a disruption occurs in SFO. The following
section will introduce an overview of the main characteristics of the two airports.
Figure 2.3: Alternative airports in the Bay Area
As it can be observed in figure 2.3, OAK is located within 30 miles from
SFO, and SJC is located within less than 50 miles from SFO. The short distances
between the three major airports in the Bay Area make very feasible the inter-
modal substitution at least within the Bay Area.
2.1.3.1 Oakland International Airport
Oakland International Airport is a public airport five miles south of downtown
Oakland, in Alameda County, California. The airport has passenger service to
destinations in the United States, as well as Mexico and Europe. Cargo flights fly
to destinations in the United States, Canada and Japan. Furthermore, OAK is
the closest airport to the San Francisco financial district.
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Passengers at the airport peaked in 2007 at 14.6 million and declined to 9.3
million in 2011, from when it remains aproximately steady. An advantage of OAK
over SFO is OAK’s history of a high, on-time arrival percentage, despite many days
of rainy and foggy weather in each city. In 2009 OAK had the highest on-time
arrival percentage among the 40 busiest North American airports.
2.1.3.2 Mineta San Jose International Airport
Norman Y. Mineta San Jose International Airport is a city-owned public airport
in San Jose, Santa Clara County, California. It is located two miles northwest of
Downtown San Jose near the intersections of U.S. Route 101, Interstate 880, and
State Route 87. Despite San Jose being the second largest city in the Bay Area,
SJC is the smallest of the three Bay Area commercial airports in terms of passenger
boarding. SJC served 8,783,319 passengers in 2013.
Regarding customer profile, SJC is a "downtown airport", unlike SFO and OAK
which are on opposite shores of San Francisco Bay. SJC’s convenient location near
downtown San Jose has also drawbacks; it is surrounded by the city and had little
room for expansion. Like Oakland airport, SJC attracts Bay Area residents who
find SFO flight times too unreliable.
2.2 Asiana crash impact on flight schedules
The historical time-series recorded for San Francisco International Airport was
analysed in order to determine the "normal" conditions in SFO. In order to de-
termine when the abnormality triggered by the Asiana crash could be considered
finished, the historical time-series was analysed, in order to compare it to the
schedule disruption of the week of the crash. After the analysis, it was concluded
that the four day period starting on the 6th of July to the 9th of July 2013, was the
disrupted period of study. After this time period, the disruption was considered
to be mitigated.
2.2.1 Schedule impact overview
The aircraft crash triggered a severe capacity reduction at SFO and consequent
delays and cancellations. The first step conducted wasto analyse the distribution
11
2 – Asiana Crash Consequences
of the flights that were scheduled to arrive to SFO or departure from SFO during
the four-day period of study. The following figure shows the evolution of scheduled
arrival flights to SFO on the 4-day period of study.
Figure 2.4: Evolution of arrivals scheduled to SFO
As previously mentioned, the Asiana crash disrupted the flight schedule at
SFO, generating abnormal cancellations and diversions. One can observe how the
day of the crash supposed a peak of abnormality in the operations at SFO, with
a 41% of arrival flights cancelled and 16,9% of arrivals diverted. At the end of
the period of study, the 9th of July, more stable indicator supported the idea of
the disruption mitigation, with a 13,6% of arrival flights cancelled and a 2,6% of
arrivals diverted. Nevertheless, it can also be seen how the trend is an increasing
recovery from the 6th to 8th of July, and then another slight downfall on the
9th, with an increase of 47 flights cancelled. In order to analyse if this variation
enters the normality margins, figures 2.5 and 2.6, reprinted from the article [5],
presents the cancellations along the month of July 2013, in order to understand if
any pattern exists.
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Figure 2.5: Percentage of arrival and departure flights cancelled in July 2013 at
SFO
Figure 2.6: Number of arrival and departure flights cancelled in July 2013 at SFO
One can observe how this additional variation has not been found to be di-
rectly attributable to one single factor. For the information analysed, there is no
apparent variation attributable to the increase in cancellations the 9th of July,
and furthermore, after this date the recovery continued smoothly to more normal
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conditions. Therefore, apparently no direct conclusions can be extracted from the
re-peak of cancellations in the 9th of July.
Moreover, the same analysis has been performed for departure flights, the re-
sults of which are presented in figure 2.7.
Figure 2.7: Evolution of departures scheduled from SFO
As for departures, the same situation occurs, starting from 52,5% of departures
cancelled finishing in a more reasonable 14,4%. The diversion of departure flights
has a more constant trend, as a great part of the flights were cancelled. Having an
overview of the distribution of cancelled and diverted flights during the four day
period of study, the focus will now be the analysis of the passengers that perceived
diversions, and how this diversions translated into delay times.
2.2.2 Diverted flights analysis
2.2.2.1 Evolution of number of diversions
The following section will focus on analysing the disruption that diverted pas-
sengers perceived, in order to be able to determine later how a more efficient
rerouting could positively impact the passengers. With that objective, an analysis
of the diverted passengers from the 6th to 9th of July was conducted. Using the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) registry, all the tail number of the diverted
flights were tracked to determine the type of the aircraft assigned to each flight.
14
2 – Asiana Crash Consequences
Then, using the Bureau of Transportation Statistics estimations for flight load
factors, the number of passengers reaching the diverted airports was estimated.
Figure 2.8 shows the average load factors that have been used for estimating
the flight loads, acording to the FAA registry of flights arriving to San Francisco
Intl. Airport in July 2013:
Figure 2.8: Load factors used for estimations
Once the load of all the diverted flights was estimated, the number of passengers
diverted can be computed. Figure 2.9 shows the number of diverted passengers
during the 4 day period of study separated by airports.
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Figure 2.9: Diversions distribution between airports
As one would expect the greatest part of the diversions was absorbed by Mineta
San Jose International Airport (SJC) and Oakland International Airport (OAK),
as both airports are the closest airports to SFO, located within less than 50 miles.
After analysing the figures though, it can now be observed how Salt Lake City
Intl. Airport (SLC), Sacramento Intl. Airport (SMF), Phoenix Sky Harbor Inter-
national Airport (PHX) and Los Angeles Intl. Airport (LAX) also absorbed part
of the diverted flights.
This figure thus support the idea of enlarging the Regional Airport System
to include major alternative airports in the case of severe capacity restrictions in
an Airport. The ferrying of Aircraft back to SFO is a costly operation, and an
intermodal substitution in the rerouting may suppose a more cost-effective solution
that airlines should take into account in such disruptive situations. Having now a
look at the disrupted airlines in figure 2.10:
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Figure 2.10: Diversions distribution between airlines
The previous analysis has permitted to compute the number of flights and
passengers that were diverted due to the ASIANA crash. Nevertheless, in order to
compute the delays that these passengers incurred, the flights should be classified
in two groups:
• Flights that could reach their final destination (SFO).
• Flights that could not reach SFO.
Using the data provided by the FAA, the distinction can be made in order
to analyse the flights separetely. The logic behind the separation is that the
flights that finally reached SFO will have substantially lower delay times than
the flights that did not reach their original destination (SFO), and had to remain
in the diverted airports. The few flights that were able to reach SFO can be a
considered a non highly disruptive situation flights, and therefore for these flights
an intermodal substitution will be less cost-effective. Figures 2.11 and 2.12 show
the number of diverted flights and diverted passengers separated in the two groups
previously mentioned.
It can be observed in figure 2.11 how the number of flights that were not able
to reach the final destination diminishes with the days, which denotes the process
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Figure 2.11: Diverted flights Figure 2.12: Diverted passengers
of recovery till normal operations of SFO. On the day of the crash, only the 29%
of the flights that were diverted were able to flight back to SFO.
Although on the Sunday 7th and Monday 8th of July SFO was not closed, the
runway 28L where the crash occurred remained unavailable for a long time. One
can observe how no diverted flights reached SFO during the 7th and 8th., so the
decision was not to ferry back the diverted flights, but use the remaining capacity
to accept some of the scheduled arrivals on the days. Finally, on the 9th of July,
reaching fairly a stable situation, a 79% reached SFO. Now can be computed the
delay that suffered this passangers that could reach SFO.
2.2.2.2 Delay times of diverted flights that reached SFO
As it can be seen in figure 2.11, there were only diverted flights that could
finally reach SFO the 6th and the 9th of July. Consequently, it has been computed
first the delay times of these diverted flights that could reach SFO.
Then, performing a quantitative analysis of the delays incurred during the 6th
of July, the table 2.13 summarizes the computed delays. The average block delay
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of these flights was 405 minutes in the 6th of July, while the weighted average
computed is 426 minutes, meaning the flights with greater passenger load suffered
more delays than the less loaded flights.
Figure 2.13: Analysis of delays the 6th of July
The same analysis was performed for the 9th of July. A detail of the quantita-
tive analysis performed can be seen in table 2.14, where it can be observed how
on the 9th of July the average block delay of these flights was 143 minutes, whilst
the weighted average computed is 139 minutes, meaning smaller flights suffered a
greater impact on their schedules.
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Figure 2.14: Analysis of delays the 9th of July
After this quantitative delay analysis, the delay time values can be summarized
in figure 2.15 for every day of the period of study, in order to be able to understand
the evolution of the impact of the crash in the diverted passengers.
Figure 2.15: Delay minutes of the diverted flights that could reach SFO
The "Average" block delay has been calculated per flight, whilst the "Weighted
average" block delay has been calculated per passenger, taking into account the
different aircraft capacities and average load factors of the diverted flights.
Please note how there are no values for the 8th and 9th of July, as due to the
disruption no diverted flights were able to arrive at SFO, therefore the delays on
the 7th and 8th of July were even greater. Then, it can be observed how the impact
grows until the 9th of July. The difference between the block delays is considerably
high, as the block delay was reduced a 65%, confirming also the attenuation of the
disruption. Finally, it can be concluded that, eventhough this diverted passengers
represent the best scenario in terms of delay perception, the delays incurred were
extremely high.
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Cost Evaluation
3.1 Introduction
Airlines invest a large amount of resources in order to develop efficient flight
schedules for their fleets. A flight schedule consists of the originating city, de-
parture time, destination, and arrival time for flights that the airline intends to
serve. Due to the seasonality of passenger travel, these schedules are created every
2 to 3 months. The ordered sequence of flights to which an aircraft is assigned is
called an aircraft route. A collection of aircraft routes that can be used to service
scheduled flights is defined as an aircraft routing.
The great expense of purchasing and maintaining aircraft, pressures airlines to
maximize their utilization by creating aircraft routings with as little embedded idle
time as possible. Therefore, when schedule disruptions occur, the consequences are
extremely costly for airlines.
Nevertheless, unplanned aircraft shortages and resulting flight schedule disrup-
tions are an unavoidable occurrence in the daily operations of an airline. Aircraft
are grounded or temporarily delayed when equipment failures make flying unsafe,
when severe weather closes an airport, or when the required flight crews are un-
available. Real-time decisions must be made to minimize lost revenues, passenger
inconvenience, and operational costs by reassigning available aircraft and canceling
or delaying flights.
Furthermore, in extreme cases where severe weather closes airports in a re-
gion, or when airports are closed due to accidents and safety issue such as in
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Asiana crash situation, aircraft are prohibited from taking off or landing at the af-
fected airports. This results in massive flight cancellations whose effects propagate
through the system causing missed connections and other disruptions at upstream
and downstream airports.
For a typical airline, approximately 10% of its scheduled revenue flights are
affected by irregularities, with a large percentage being caused by severe weather
conditions and the associated loss of airport capacity. The New York Times pub-
lished a study the 21th of January 1997, noting that the financial impact of irreg-
ularities on the daily operations of a single major US domestic carrier can exceed
$ per annum in lost revenue, crew overtime pay, and passenger hospitality costs.
Furthermore, in an article published in the Handbook of Airline Economics, it was
stated that on average 0.1 - 0.2 % of a typical airline’s flights were interrupted due
to maintenance problems. In addition, an equal average 0.1 - 0.2 % of that same
airline’s flights will experience irregularities due to weather problems. In January
1996, it was estimated that a single snowstorm, the "Blizzard of ’96" costs the US
airline industry between $50 - $100 million (Aviation Week, 1/15/1995).
It is a fact that airlines have to cope with reduced fleet size on a daily basis, as a
result of aircraft breakdown, as well as other many external factors. Nevertheless,
very little research has been done on the problem of addressing the impact of ir-
regular operations, and developing potential decision support systems which could
assist short term aircraft rescheduling. The impact of irregular airline operations
on the daily activities of a carrier can lead to significant loss in profitability.
In this thesis, inter-modal substitution in the rerouting of diverted passengers
is proposed as a measure of airline recovery operations after highly disruptive
situations, with the objective to lower the impact of irregular operations in airlines’
image and profitability.
Thus, the following section will first assess which was the economic impact of
Asiana crash during the crash weekend, in order to get a sense of the disruption’s
dimension of the Asiana crash, and then it will introduce the previous research
done in addressing the impact of irregular operations.
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3.2 Methodology
If one may recall from the crash consequences section, the crash had direct
consequences in the air traffic network, as the SFO runways were temporary closed.
Incoming flights had to be diverted to other airports, and outgoing flights could not
take-off. Such impact triggered severe costs of delays, diversions and cancellations,
that perhaps could have been more efficiently handled.
In order to have a sense of how severe, in economic terms, the Asiana crash
was, not only for Asiana Airlines but for San Francisco International Airport, a
cost evaluation has been performed. The objective is to determine the dimension
of the disruption costs, and to distinguish which are the major cost variables that
take part in disruptions.
The first thing that must be adressed when starting a cost evaluation of the
consequences of Asiana Crash at San Francisco International Airport, is to define
which costs components will be taken into account. For the data available, it was
decided to compute three main costs:
• Cost of delays
- Arrival delay costs
- Departure delay costs
• Cost of cancellations
- Cancellation of arrivals to SFO
- Cancellation of departures from SFO
• Cost of diversions
- Diversion of arrivals to SFO
- Diversion of departures from SFO
One must notice that the cost evaluation will be an under estimation, as the
delay costs will be computed only from passengers point of view. Although there
are no reference estimations of aircraft operating expenses, published by the Bu-
reau of Transportation Statistics (BTS), it is difficult to assess to which extent
a delayed departured flight is using an aircraft, therefore it has been substracted
from the analysis.
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3.3 Cost evaluation
3.3.1 Delay costs estimates
The cost of delay to airline operations comprises several components. These
include the costs of passenger delay to the airline, plus crew and other additional
expenses that airlines may abosrb in order to ensure that their passengers perceive
the least unpleasant delay. Also, primarily in the airborne phase, fuel costs need
to be considered, and in the future, emissions charges. The total cost is often
dominated by the passenger component.
This passenger delay cost component is described by Cook et al. [6] to be split
into "hard" costs, such as those due to passenger rebooking compensation and care,
and "soft" costs. Hard costs are typically difficult to defin for a given flight due
to accounting complexities, but are in theory, at least identifiable deficits in the
airline’s bottom line. Soft costs manifest themselves in several ways. Even with no
experience of an airline, a passenger may perceive it to be unpunctual and choose
another, instead. Soft costs, exemplified by these types of revenue-loss, are rather
more difficult to quantify, but may even dominate the hard costs.
As described previously, the "hard" cost component of passenger delay cost, is
subjected to aviation passenger rights in cases of fllight disruption, average trav-
elling distances, or rerouting transportation alternatives, as well as other factors
that influence the disruption cost impacts. These factors can considerably differ
between the United States and Europe. For instance, US aviation passengers are
less covered in case of disruptions, nevertheless average travel distances between
US and EU main destinations also substantially differ. Furthermore, surface trans-
portation alternatives in US are far less efficient, and airline policies have much
agressive client loyalty initiatives. As a result, airlines’ cost perceived as a result
passenger delays notably vary in case of disruptions between US and EU.
Cook et al. (2009) in [6] propose an estimation for hard and soft aggregate
costs in the European context. As a result of the European Union’s air passenger
compensation and assistance scheme (Regulation (EC) NO. 261/2004) introduced
on 17 February 2005, passengers in Europe are now afforded with additional rights
in flight disruptive situation, such as denied boarding, cancellation or delays. This
new regulation applies to any flight departing from the EU and to all flights op-
erated by EU carriers from or to an EU airport. The resulting aggregate cost
estimations are summarised in table 3.1.
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Figure 3.1: Summary of estimations on passengers delay cost by Cook et al. (2009).
Assuming a "Base" cost estimate, it can now be concluded for the European
context a total aggregated passenger delay cost of 0.36 e per minute.
Nevertheless, as it has been stated previously, passenger delay costs may con-
siderably differ between EU and US. Having in mind that in the current Bureaou of
Transportation Statistics (BTS) database used to perform the optimization there
are no international flights to which the European Union’s air passenger compen-
sation and assistance scheme (Regulation (EC) NO. 261/2004) would apply, a US
focused estimator of passenger delay costs will be assumed.
The United States Department of Transportation (DOT), that is the US gov-
ernment agency in North America devoted to transportation, proposes in [7] an
approach to measure the hourly values of travel time for aviation passengers. These
values are used by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and are not to be
updated for changes in price levels. Table 3.2 shows the recommended hourly val-
ues of travel time savings, proposed by the Department of Transportation (DOT)
upon guidance furnished by the Office of the Secretary of Transportation of the
United States of America (OST).
Figure 3.2: Recommended values for aviation passenger travel time.
As there is no specific data on the travel purpose of the diverted passengers,
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it will be assumed that all the passengers in our study can be embraced by the
category "air carrier, all purposes". Therefore, it can be concluded that the cost
coefficient CostP that will be used in the mathematical model, to represent the
diverted passengers value of time, will be equal to US$ 28,60, or equivalently 0,48
US$ per minute.
3.3.2 Delay costs evaluation
3.3.2.1 Delay costs of arrival flights to SFO
In order to compute the delay costs triggered by the Asiana Crash during
the 4-day period of study, all the planes having delays during the crash weekend
have been selected. Then, tracking the flight tale numbers in the FAA registry,
the flights’ passenger capacity hasa been computed. Using the average load fac-
tors provided by the BTS, it has been estimated passenger load of all the flights.
Finally, analysing their scheduled and actual arrival times in the BTS database
mentioned in ref to introduction data, it has been computed the delay hours per-
ceived by all the flights arriving at SFO.
The following table shows the average load factors that have been used to
estimate the actual loads of the delayed flights:
Figure 3.3: SFO arrival flights’ load factors in July 2013.
The load factors displayed in table 3.3 correspond only to US Carriers, as no
international Carriers are recorded in the flight schedules’ database that has been
analysed. Once the average load factors are defined, the total estimated delay
hours can be computed. The results are displayed in the following table:
In order to compute the accurate economic impact of this delays, the "Total
Passenger delay hours" have been computed multiplying independently each flight
delay per its passenger load. Table 3.4 shows the aggregated value of these
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Figure 3.4: Arrival flight delay hours in the 4 day period of study.
passenger delay hours for every day of study.
As it has been concluded in 3.3.1, the economic value of time decided to
represent the passenger cost of delay is $ 28.60, as displayed in table 3.2 . Finally,
the arrival flight dealy’s cost can be computed by multiplying the passenger cost
of delay per total passenger delay hours. As it has been previously stated, the
flight delay hours will not be taken into account to compute the extra operational
cost triggered by delaying the flights, as there are no accurate estimates regarding
this matter currently. Thus, the total delay costs of arrival flights for the 4 day
period of study are summarized in the following table 3.5.
Figure 3.5: Arrival flight delay costs in the 4 day period of study.
One can observe from table 3.5 how the costs diminish during the 7th to 9th of
July, the days after the Asiana Crash. This is due to the fact that during the crash
day there were more cancellations than delays, and therefore there were greater
cancellation costs. The overall cost of delays that can be allocated to the Asiana
crash disruptions is close to the US$ 8 million.
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3.3.2.2 Delay costs of departure flights to SFO
The same procedure has been performed to compute the delay cost of departure
flights to SFO during the 4 day period of study. In the case of departure flights,
the average load factor estimates that BTS provides are summarized in table 3.6.
Figure 3.6: SFO departure flights load factor estimates in July 2013.
Once the average load factors are defined, the total estimated delay hours can
be computed. The results are displayed in table 3.7.
Figure 3.7: Departure flight delay hours in the 4 day period of study.
Analogously to section 3.3.2.1 , it can be computed the departure flights’ dealy
costs by multiplying the passenger cost of delay per total passenger delay hours.
Thus, the total delay costs of departure flights for the 4 day period of study are:
Figure 3.8: Departure flight delay costs in the 4 day period of study.
28
3 – Cost Evaluation
3.3.2.3 Summary of delay costs
After computing separately the cost of arrival flights’ delays and departure
flights’ delays, one can now conclude that the total costs of delays triggered by
Asiana crash disruption are:
Total cost of delays = $ 13.64 Million (3.1)
3.3.3 Cancellation costs evaluation
3.3.3.1 Cancellation costs estimates
Flight cancellations are costly to both airlines and air passengers, and although
many attempts have been made to try to empirically value the cost of a flight
cancellation, there is still few published literature that quantifies this value. This
study will assess the cost of cancellation from Airlines and Passengers point of
view. Both cost components will be then aggregated to compute a total cost of
cancellations.
Regarding the Airlines point of view, Banavar Sridar, stated in his presentation
at the National Center of Excellence for Aviation Operations Research Conference
in 2007 [8], that one cancellation is equivalent to between 200 and 300 minutes
of delay in terms of cost. Furthermore, Hansen et al. stated in [9] how Metron
Aviation in 2006 (Metron Project Report, unpublished) assigned $ 6.000 per flight
as the cost of flight cancellation in an unpublished report. Finally, Hansen et al.
compute in [9] a cost of cancellation to be worth $ 4,977, assuming the cost of
ground delays to be $ 30 dollars.
As there is no empirical basis of which approach is more correct, this study
will assume that the value reported by Merton serves as an upper bound for the
cancellation cost value, whilst the value proposed by Hansen et al. will serve as
a lower bound. Therefore, the cancellation cost value from airlines point of view
will be considered to be of $ 5488.50 per flight.
In the case of passengers point of view, and according to Sridar estimation,
it will be assumed that each flight cancellation impacts in between 200 to 300
minutes of delay. For the following calculations, it will be assumed that every
cancelled flight is comparable to 250 delay minutes, and the passenger value of
time will be used to compute the total passenger cancellation costs.
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3.3.3.2 Cancellation costs of arrival flights to SFO
Airline cancellation costs: In section 3.3.3.1 it has been concluded how
the cancellation cost value from airlines point of view will be considered to be of
$ 5488.50 per flight. Acording to this estimation, the following figure shows the
calculation of the airline cancellation costs, taking into account all the cancelled
flights during the 4 day period of study.
Figure 3.9: Arrival flight cancellation costs in the 4 day period of study.
Passenger cancellation costs: In the case of the passenger cancellation
cost component, in section 3.3.3.1 it has been concluded how the cancellation cost
value from passengers point of view will be considered to be equivalent to 250 delay
minutes. Having in mind that the passenger value of time has been estimated to
be $ 28.6, the total passenger cancellation costs can be computed. The following
figure shows the calculation of the passenger cancellation costs, taking into account
all the cancelled flights during the 4 day period of study:
Figure 3.10: Arrival flight passenger cancellation costs in the 4 day period of study.
Once both cancellation cost components have been computed for the arrival
cancelled flights, the total arrival cancellation costs can be computed by aggregat-
ing both cost components:
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Total cost of arrival cancellations = $ 6,80 Million (3.2)
3.3.3.3 Cancellation costs of departure flights from SFO
Airline cancellation costs: Analogously to the calculation for arrival flights,
in this section the cancellation cost value from airlines point of view will be con-
sidered to be of $ 5488.50 per flight. Acording to this estimation, the following
figure shows the calculation of the airline cancellation costs, taking into account
all the cancelled departure flights during the 4 day period of study.
Figure 3.11: Departure flight cancellation costs in the 4 day period of study.
Passenger cancellation costs: In the case of the passenger cancellation
cost component, in section 3.3.3.1 it has been concluded how the cancellation cost
value from passengers point of view will be considered to be equivalent to 250 delay
minutes. Having in mind that the passenger value of time has been estimated to
be $ 28.6, the total passenger cancellation costs can be computed. Figure 3.12
shows the calculation of the passenger cancellation costs:
Figure 3.12: Departure flight passenger cancellation costs in the 4 day period of
study.
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Once both cancellation cost components have been computed for the arrival
cancelled flights, the total arrival cancellation costs can be computed by aggregat-
ing both cost components:
Total cost of departure cancellations = $ 8,23 Million (3.3)
3.3.3.4 Summary of cancellation costs
After computing separately the cost of arrival flight and departure flight can-
cellations, it can now be concluded that the total costs of cancellations triggered
by Asiana crash disruption are:
Total cost of cancellations = $ 15.03 Million (3.4)
3.3.4 Diversion costs evaluation
Flight diversions are a common and expensive disruptive element of flight oper-
ations, costing at least 300 Million $ of dollars annually for US carriers for domestic
flights alone. The cost of diversions though can considerably differs depending on
the point in which the flight is in his journey. Jenkins & Cotton state in [10] how
diversion costs can range from $15.000 for a narrow-body domestic flight, to over
$ 100.000 for a wide-body international flight.
Depending on the position in the scheduled route of the flight, the aircraft might
be severly overweighted for landing, due to a too high fuel load, or it may have
been flying for too long and at the point of the diverted landing must be replaced
or inspected, or what’s more the crew extra-hours force them to be replaced or
to overnight in a hotel, due to FAA crew schedule legislations. For instance, a
single passenger unstable behaviour forced a Qantas flight to be diverted in 2012,
costing the airline $ 120.000, as the aircraft had to dump 60.000 litres of fuel before
being able to land filled up with 350 passengers, as informed by the the Australian
Federal Police.
Furthermore, high-end airlines may want to make this unpleasent situation for
their passengers the least disruptive, by issuing free meal vouchers and overnights
at closer hotels, so that passengers can wait to be rebooked comfortably. For
instant, after the Asiana crash some airlines like Delta or United Airlines offered
such amenities. For instance, the News10 from ABC featured the 6th of July [11]
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an article stating how Delta and United Airlines Delta Airlines arranged taxi and
shuttle services for passengers to get to San Francisco after their planes were forced
to land in Sacramento. Quoting from the article, "They’re paying for everything
- Delta is. For everybody on our flight, so they’re taking care of us," said Delta
passenger Shawn Scott, who was flying from Atlanta to SFO on a family vacation."
An unpleasant diversion journey may trigger severe irritations within the airline
customers, damaging their punctuality and customer relationship image. There-
fore, airlines may implement measures to reduce this perceived insatisfaction, and
thus increasing considerably the amount allocated to reroute their passengers.
3.3.4.1 Diversion costs of arrival flights
If one recalls from chapter 2, there were a total of 119 diverted flights from the
6th to 9th of July 2013, from which a 38% could not reach their final destination
SFO. Figure 3.13 summarizes the diverted flights distribution during the 4-day
period of study:
Figure 3.13: Number of diverted flights during the 4 day period of study.
In order to do a more accurate estimation of the cost evaluation of the ASIANA
crash, two cost components should be distinguished: Airline cost component and
the Passengers cost component.
Airline cost component:
Concerning the ASIANA crash cost evaluation, within this study it was decided
to assume an average of $ 25.000 per diverted flight that could not reach their final
destination (SFO). Furthermore, diverted flights reaching the alternatively the Bay
Area (SJC or OAK), will be assumed to have an operational cost negligible. The
same cost value has been given to the flights that were diverted to alternative
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airports, but could reach SFO, as the delays triggered have been already taken
into account in the delays cost evaluation.
One can now compute the total costs of these diverted flights acording to the
diverted flight distribution shown in 3.13. Table 3.14 shows the computed results:
Figure 3.14: Cost of the diverted flights during the 4 day period of study.
Therefore, one can conclude how the total cost of arrival flights from the Air-
craft point of view is $600.000 dollars.
Passengers cost component:
Following the distinction made in figure 3.14 separating the diverted flights
that finally reached SFO from those who couldn’t, it will be assessed first the
diversion cost of the passengers that could finally reach SFO. These passengers,
although they were diverted, they could reach SFO with the same flight, therefore
they only perceived delays. The diversion cost for these first type of passengers
has been computed tracking their flight delays and multiplying per the estimated
load of the flight.
Cost of diversions =
∑
f
Flight_Delayf × Estimated_Flight_Loadf =
= 32.146 (hours) · 28.6 ($ · hour) = $ 919.376
(3.5)
In the case of the cost of passengers who could not reach SFO within the same
flight, it was decided within the research project to draw three hypothesis, in order
to be able to estimate the total cost of diversions:
• The 100% of the diverted passengers are assumed to have SFO as final des-
tination, even if OAK or SJC are closer airports to their end-of-journey
destination.
34
3 – Cost Evaluation
• The passengers are rerouted back to SFO with surface means of transport.
It was assumed within the resaearch project an average speed of 1 mile per
minute for surface means of transport.
• The passengers diverted to airports within more than 400 miles of driving
distance to SFO will not be rerouted by surface means of transport, thus
these diverted flights will be estimated as cancelled flights in terms of cost.
The flight distances between SFO and the airports that absorbed diversions
on the 4 day period of study have been computed, in order to distinguish which
assumption apply to every diversion case. First, table 3.15 shows the diverted
airports within less than 400 miles driving distance to SFO.
Figure 3.15: Diverted airports within less than 400 miles from SFO.
All the diverted aiports in table 3.15 are located within less than 400 miles
driving distance from SFO, thus a rerouting through surface means of transport
would be feasible. In this case, the total cost of diversion has been computed as
the total travel time of the diverted passengers multiplied per the passenger value
of time. The results are as summarized in table 3.16:
Figure 3.16: Cost of diversion for airports located within less than 400 miles from
SFO.
The second grouping of airports includes the diverted airports located within
more than 400 miles from SFO. In this case, the diversion costs, as explained
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previously in the assumptions, will be considered to be equiparable to a cancelled
flight. Therefore, as seen in section 3.3.3.3, these flights will have the cost of $
5.489 per flight. Table 3.17 shows the total costs of this second group of diverted
flights:
Figure 3.17: Diverted airports within more than 400 miles from SFO.
Now, the total diversion costs can be computed as the sum of the passenger
and aircraft cost components:
Total cost of arrival diverted flights = $1.368.317 (3.6)
3.3.4.2 Diversion costs of departure flights
During the 4 day period of study, 44 flights that departured from SFO were
diverted to other airports. In this case, as the destination of the diverted flights is
not the trully disrupted airport, it is difficult to assess to which extent the flights
were diverted due to Asiana crash impact on their operational performance, or if
otherwise was result of another external factors. Thus, as it is not accurate to
allocate this cost to Asiana crash, they will not be computed as part of the cost
impact of the crash. Furthermore, all the 44 flights were able to reach their final
destination within the same day, and thus their cost has been included only as
delay costs.
3.4 Cost evaluation summary
The total cost of Asiana Crash disruption in the network can be now computed
as the sum of the total Cost of Delays, the total Cost of Cancellations and finally
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the total Cost of Diversions. The following figure summarizes these three values,
in order to have a sense of the dimension of each cost component in relation to the
others.
Figure 3.18: Summary of cost evaluation.
The computation performed in 3.3 has shown how the cost of delays accounted
for a 45 % of the total cost, the cost of cancellations accounted for a 50%, and the
diverted flights accounted for a 5% of the disruption costs. This is due to the fact
that most of the flights were cancelled instead of diverted or delayed on the ground.
The accident happened on a Saturday, and as the airline officers expressed, the
flights were highly booked, making the reaccomodation of passengers difficult.
Furthermore, the evaluation performed is an underestimation of the real costs
that airlines and passengers perceived, as it is based on BTS data base schedules,
where no international flights are included. Additionally, the diversions costs have
been computed without taking into account the reaccomodation costs that the
airlines had to unexpectedly face, and that are very difficult to track. Nevertheless,
the figures already gives us a reasonable estimate of how the closing of the SFO
runways for long hours triggered costly consequences for the airlines operating in
SFO.
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Chapter 4
Research motivation: Inter-modal
rerouting of diverted passengers
There is many research performed in flight delay management, or optimisation
of aircraft and crew schedulings, but few research has been on passenger-centric
recovery from highly disruptive situations. Until great disruption events as the
Eyjafjallajokull volcanic eruption in 2010, the low frequency of highly disruptive
situations supported the fact that few researchers focused in the efficient handling
of these situations. Nevertheless, as the airlines’ trend is to optimise the flight
schedules to leave the minimum idle time possible, when such huge disruptions
occur, airlines are surpassed, ressources are inefficiently allocated, and the impact
of the disruption snowballs becoming very costly for airlines.
This master thesis research started with the analysis of Asiana Crash impact
on schedules, as well as an economic estimation of the costs triggered by the
crash. As explained in Chapter 2, 9.770 passengers were diverted the 6th of July,
4.260 on the 7th and aproximtely 1.470 on the 8th and 9th of July. Only a
21% of these passengers could reach their final destination SFO with the same
flight. These are large numbers, but could have been greater if airlines hadn’t
cancelled the major part of scheduled departure flights. After digging how the
crisis was handled, the news showed how the disruption left most of the diverted
passengers unattended and uninformed, waiting for the airline representatives to
figure out how to reaccomodate them urgently. Twitter quickly started to be the
most updated channel of information for passengers:
As seen previously, most of the flights were diverted to either SJC, OAK, or
to the closest hubs to SFO (SEA, LAX, PHX). The problem arised when flights
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Figure 4.1: First tweets informing about the SFO situation.
started to be forced to land in airports in which they don’t operate. That was the
case of a United Airlines flight from Seattle, that ended being diverted in Oakland.
Willit News [12] interviewed the 6th of July 2013 some of these passengers: "We
were dumped here," the man said. "United has no support here. They sent a
dislocation team, but basically what they keep saying is: "You’re dislocated." The
officials said they had to bring extra staff to accommodate all those passengers
that were landing at the same time.
Figure 4.2: Tweets informing about the flight diversions.
Additionally, some passengers were diverted to airports where their airline op-
erates at low frequency. For instance, at the Virgin America counter of Seattle
Tacoma International Airport on the 6th of July, Seattle Times [13] describes
how customer-service representative Jody Devereaux collected traveler names and
phone numbers so the airline could rebook or cancel flights without the people
standing line. "Just to cause them less stress," Devereaux said. She advised trav-
elers that the quickest option to get home would be to rebook through another
carrier and obtain a refund, as "the soonest flights on Virgin America will be Mon-
day or Tuesday". Although being notified that waiting times could reach the two
days, passengers argued they had no extra money to purchase new flights and be
refunded later, causing them a lot of stress. Seattle Times reported the 6th of July
[3], "We don’t really have $500 to buy another ticket and wait for a refund" the
couple said, as they were flying to Dulles International Airport on their way home.
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CBS news [14] published how in Sacramento, although being less than 100
miles from SFO, the people waited for hours uninformed, queueing around help
desks waiting for airline representatives to inform about the rerouting options.
CBS News reported the witness of a couple, "We were not even aware of what
had happened until someone on the flight was able to turn on the cell phone.",
and how they also said "Our carrier had no information whatsoever. Basically we
were booted off the plane and with no direction whatsoever." Such witnessess sup-
port the fact that airlines had no systematic rerouting scheme for such disruptive
situation.
Furthermore, ABC Eyewitness News [15] informed about the situation in LAX,
explaining that, as Asiana Crash happened on a Saturday, the Airlines were fully
booked, and thus the rerouting of passengers was impossible. "Sunday’s flights
between LAX and SFO are heavily booked due to the combination of holiday
weekend and peak summer travel. It is expected the airlines will need one or two
days to catch up on the backlog of canceled flights.", adding also that "The route
between LAX and SFO is very busy, served by seven airlines including American,
Delta, United, United Express, Virgin, US Airways and Southwest. But Satur-
day night’s cancellations are making a big disruption for travelers on this holiday
weekend. Some travelers will spend the night in L.A." In conclusion, the news
informed how even in the route LAX - SFO, that is served by seven airlines, the
quick reaccomodation of passengers was impossible, and that therefore passangers
may had to wait even for two days.
The few information that airlines delivered, added to the highy booked situation
at the diverted airports, made the passengers perceive a very stressful and irritating
situation. The caotic situation that the shutdown of the two main SFO runways
triggered, made the schedules collapse around SFO, and the cancellations were
increasing. At that point, some airlines decided to implement first inter-modal
operational measures, placing buses and taxis to reroute their passengers, but
they did so in a ineffective and non-collaborative way between ground and air
networks.
For instance, ABC Eyewitness News reported some inter-modal rerouting mea-
sures that some airlines took for LAX diverted passengers. Quoting from [15],
"Airlines that canceled flights between LAX and SFO are making arrangements
for passengers, including rebooking flights, adding special flights if aircraft are
available, bussing passengers to SFO, putting up passengers in airport-area hotels
and asking passengers to return to LAX on Sunday." Additionally, they explained
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Figure 4.3: Tweets reporting inter-modal rerouting.
how although the inter-modal rerouting saved passengers from spending the night
in the diverted airports, many of them were disappointed for the disorganized and
discentralized way in which they were assigned to the modes.
Therefore, after analysing how airlines started to implement first insights of
inter-modalism in the rerouting of diverted passengers, the scope of the research
was narrowed to try to develop a cost-effective model that may serve as first start
for a decision-making support tool to determine the inter-modal rerouting pas-
sengers. The work presented in this master thesis explains the state of the art
in inter-modal operations in the airline industry, analyses the operational isues of
inter-modal rerouting, and offers two mathematical models to optimise the cost
of reroutings in a passenger-centric way. The first model is an airport-pairs opti-
misation model, and has been implemented on a real set of data corresonding to
the Asiana Crash period of study. The second optimisation model, attached in
the Annex, expands the first model to a whole network level. Its implementation
has not been performed, reason why it has been proposed as a possible path for
further research in this topic.
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Chapter 5
Operational issues in airlines
inter-modal operations
5.1 Introduction
In order to correctly implement inter-modal strategies for the rerouting of pas-
sengers as proposed in this study, several fundamental issues need to be considered.
The goals of this chapter are to identify these issues, assess their importance, deter-
mine the difficulties that might arise, and suggest solutions based on preliminary
investigation.
In the current Asiana Crash case study, two possible inter-modal implementa-
tions have been taken into account for the rerouting of diverted passengers.
• Approach I: Partial inter-modal substitution. The substitution of
modes is applied when the diverted passengers land in the alternative airports
in the Bay Area, where they do a short commute to travel to SFO by surface
means of transport.
• Approach II: Complete inter-modal substitution. The substitution
is executed straight from the diverted airport. The diverted passengers are
transported back to SFO by surface means of transport.
The chapter will first analyse the state of the art in inter-modal transporta-
tion in the airline industry, then explain the results obtained in a survey to SFO
customers about their modes of transportation, followed by an analysis of the Ap-
proach I and Approach II implementations at SFO, and finally the assessment of
further operational issues in inter-modal substitution.
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5.2 Previous literature in integration of multi-
modal operations in the airline industry
The Eyjafjallajokull volcanic eruption in 2010 had such an impact on aviation
that it also had a series of knock-on effects on other modes of transportation.
These can be explained by the rigidity and complex nature of transport networks,
as well as by the lack of appropriate preparation. Since then, academia has started
to realize the importance of the integration within transportation modes, in order
to be able to absorbe the permanently increasing demand in the airline industry.
For instance, the partial substitution of some short-haul flights with High Speed
Rail transport, either through modal competition or complementarity, is already
in place in four Eouropean hubs (Frankfurt Main, Paris CDG, Madrid Barajas,
Amsterdam Schipol).
Intermodality must be understood in the work proposed here, as the use of sev-
eral transport modes in one trip when the transport modes are coordinated thanks
to an adequate intermodal infrastructure, and intermodal agreements concluded
by transport operators. Marzuoli et al. [16] particularizes how at an airport level,
it can be distinguished two different types of intermodality:
• Airport Access Intermodality: when the use of the land transport (bus,
tramway, train, etc.) aims at linking the airport to the city center, usually
a short commute.
• Network Integration Intermodality: when the use of the land transport
is in the scope of the airport integration in the regional or national network of
the landside transport modes (High-Speed train, etc.). Related to including
the airport in a multimodal network linking to centers.
Airport Access Intermodality is widely implemented nowadays, as most of the
airports have put efforts to integrate rail transportation and shuttle bus services
to efficiently connect airports with the city centers. These measures have helped
to reduce congestion in roads close to the airports, as a result of the permently in-
creasing air transportation demand, and have enabled to smoothly link airports to
the real final destination of the passengers. Nevertheless, the problem of Network
Integration Intermodality has started to be tackled recently, as it is difficult for
the airline industry to clearly understand the benefits of integrating competitor
modes of transport to its network.
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In order to try to understand how airlines may react to a change in demand
towards surface means of transport, Janic [17] shows that High Speed Rail sub-
stitutive capacity does not act as a barrier to developing air/rail substitutions
at the airport. Furthermore, he states how a modest substitution may produce
substantial savings in airline costs and passenger delays. Furthermore, Steel et
al. [18] pose the problem of predicting the changes in passenger demand between
different modes of transports during a disturbance of one or more of its systems.
Their research develops a simplified dual-mode UK transport model using system
dynamics and recent data, to test responses to disturbances.
Few research has been performed to try determine a feasible and efficent in-
tegration of ground and air transportation. For instance, Zhang et al. [19] build
a supernetwork, where the networks for different modalities are integrated. They
distinguish road, rail, air, water transportation as well as private (e.g. foot, bike,
car) or public modes (e.g. bus, train, tram, metro). The authors tested their tool
for the Eindhoven region with success. Furthermore, Hsu [20] develops a simple
model to represent the transfer waiting time for a connecting service at multi-
modal stations, where waiting time takes into account the characteristics of both
the connecting service and its feeder service. The Results show that transfer wait-
ing times is mostly affected by the capacities and headways of the connecting and
feeder services.
Finally, Zhang [21] performed a thorough research to assess the effectiveness
of integrating surface modes of transport to connect spokes to hubs in a Hub-
and-Spoke network. Zhang interviewed with representatives at United Airlines
and American Airlines, to analyse when did these airlines find optimal to apply
inter-modal strategies. She found for instance, how in Chicago O’Hare (ORD),
if flights with destiantions close to ORD were cancelled, passengers would be re-
accommodated on buses to avoid staying at the terminal overnight, or even longer
when snowstorms are sever at ORD. The direct cost of hiring buses, as estimated
by the customer relation division, is equivalent to the cost of providing discount
vouchers for hotel accommodations and reassigning passengers on later flights, and
additionally saves passengers from an unpleasant enlargment of their trip. Fur-
thermore, at UA’s LAX hub, when thunderstorms lead to cancellations of flights
out of the airport, the station occasionally hires buses to transport passengers to
San Diego (SAN), two hours from LAX. As in the case of ORD, buses are used so
that passengers do not have to stay at the terminal overnight.
Additonally, Zhang reports how American Airlines (AA) implemented in March
2007 inter-modal reroutings, due to a sever thunderstorm passing through Dallas
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FortWorth International Airport (DFW). Because of the cancellation, there would
be no protected space for several days and buses became the best option. AA set
up pseudo flight numbers for the buses and the passengers were booked according
to first-landing-in-first-out. As a result of the experience, they intend to make it
a more formal part of the off-schedule operations (OSO) planning package with
detailed procedures on how to handle similar situations.
It is reasonable to decide to use buses in highly disruptive situations, never-
theless, airlines are performing reactively in these cases, without a systematic way
to integrate airfield and ground operations. The mathematical programming pro-
posed here aims to offer a optimization modal that may serve as a future tool to
ensure a cost-efficient network integration of inter-modal operations in the rerout-
ing of diverted passengers, after highly disruptive situations.
5.3 Customer survey on transportation modes
at SFO
5.3.1 Modes of transportation to SFO
To assess the mode of transport that best fits the travelers expectatives, and
thus that would impact the least in their delay perception, two surveys that were
done to SFO passengers in the year 2009 and 2011 have been analysed. The
surveys asked for the mode of transport with which they had arrived to SFO. It
will be assumed that the passengers who arrived at SFO use the same modes of
transport as those who fly from SFO. Therefore, the survey results will help to
disentangle which surface modes of transports are more commonly used within
SFO customers.
In the following table, reprinted from one of the reports of A. Ucko at the
Institute of Transportation Studies of UC Berkeley, it is summarized the modes of
transport used by the passengers interviewed.
Please have in mind that there were differences in the survey response options
between 2009 and 2011, and although in some cases the responses do not match
the same modes, the survey it is still a useful indicator of how the SFO customers
are used to arrive or leave the airport.
As one can observe, the highest percentage (26%) corresponds to passengers
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Figure 5.1: Survey to SFO passengers on arrival modes of transport.
that were dropped off at SFO. Only around a 8,5% of the passengers, both in
2009 and 2011, used Bay Area Rapid Transport (BART) as mode of transport
to reach SFO. Very few passengers, only a 0,08% of the passengers use another
public transit other than Bay Area Rapid Transport (BART). Finally, a total of
approximately 16% use either door-to-door van services, private scheduled bus or
free hotel shuttle. That means, a 16% of the SFO customers are used to involve
a motor coach transport as part of their journeys when they fly from or to SFO.
Additionally, it is also interesting to see how only an average of 20% of the inter-
viewed passengers were connecting passengers.
From these two surveys one can infer three main conclusions:
• The most used mode of transport are private cars.
• The preferred public surface mode of transport is Bay Area Rapid Transport
(BART) service.
• Private motor coaches or shuttle bus are also highly used by SFO passengers
to reach the airport.
Therefore, it can be concluded how the use of private motor-coaches or train
vouchures will impact in a low extent the customers travel routines, and there-
fore are suitable modes of transport to be assessed in the inter-modal rerouting
proposed in this study.
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5.3.2 Final destination of SFO arrival passengers
One of the important things that one has to assess when diverting flights to
the Bay Area, is how many of the diverted passengers must actually go to SFO.
SFO is the greatest hub in the Bay Area, and consequently with wider range of
flight options. Reason why some of the passengers might be forced to take flights
from SFO although they may live closer to the other 2 alternative airports in the
Bay Area.
The following figure shows the county distribution in the Bay Area, in order
to have a better reference of possible passenger final destinations:
Figure 5.2: Bay Area counties’ distribution.
For instance, passengers that started their journeys from Santa Clara or Alameda
would rather prefer to stay in OAK or SJC than having to go back to SFO. The
same situation would happen to passengers from Contra Costa, Solano, Napa or
Sonoma, as if being diverted to OAK that would leave them closer to their final
destinations.
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The SFO customer survey of 2011 also reported the county from which passen-
gers departed to go to SFO. Again, it will be assumed that the origin county of the
passengers it is also their trip’s final destination. The following table, borrowed
from [22], shows the results from the 2011 SFO survey regarding passengers trips’
origin.
Figure 5.3: Results of the survey to SFO customers asking for their departure
county.
The first thing one can notice is that most of the people had to go to San
Francisco once they arrived in SFO, a 36% of the interviewed passengers. Another
additional 10% had to go to San Mateo, which is the county where SFO is located
in, thus having to go back to SFO would not disturb their journey. One can
also observe how 20% of the passengers were connecting passengers, which will
have to go to SFO to catch their connecting flight. Finally, there is about a 20% of
passengers which have Alameda, Santa Clara or Contra Costa as final destinations.
These counties are the counties where the two alternative airports (SJC and OAK)
are located in, reason why is very likely that these passengers would not want to
be rerouted back to SFO. Only a 7% of the passengers will travel to Napa, Marin
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and Sonoma, which are counties from similar distance to SFO than to OAK.
In order to ensure mathematical simplicity, it will be assumed in the model
that all the passengers that have been squeezed into flights to SJC and OAK
will be transported back to SFO. Nevertheless, further implementations should
take into account that only an average 80% of the squeezed passengers should
be transported back to SFO. The estimation has been computed based on the
fact that a 20% would prefer to stay in either SJC or OAK and go back to their
destination counties by their own means of transport.
5.4 Approach I: Partial inter-modal substitution
As it has been explained previously, the first approach consists in implementing
the inter-modal substitution when the diverted passengers reach the Bay Area.
This approach involves the passengers being ferried to OAK or SJC, and then
transported to SFO by surface means of transport. For this first approach, as
mentioned in the assumption made in 5.3.1, two possibilities of modes of transport
exist: Public and Private transportation. According to this distinction, each type
of transportation in the Bay Area will be assessed.
5.4.1 Public transportation within the Bay Area
One of the most critical aspects when considering the rerouting of diverted
passengers through the Bay Area which is the best way of transporting passengers
from one airport to another. An inefficient handling of the transition between
airports would increase the irritation of the customers, and therefore increase the
disruption perceiveness, negatively affecting airlines to a greater extent.
In the case that, for instance, a high percentage of the passengers are rerouted
back to SFO through the Bay Area, and once at either SJC or OAK are given
all taxi vouchers, close to 5.000 passengers would enter the road network, creating
large traffic jams and long taxi waiting times. Therefore, the focus will be to look
at the public transportation options that passengers may want to consider once in
the Bay Area, in order to reduce the road network disruption impact.
As one can see in the figure 5.4 displayed above, there are two main rail public
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Figure 5.4: BART system network.
transits connecting SFO and the alternative airports in the Bay Area, SJC and
OAK.
Caltrain is serving the west and south part of the Bay, thus efficiently con-
necting SFO with SJC. On the other hand, one can see BART serving the north
and east part of the Bay, therefore most efficiently connecting SFO with OAK.
Now can be assessed which would be the passengers journeys from each airport
individually.
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5.4.1.1 Public transport connection between SFO and OAK
As previously stated, the public trail service best connecting SFO and OAK is
the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART). This heavy-rail public transit and subway
system connects San Francisco with cities in the East Bay and suburbs in northern
San Mateo County. Bay Area Rapid Transport (BART) operates five routes on
104 miles (167 km) of line, with 44 stations in four counties.
As one can observe in figure 5.4, there is no possibility of going from SFO
Intl. Airport to OAK Intl. Airport without transfering between Bay Area Rapid
Transport (BART) lines and Airport shuttle bus services. Therefore, starting from
Oakland International Airport terminal, the trip that passengers would have to
follow if using Bay Area Rapid Transport (BART) network is presented below:
Figure 5.5: BART journey to connect OAK with SFO.
As stated in figure 5.5, the trip would take an estimated time of 1 hour and 26
min (conditional upon real waiting times), could be done with 15 min frequency,
and has a total fare of 12,40$ per passenger. Now, the capacity of the lines and
estimated load factors will be computed, and thus it will be assessed the impact
that the use of this mode of transport by diverted passengers could have in the
Bay Area Rapid Transport (BART) operational performance.
The average number of passengers is 373,945 passengers during week days, an
average of 176,616 passengers on Saturdays, and 119,247 passengers on Sundays,
according to data recorded in January 2013. The maximum number of stuck
diverted passengers per day was 7,371 passengers on the 6th of July, as shown
in Chapter 2. The 6th of July of 2013 was a Saturday, meaning that on the 6th
of July, Bay Area Rapid Transport (BART) was serving an estimate number of
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176,616 passengers.
Assuming that passengers are aproximetly evenly distributed through the 5
BART lines, that would mean that 35,300 passengers would be using the Pittsburg-
SFO line (Yellow in figure 5.4) and the Richmond-Millbrae line (Green in figure
5.4) during that day. Finally, one should have in mind that during week days
the same lines would serve more than the double of passengers (74,800 passen-
gers each line). Therefore, even if all the 7,371 passengers were diverted through
OAK during the whole day, and then sent to SFO through Bay Area Rapid Trans-
port (BART) lines, that would not disturb the operational performance due to
remaining capacity.
5.4.1.2 Public transport connection between SFO and SJC
As previously stated, the public rail service that offers the best connection
between SFO and SJC is Caltrain. Caltrain is a California commuter rail line
serving the San Francisco Peninsula and in the Santa Clara Valley (Silicon Valley).
The north end of the line is San Francisco, at 4th and King streets; whilst its south
end is Gilroy.
The Caltrain departures’ frequency in the area of interest, San Francisco and
San Jose, are about hourly on weekdays, and more frequently during commute
hours or sporting events.
One can see in figure 5.6 how the connection between SFO and SJC is done
through the same Caltrain line, with the only transfers to the Airport shuttle
buses. Therefore, starting from Mineta San Jose International Airport terminal,
the trip that passengers would have to follow if they are rerouted using public
transportation vouchers is presented below:
As stated in figure 5.7, the trip would take a total time of 1 hour and 53 min
(conditional upon real waiting times), could be started with 30 minutes frequency,
and has a tota estimated fare of 11,25$ per passenger. The total travel time in the
case of the connection between SJC and SFO could fluctuate more, as Caltrain
service varies depending on the hour of the day and the day of the week, and thus
it may force the passengers to take another similar route. In any case, travel time
may raise up to 2h and 10 or 20 min, which would not make much of a difference.
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Figure 5.6: BART system network.
Figure 5.7: Passengers journey to connect SJC with SFO.
Now, finding the capacity of the Caltrain line described, as well as its estimated
load factors, and thus assess the impact that the use of this mode of transport by
diverted passengers could have in the Bay Area Rapid Transport (BART) opera-
tional performance.
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According to the findings on Caltrain passenger counts issued in February 2013
[23], the weekday ridership averaged 47,060 passengers, with ridership at Bullet
stations making up 83.5% of total boardings. The maximum number of stuck
diverted passengers per day was 7,371 passengers on the 6th of July, as shown in
Chapter 2. The 6th of July of 2013 was a Saturday, meaning on that day Caltrain
was serving estimately a 40% less passengers than during business days, making
up an estimate number of 28,236 passengers using the Caltrain line on the 6th of
July.
The maximum number of stuck diverted passengers per day was 7,371 passen-
gers on the 6th of July, as shown previously in Chapter 2. Even if all the 7,371
passengers were diverted through OAK during the whole day, and they would be
send to SFO through Caltrain Limited or Baby Bullet lines, that would mean an
increase in demand of 26%, not even reaching the number of passengers using the
line during weekdays. Therefore, one can conclude that it is not likely that the
rerouting of the passengers through the Caltrain would disturb the operational
performance of the train.
5.4.2 Private transportation within the Bay Area
In the case of private transportation, as shown figure 5.3, the survey made to
SFO passenges showed that the most used modes of transport were; shuttle buses
or hotel private motor coaches (16% of the interviewed passengers) and private car
drop-offs (26% of the passengers).
Translating these results into possibilities of airlines’ operational measures, the
most convenient mode of handling the private surface mode of transport rerouting
would be by offering a motor-coach service. Passengers are used to involve this
mode of transport as part of their flight trips, and thus the perceived delay would
be probably lower.
5.4.2.1 Analysis of charter companies in the Bay Area.
As discussed in 5.6.1, the alternative that seems more feasible for airlines
to implement is alternative 3. Then, if airlines outsource the operation to local
companies, contracting them for the inter-modal services in an on-call basis, the
ability of such companies to respond in a timely manner to requests for service,
wich will be evidently urgent and unpredictable, is critical.
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The first thing one must assess is how many charter companies offer such service
in the Bay Area, understand the type of buses that can best substitute airlines’
arrivals, and finally determine which will be the time impact of the substitution
in passengers trips. In the following table 5.8 it is summarized the number of
charter companies offering 3 different types of buses, as well as the quantity of
buses available and rental fees.
Please notice how some costs were not available, as well as that the range of
passenger capacity for each type of motor-coach may vary within areas.
Figure 5.8: Charter companies offering motor-coaches in the Bay Area.
The table 5.8 lists 3 categories of motor-coaches, and their existing offer for
each type of motor-coach, (last accessed in June 2014). The charter companies
have been grouped in the following 3 areas:
• Area 1: San Jose, Santa Clara and South Bay area.
• Area 2: San Francisco and San Mateo.
• Area 3: Oakland, Concord and Stockton.
Please notice how the charter companies located in counties within less than
50 miles of any of the 3 airports of the Bay Area have been allocated to serve
their closest airport. Furthermore, the charter companies located in Area 2 (San
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Francisco and San Mateo), in case of inter-modal substitution, could attend both
Oakland and San Jose airports demands.
The 3 types of bus that have been considered are: Minibuses, Charter Buses
and Limobuses or Executive Buses.
The sitting capacity of Minibuses ranges from 21 to 37 people, depending on
the charter company. Charter buses have higher capacity, ranging from 36 to 58
passengers. Finally, Limobuses or Executive buses range from 21 to 45 passengers
capacity. All motor-coaches types have shelf and belly space to accomodate lug-
gage. Restrooms, air conditioning, Public adress systems and TV/DVD are current
standard equipement also. Some of them dispose of Satellite TV on board and
WiFi service, although not so widely spread. The difference between minibuses
and Charter buses does not reside in the service quality, as the ammenities of-
fered in both are considerably similar, but in the passengers capacity. Limobuses
and Executive buses though are customized to enhance the passengers experience.
Plush perimeter seating, tables shared by 2 to 4 passengers, individual TV mon-
itors, and on-board concierge to serve drinks are some of the special features of
this high-end type of buses offered.
In order to have an overview of the number of motor-coaches offered of each
type in the Bay Area as a whole, the following table summarizes the results sorted
by type of bus. Furthermore, an estimation has been made of the number of pas-
sengers that could be rerouted, assuming all the motor-coaches are used (none was
already booked), and using an estimated average passenger capacity per motor-
coach type.
Figure 5.9: Summary of the motor-coach charter service in the Bay Area.
As one can observe, assuming alternative 3 implies that local charter companies
would be contracted under the condition that they should supply service whenever
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the inter-modal operations are needed, and thus, that all of them would be avail-
able, the maximum number of reroutable passengers would be 16,895 passenger,
which is more than sufficient. If one recalls from Chapter 2, the maximum num-
ber of stuck diverted passengers were 7,371 passengers. Additionally, one must
have in mind that the the diversions occurred along the whole afternoon of the
6th of July, and that the flights that were able to reach SFO didn’t arrive at the
same time. Therefore, it can be inferred how all the diverted passengers rerouted
through the Bay Area would not reach the Bay at the same time period,and thus
can be concluded that the current charter service offer in the Bay would be more
than sufficient to reroute all the diverted passengers.
5.4.2.2 Cost evaluation of private transportation
After analysing the private transportation in the Bay Area, and concluding that
there is enough offer to meet airlines’ unpredicted inter-modal service requests, one
can now set the cost evaluation. The following table shows the costs of charter
buses contracting for the 3 areas distinguished in the Bay Area:
Figure 5.10: Summary of the motor coach charter service costs.
One can observe how the renting prices vary within the Area. The row ’Total’
of table 5.10 computes a weighted average cost per day for each type of motor
coach offered. Therefore, and in order to simplify the mathematical modeling,
the motor coaches offers will be aggregated, without taking into account to which
charter company they belong, nor their exact renting fee. Thus, the cost of renting
motor coaches per passenger and day are as follow:
Figure 5.11: Motor coach service costs per passenger.
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As it can be seen, the cost per passenger of renting a Minibus and a Charter
Bus are very similar, as they offer the same ammenities. As expected, Executive
Buses and Limobuses offer a higher level of comfort, and therefore have a higher
cost per passenger. Furthermore, one can see in figure 5.10 how the number of
executive limobuses offered is really small (only a 5%), compared to the existing
offer of Minibuses and Charter Buses. Thus, it is not likely that there is enough
motor coaches demand to finish the cheap motor coach supply (95% of total offer).
The costs computed in 5.11 assume that each motor coach will be used for
two passenger reroutings, meaning that the motor coaches should be able to travel
back and forth two times between the airports. As it has been displayed previously,
driving times between the airports involved in the Bay Area are close to the hour,
therefore this assumption seems feasible. Nevertheless, congestion near SFO due
to bottlenecks caused by rubbernecking and emergency vehicles may increase this
driving times.
It can be concluded that the cost per passenger of renting motor-coaches to use
them in the inter-modal services, noted in the mathematical model as CostBV ,
will be 11$ per passenger.
5.4.3 Summary of approach I
The following figure summarizes the values of travel times and trip fees to
compute the total costs, in order to determine for every diverted airport which
rerouting option is most cost-efficient:
Figure 5.12: Summary of transportation possibilities within the Bay Area.
The analysis shows how the use of motor-coaches as private transportation is
the most cost efficient measure of applying an inter-modal substitution to reroute
passengers within the Bay Area to SFO. Nevertheless, the operational costs of
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giving transport vouchers are not substantially different to those of contracting
motor-coaches, and rerouting passengers through the underground rail network
could help to diminish the impact of the crash in the road network
5.5 Approach II: Complete inter-modal substi-
tution
As explained previously, a complete inter-modal substitution would imply that
the passengers are rerouted by surface means of transport from the diverted air-
ports where they got stuck. The airports from which a complete inter-modal
substitution is feasible are:
• Oakland International Airport (OAK), 30 miles from SFO.
• Mineta San Jose International Airport (SJC), 50 miles from SFO.
• Sacramento International Airport (SMF), 100 miles from SFO.
• Reno Tahoe International Airport (RNO), 230 miles from SFO.
• Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), 390 miles from SFO.
• McCarran International Airport (LAS),565 miles from SFO.
Having the 5 airports presented above in mind, there are two possible ways of
rerouting passengers through surface means of transport:
• Public transportation: Use the bus and train networks to connect the
passengers with their final destination SFO.
• Private transportation: Use private motor coaches to reroute the passen-
gers.
Both possibilities have been assessed, in order to decide which surface trans-
portation mode will be implemented in the rerouting optimisation model.
5.5.1 Public transportation outside the Bay Area
5.5.1.1 Overview of public transportation: Railway system in Califor-
nia.
Although long distance public transportation it is still in the US not always
an optimal solution, both possibilities will be assessed for all the airports, and
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then the most cost-effective rerouting option will be chosen. In order to get a
sense of the railway network in california, the following picture shows the National
Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) lines in California.
Figure 5.13: AMTRAK railway system.
In the map shown in figure 5.13, the two largest routes of the National Rail-
road Passenger Corporation (AMTRAK) are the Pacific Surfliner (green) and San
Joaquin (blue). Other AMTRAK routes in California are shown in black, and the
Capitol Corridor is shown in red. Non-AMTRAK commuter rail lines are shown
in yellow.
Analyising the network in detail, starting from the Pacific Surfliner, one can
observe how is the major commuting route in Southern California. The entire
length of the line runs from San Luis Obispo in the north, down to San Diego in
the south. The San Joaquin line operates twelve trains each day between Bak-
ersfield and Stockton. From Stockton, four trains from Bakersfield continue west
to Oakland, whilst two trains proceed north to the state capital of Sacramento.
Finally, the Capitol Corridor route runs north from San Jose through the East
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Bay to Oakland and Richmond, then east through the Delta communities of Mar-
tinez and Suisun City, and the Sacramento Valley. One Capitol Corridor train per
day continues east of Sacramento crossing the state to Auburn and Reno cities in
Nevada.
As one can observe, Amtrak railway network connects the cities involved in
this system of study; Sacramento, Los Angeles and the Bay Area. Although is not
present in the map, as it has been previously mentioned, Reno is also connected
through Amtrak to Sacramento and the Bay Area.
5.5.1.2 Connection SMF to SFO
It has been seen in figure 5.17 how Sacramento International Airport (SMF)
is the closest airport to the Bay Area, being located within only 100 miles from
SFO. The following figure shows the rerouting proposed to transport passengers
by public modes of transport from SMF to SFO.
Figure 5.14: Rerouting from SMF to SFO using public transportation.
The above presented rerouting would take an overall journey of 4h and 49’,
involving 3 transport transfers to connect door-to-door SMF with SFO. Passengers
would have to take a YOLOBUS to go from SMF to Sacramento city center, with
a cost of 2.00$. Then, they would transfer to AMTRAK train with a ticket fare
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of 32.00$ with destination Richmond in the Bay Area, and then finally transfer
to Bay Area Rapid Transport (BART) to reach SFO, with a ticket fare of 9.85$.
The transitions between different public transport modes would make passengers
walk up to 17 min. Long walking times can impact on the passengers perception
of delay cost, as it is unpleasant to walk long ways carrying heavy luggage with
them, reason why the routes have been designed trading-off between having few
transport transfers and the least possible walking times.
In the case of Sacramento International Airport, the total cost of this first
rerouting would be 43.85$ per passenger, with a total journey time close to 5
hours.
5.5.1.3 Connection RNO to SFO
Figure 5.17 shows how Reno Tahoe International Airport (RNO) is the sec-
ond closest airport to the Bay Area, after SMF, as it is located within only 230
miles from SFO. The following figure shows the rerouting proposed to transport
passengers by public modes of transport:
Figure 5.15: Rerouting from RNO to SFO using public transportation.
The above presented rerouting would take an overall journey of 10h and 11
minutes, involving 4 transport transfers to connect door-to-door SMF with SFO.
Passengers would have to take a Regional Transportation Comission bus to go
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from RNO Airport to the Reno AMTRAK station, with a cost of 2.00$ [24].
Then, passengers would take the AMTRAK train with a ticket fare of 56.00$ with
destination Richmond in the Bay Area, and then transfer to Bay Area Rapid
Transport (BART) to reach SFO, with a ticket fare of 9.85$. The transitions
between different public transport modes would make passengers walk up to 13
min, that can be annoying on the passengers view if they are carrying heavy
luggage with them.
Thus, the total cost of this first rerouting would be 67.85$ per passenger.
5.5.1.4 Connection LAX to SFO
When analysing the possibility of giving public transport vouchers to passen-
gers, Los Angeles Intl. starts to be a extreme case scenario. Due to a lack of fast
and efficient surface rail transportation, the transportation times between these
two cities become really high. The following figure explains in detail the public
transport route between the two cities.
Figure 5.16: Rerouting from LAX to SFO using public transportation.
The above presented rerouting would take an overall journey of 11h and 18’,
involving 5 transport transfers to connect door-to-door LAX with SFO. The first
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two transfers belong to Metro Los Angeles bus service, and serve the passengers
to connect the LAX airport with the Bundu Bus station, with a ticket fare of
1.50$. This transfers could be avoided placing a shuttle bus sending people from
the airport to the bus station in the city center. Bundu Bus offers a straight 7h
and 40 min bustrip connecting LAX and SFO, with a fare of 58.00$ per person.
The destination station is 1 min by foot far from a Bay Area Rapid Transport
(BART) station in Montgomery street, from which passengers can take a straight
30 min trip to the airport, with a ticket fare of 8.65$ per person.
Thus, the total cost of this rerouting would be 66.15$. The critical problem with
this rerouting is that the Los Angeles to San Francisco Bundu Bus service is offered
only once a day departuring at 12pm, therefore, most of the passengers could miss
the bus and would have to wait until the next day departure. Furthermore, the
trip times raise up to more than 8 hours, reason why most of the passengers would
rather prefer to stay in the airport waiting for another flight, or overnight in a
nearby hotel, than to spend 8 hours seating in a train.
5.5.1.5 Connection from LAS, PHX, SLC, DEN and MSP to SFO
Las Vegas Intl. Airport established the extreme case scenario for public trans-
portation, as the trip time reaches 8 hours. The rest of the airports located within
more than 400 miles to SFO have infeasible rail and public bus transportation
options, as they take more than one day travel. For instance, Mc Carran Intl.
Airport, located within 560 miles from SFO, has no straight transportation time
to SFO. This means that passengers should take a train to Los Angeles and trans-
fer to another mode to reach SFO, taking a total trip time of 1 day and 9 hours
(estimated by google maps). In the case of Phoenix Sky Harbor Intl. Airport,
located within 750 miles from SFO, the trip time would be of 2 days and 15 hours.
Naturally, the travel times keep raising even further for the airports in Salt Lake
City, Denver or Mississipi, which absorbed also diversions during the 4 day period
of study.
Therefore, after analysing the public transportation possibilities from the di-
verted airports to SFO, it can be concluded that there is only a feasible public
transport route from SMF, RNO and LAX to SFO. The next section will assess
if the public transportation option is more cost-effective than using motor-coaches
for the rerouting of passengers.
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5.5.2 Private transportation outside the Bay Area
5.5.2.1 Overview of private transportation: Motor-coaches.
The main problem of inter-modal substitution is that it is not cost effective for
long distance substitution. It has been seen in the public transportation overview
how, although San Francisco is well connected to the alternative airports in Cal-
ifornia and to Reno in Nevada by Caltrain network, transport times reach levels
were passengers would likely prefer to overnight in a hotel and wait for a morning
flight.
Evidently, private transportation is no exception, and therefore after analysing
all the airports that were involved in the diversions triggered by the ASIANA
crash, it is clear that some of them could not apply inter-modal substitution. The
following figure shows the airports used to absorbe diversions.
Figure 5.17: Map of the airports that absorbed diverted flights.
One can observe how airports like Minneapolis St. Paul International Airport
(MSP) or Denver International Airport (DEN), are over 1.300 miles far away from
San Francisco, meaning the surface transport time would be over a day. Such a
journey would not be accepted by passengers, therefore MSP and DEN will not
be considered for the inter-modal substitution rerouting option.
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Analysing further the map, it can be distinguished a second layer of airports,
that includes Salt Lake City International Airport (SLC), Phoenix Sky Harbor
(PHX) and Las Vegas McCarran International Airport (LAS). All three airports
are located within more than 570 miles from SFO. Passengers, in this case, would
perceive a rerouting journey of over 10 hours in the best scenario, making inter-
modal substitution also highly unlikely for SLC, PHX and LAS.
Finally, it can be observed a third cluster of airports outside the Bay Area,
that includes Los Angeles International (LAX), Reno Tahoe International Airport
(RNO) and Sacramento International Airport (SMF). These 3 airports are located
within less than 400 miles from SFO. LAX is the airport in greater distance to
SFO, implying a 6 hours road journey to reach SFO. Driving times would diminish
to 4,5 hours in the case of RNO, or to 2,5 hours in the case of SMF. These driving
times are more likely to be accepted by diverted passengers, thus LAX, SMF and
RNO are the 3 airports outside the Bay Area from where it will be assessed an
inter-modal substitution as a rerouting option.
It has been seen in 5.4.2 the private transportation analysis for the Bay Area,
therefore the next analysis will focus in public and private modes of transport
available to connect these 3 selected airports with SFO. The study will conclude
for the 3 airports above detailed which transportation option is more cost effective
for an inter-modal complete subsitution.
5.5.2.2 Private transportation from SMF to SFO
The case of SMF is the best scenario for complete inter-modal substitution
from diverted airports outside the Bay Area. Being located within only 100 miles
from SFO, the door-to-door driving time is estimated to be of 1h and 50 minutes.
From Sacramento International airport, the journey would mainly involve I-5
N motorway, afterwards the I-80W motorway and finally merging onto US-101 S.
On the crash day, due to congestion generated by rubbernecking and emergency
vehicles, the US-101 part that is attached to SFO there was a considerable road
congestion. A good way to ensure passengers do not perceive larger delays, could
be to send them straight to San Francisco downtown instead of ending the trip
in SFO airport. Passengers could be left at a Taxi or Bay Area Rapid Transport
(BART) station in San Mateo county, saving the time they would spend going
back and forth to SFO in order to reach their final destination.
Therefore, the private transportation rerouting from SMF to SFO would have
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a total estimated travel time close to the two hours. One can now analyse if there
is enough offer in Sacramento to fulfill the possible inter-modal service demand in
highly disruptive situations. Figure 5.18 shows the available charter-compaines
in Sacramento:
Figure 5.18: Charter companies available in Sacramento area.
As one can observe in figure 5.18, the charter companies analysed were lo-
cated either in Sacramento area or in Elk Grove area. Elk Grove is a small town
located in the suburbs of Sacramento city, in which the charter companies find
cheaper storaging garages and can still serve the Sacramento offer. Only 8 charter
companies have been found with base in Sacramento, offering a total of 25 motor
coaches. The 70% of the motor coaches available are Charter Buses, with a pas-
senger capacity between 47 and 58 passengers, and an all-day renting fare of 750$
on average. The second greatest amount of motor coaches available are from the
Minibus type, with an average capacity of 37 passengers and an average fare of
650$. Finally there is one charter company offering a Limobus, without renting
cost details.
Therefore, acording to the data available, the total reroutable passengers at
SMF would be of 1.173 passengers, considering that each motor coach can per-
form only one substitution. Computing the costs of the inter-modal service in
Sacramento, the results are shown in figure 5.19:
Figure 5.19: Costs of motor coaches renting in SMF area.
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Comparing the renting costs to the ones of charter companies in the Bay Area,
one can see how costs are slightly lower in SMF, probably due to a lower mar-
ket demand. Additionally, one should have in mind that these costs have been
computed considering every motor coach does only one substitution, although is
rented all day. As SMF is located within 2 hours drive time from SFO, it could be
assumed that the motor coaches would be able to make one trip in the morning
and another during the afternoon, lowering the costs a 50%. Nevertheless, it is
probable that in highly disruptive situtations there is a peak of diversions dur-
ing the late morning, reason why, having the passenger value of time in mind, it
would be more cost effective to use motor coaches as long as passengers arrive to
the airport.
5.5.2.3 Private transportation from RNO to SFO
In the case of Reno Tahoe International Airport, the 230 miles road distance
to SFO would mean a door-to-door driving time of 3h and 45 minutes.
The journey would mainly elapse in I-580 N motorway, afterwards merging onto
I-80W motorway and finally taking the US-101 S to reach SFO. As it has explained
before for the SMF assessment, on the crash day, the US-101 section attached
suffered considerable congestions. As for a rerouting from SMF, passengers could
be left in a Bay Area Rapid Transport (BART) station or Taxi station at San
Mateo or San Francisco counties, in order to ensure passengers do not perceive
larger delays.
Therefore, the private transportation rerouting from SMF to SFO would have
a total estimated travel time close to the four hours. One can now analyse if there
is enough offer in Reno to fulfill the possible inter-modal service demand. The
following figure shows the available charter-compaines in Reno:
As one can observe in the figure, the charter companies offer in Reno is limited
to 2 charter companies, offering a total of 54 motor coaches. A 93% of the motor
coaches available are Charter Buses, with a passenger capacity between 47 and
58 passengers. The remaining 7%, corresponds to 4 minibuses, with capacity of
37 passengers. Therefore, acording to the data available, the total reroutable
passengers at RNO would be of 2.598 passengers, considering that each motor
coach can perform only one substitution.
There is no data available on all-day service costs, as both companies do not
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Figure 5.20: Charter companies available in Reno area.
offer details on renting fees. It will be assumed the costs of motor coach service in
RNO to be similar to the ones at Sacramento, as RNO is probably serving other
poblations in Nevada, and it does not have high demand itself. Therefore, costs
will be assumed to be the following:
Figure 5.21: Costs of motor coaches renting in RNO area.
In the case of Reno Tahoe, as the driving time would reach the 4 hours, it is
infeasible that motor coaches can do more than one substitution, in order to lower
the fixed costs. Airlines would thus have to contract the service for all day, and
start rerouting passengers as soon as they reach RNO.
5.5.2.4 Private transportation from LAX to SFO
In the case of Los Angeles International Airport, the 390 miles road distance
to SFO would mean a door-to-door estimated driving time of 6h and 30 minutes.
The journey would mainly elapse in I-405 N motorway to leave Los Angeles
area, then transfer to I-5 for 260 miles, and finally merging onto the US-101 S
motorway to reach SFO. As it has explained in the previous airport assessments,
on the crash day, the US-101 section attached suffered considerable congestions. As
for a rerouting from SMF, passengers could be left in a Bay Area Rapid Transport
(BART) station or Taxi station at San Mateo or San Francisco counties, in order
to ensure passengers do not perceive larger delays.
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Therefore, the private transportation rerouting from LAS to SFO would have a
total estimated travel time close to the 6h and 30 minutes, taking into account the
delay minutes due to the US-101 congestion close to SFO. One can now analyse
if there is enough offer in Reno to fulfill the possible inter-modal service demand.
Figure 5.22 shows the available charter-compaines in Reno:
Figure 5.22: Charter companies available in Los Angeles area.
As one can observe in figure 5.22, the charter companies available in Los
Angeles area is extremely high. This is due to the fact that many town villages
surrounding Los Angeles (within less than 50 miles), offer tour guides visiting the
california south cost, San Diego and Los Angeles. A 30% of the motor coaches
available are Mini Buses, with a passenger capacity between 20 and 37 passengers.
The most abundant type of buses available is the Charter Buses (60%), with a
capacity range of 38 to 53 passengers. Finally, there is a relatively short supply
of Executive or Limo Buses, only a 10 % of the offer, with a range capacity of 9
to 28 passengers. Therefore, acording to the data available, the total reroutable
passengers from LAX to SFO would be of 29.810 passengers, assuming the charter
companies have no pre-comittments on the crash weekend.
The data available on all-day service costs was low, as some of the charter
companies do not offer details on renting fees online, nevertheless the price range
already serves as a reference to estimate an average renting fee per motor-coach.
Thus, the contracting costs have been estimated to be the following:
Figure 5.23: Costs of motor coaches renting in Los Angeles area.
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In the case of LAX, as the driving time would reach up to 6 hours, it is infeasible
that motor coaches can do more than one substitution, in order to lower the fixed
costs. Airlines would thus have to contract the service for all day, and start
rerouting passengers as soon as they reach RNO. Therefore, the operational cost
of renting motor-coaches for inter-modal service from LAX will be assumed as
shown in figure 5.23.
5.5.2.5 Private transportation from LAS, PHX, SLC, DEN and MSP
to SFO
As it has already been explained in the public transportation analysis, Las
Vegas Intl. Airport established the extreme case scenario for public transportation,
as the driving time reaches 8 hours and 30 minutes. The rest of the airports located
within more than 560 miles to SFO have infeasible motor-coach transportation
options, as the travel times raise to more than one day travel.
Therefore, after analysing the private transportation possibilities from the di-
verted airports to SFO, it can be concluded that there is only a feasible motor-coach
passengers’ rerouting from SMF, RNO, LAX and LAS to SFO.
5.5.3 Summary of Approach II. Comparison and selection
of the most cost-effective mode of transport.
The following figure summarizes the values of travel times and trip fees to
compute the total costs, in order to determine for every diverted airport which
rerouting option is most cost-efficient:
In order to summarize the values, it has been assumed that Las Vegas area
would have a level of supply of charter companies comparable to the one in Los
Angeles, due to the high level of tourists that travel there for recreational objectives
or to visit the Grand Canyon area. The analysis shows how the use of motor-
coaches as private transportation is the most cost efficient measure of applying an
inter-modal substitution to reroute passengers from closer airports outside the Bay
Area to SFO. The operational cost of using private transportation raise, but even
in a great way raise the trip times, impacting directly in the passengers journey
back home.
71
5 – Operational issues in airlines inter-modal operations
Figure 5.24: Summary of transportation possibilities outside the Bay Area.
5.6 Further operational issues in inter-modal sub-
stitution
5.6.1 Motor-coach operational handling alternatives
As Hansen & Zhang distinguished in [21], there are three roles in supplying
motor coach service, a combination of which make up 3 alternatives of handling
motor-coaches service. The main roles in supplying motor coach service are:
1) Owning the vehicles.
2) Operating and mantaining the vehicles.
3) Provide airport facilities.
According to these roles, the alternatives that airlines have in handling the
motor-coaches service, as part of their inter-modal operations, are summarized in
the table below:
As one can observe in the table 5.25, the first alternative would be to purchase
a fleet of vehicles, and dedicate them for inter-modal operations. From airlines’
point of view, the advantages of owning the vehicles would be that airlines could
customize them and furnish the vehicles with flights’ similar amenities, such as
beverage, entertainment or more luggage space, in order to help retain passengers’
loyalty and reduce their customers’ perceived costs of inter-modal substitution.
Furthermore, airlines would be in position of operating the fleet by themselves, so
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Figure 5.25: Alternatives in motor-coach service handling.
that they can have control of vehicles dispatch, and what’s more, ensure an effi-
cient integration of airside and landside operations. Despite these advantages, this
alternative could barely be economical, as the inter-modal substitution proposed
in this study is an operational measure conceived to be implemented in highly
disruptive situations, which occur infrequently.
The second alternative presented in table 5.25, could be to own the fleet but
outsource the operating and mantainace. The advantages of this second alterna-
tive would be that airlines could use the fleet for internal operations, or obtain an
extra revenue source by offering a surcharge charter service, during the days with-
out inter-modal operations. The days with inter-modal service then, airlines could
contract part-time drivers that serve on-call demands, and outsource the operating
and maintenance of the fleet to a third party with acces to professional charter
services and who agrees to give top priority to airline inter-modal service requests.
This second alternative would help to control the labor cost of inter-modal oper-
ations, that is a major component of motor coach operating cost. Although this
alternative would definitely lower the costs of the service, still leaving the vehicle
fleet idle on the days without inter-modal operations can be inefficient.
Finally, the third alternative for airlines would be to contract with existing
local charter companies to supply service whenever the inter-modal operations are
needed, with a negotiable economic incentive if companies had previously arranged
commitments. This alternative implies that the local compaines would own, op-
erate and mantain the vehicle fleet. The main advantage of this option is that it
would requiere low investment and no fixed costs (such as vehicle fleet amortiza-
tion), and would enable airlines have a first experience with inter-modal operations
without making a large commitment nor great investment.
In order to have an overview of the 3 alternatives proposed, the following table
summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative:
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Figure 5.26: Evaluation of alternatives in motor-coaches handling.
As it can be seen in figure 5.26, the optimal alternative for inter-modal substi-
tution operations in highly disruptive situations, would be alternative 3. Disrup-
tive situations where an inter-modal substitution is the most cost-effective rerout-
ing are not frequent, and thus it is difficult to assess if airlines would be the party
that would inititate the inter-modal operations. The third alternative would be
good way to ensure a smooth introduction of the inter-modal concepts, and then,
perhaps airlines would more likely develop further the service by implementing one
of the two first alternatives.
5.6.2 Time response to urgent service requests
Acording to the conclusions in 5.6.1, the alternative in motor coaches handling
that seems more feasible for airlines to implement is alternative 3. Then, if air-
lines would more likely outsource the motor-coaches handling operations to local
companies, contracting them for the inter-modal services in an on-call basis, the
ability of such companies to respond in a timely manner to requests for service,
wich will be evidently urgent and unpredictable, is critical.
Hansen & Zhang conducted in [21] a research on charter companies’ response
to service inter-modal service requests.
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To get a general idea about how promptly charter companies could respond to
service requests, Hansen & Zhang conducted a telephone survey for ten randomly
picked charter companies for six regions in the US: San Francisco, Los Angeles,
New York, Chicago, Miami and Texas. All of the regions are supposed to have a
charter companies’ offer comparable, if not bigger in some cases, to San Francisco.
They constructed a scenario motivating an urgent request for a motor coach service
at an airport, and asked for a motor coach that could accommodate at least 30
passengers and their personal belongings and be available for at least 6 hours.
The following table reprinted from [21] shows the results of the survey con-
ducted:
Figure 5.27: Survey on time response to inter-modal service request.
The results in figure 5.27 show how about a 30 % of the charter companies did
not have vehicles or drivers available at the time of the request. For companies
who can provide the service, a 50% can get to the airport within one and half
hours, while the other half need about tree to four hours.
The problem lays in the fact that many charter companies hire part-time drivers
and schedule their work load according to reservactions. For urgent requests, they
need to check the availability of drivers and reorganize their shifts.
While being interviewed by Hansen & Zhang, some charter companies asked if
the surveyor had a business relationship with their company, implying that they
might respond more quickly if this were the case. Furthermore, they interviewed
a customer service manager of United Airlines at ORD about her experiences
working with local charter companies. The manager stated that United could
obtain motor coaches within one hour of making the request. This evidences
that if airlines could establish a long-term relation with local charter companies,
contracting them for whenever an inter-modal service is required, that could ensure
a timely response of the charter companies.
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Although the project had no ressources to conduct equivalent surveys for Reno
and Sacramento local charter companies, the Hansen & Zhang results can be
extrapolated to this study. Acording to 5.27, a 33% of the randomly picked
charter companies in San Francisco could not respond to an urgent service request.
From the remaining 66% of charter companies surveyed, a 22% could deliver motor
coaches within 1 and 1.5 hours, and a 44% could deliver motor coaches within 3
to 4 hours.
One could consider that the Bay Area is an extension of the San Francisco
region considered in Hansen & Zhang survey, and therefore the same proportions
would apply for the local charter companies that this study has considered in the
3 areas of the Bay Area distinguished in 5.4.2.1.
Furthermore, assuming the random sample used in the surveuy to be represen-
tative of the population, and analysing the proportions of time responses within
the same regions:
Figure 5.28: Summary of the survey on time response to inter-modal service re-
quest.
In order to be conservative with the estimations, it will be assumed that Reno
and Sacramento local charter companies, have average time responses in relation
to fthe sample of study. Therefore, as displayed in the figure 5.28, a 36% of the
charter companies will not be able to provide the service, whilst the 64% remaining
will be able to attend the inter-modal service urgent request. A 27% of the charter
companies will be able to attend the request within 1 and 1,5 hours, and a 37%
will provide the service within 3 and 4 hours from the request.
Therefore, as it has been estimated in 5.29 with a weighted average, the time
response of the local charter companies in Reno and Sacramento will be assumed
to be of 2 hours and 35 minutes. Evidently, this average time response has be only
assumed for the percentage of local charter companies that will be able to provide
service in Reno and Sacramento. It is difficult to assess wether charter companies
with more motor coaches are able to respond to the request faster. Furthermore,
76
5 – Operational issues in airlines inter-modal operations
Figure 5.29: Estimation of overall time of response to inter-modal service request.
it is also difficult to assess to which extent the charter companies can be over-
booked. Therefore, it will be assumed that the total number of buses displayed in
figure 5.8 is evenly distributed between all the charter companies. Therefore, and
as estimated in figure 5.29, only a 64% of the charter companies will be able to
attend the request, and the service will be provided within 2,55 hours.
After the estimations performed, one can conclude that the value of the coeffi-
cient BWT used as input in the mathematical programming will be 175 minutes.
5.6.3 Passengers perception of inter-modal substitution
Compared to flying, the surface modes of transport are sometimes considered
inferior, not only in terms of service, but also in terms of speed. The implemen-
tation of inter-modal operations therefore must take into account the customer
reaction when reassigned to surface modes of transport, as it is expected that
some of the passengers may offer resistance to such reaccommodation.
As the survey to SFO passenger displayed in table 5.3 shows, a total of ap-
proximately 16% use either door-to-door van services, private scheduled bus or
free hotel shuttle. That means, a 16% of the SFO customers are used to involve a
motor coach transport as part of their journeys to move inside the leave or reach
SFO. This is due to the fact that most of the customers of SFO live in counties
that are located within 20 to 50 miles of SFO, and such distances are admissible
to be made by surface modes of transport. The problem will raise with passengers
reassigned to motor coaches from SMF or RNO back to SFO, when traveling times
are higher.
In any case, a good way to deal with such resistance could be to offer the
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inter-modal substitution as an extra option, and retain the right to be reassigned
to a later flight instead if passengers prefer to. Airlines should notify that refusing
the substitution could lead to long delays, making passengers awareness of the
consequence an inducement to accept the substitution.
If passengers still prefer to be retained at their diverted airports, the airline
policy could be to rebook them in a way that the cost incurred is no more than that
of reassigning them in a motor coach. This may result in severe delays, as airlines
will prioritize to accommodate passengers who have been involuntarily disrupted.
Furthermore, as airlines have limited obligations to provied compensations to pas-
sengers if their disruption is caused by adverse weather or emergency accidents,
the passengers that are aware of this would thus accept the substitution as the less
disruptive rerouting to end their journeys.
5.6.4 Security issues
Inter-modal substitution as an option for rerouting diverted passengers raise
new security questions. These passengers, who have been reassigned from flights to
ground transportation, will enter or leave the airport system (with their luggage),
and therefore the inter-modal operation must ensure they are processed through
security as well. As diversions mostly occur last minute, the flight might be forced
to land in airports that have less traffic, meaning they might not have the optimal
facilities to handle the security check of inter-modal passengers. The main problem
appears if there are international flights involved in the inter-modal operations, as
these passengers must go through custom borders and special security checkpoints.
For instance, during the 6th of July Salt Lake City International Airport (SLC)
absorbed most of the international flights, instead of San Jose or Oakland. SLC was
the closest airport with an international custom able to process this international
flights diverted, as OAK and SJC had no such facilities ready.
Figure 5.30: Tweet reporting OAK not ready for international customs.
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Some international flights had no chance to be diverted to international hubs
such as seattle or Phoenix, due to low fuel reserves or other aircraft security issues.
Therefore, some of them were forced to land in Sacramento, which had no custom
checkpoints available, forcing the custom officers to move to the aircrafts to proceed
with the security checks, as figure 5.31 shows.
Figure 5.31: Tweet reporting custom officers being called onto flights.
Zhang proposes in [21] two process passengers transfered to surface modes of
transport securely:
• Transfer between modes in a secured area inside the airport
– Passengers are loaded and unloaded inside the airport secure area, in
which only airport and airline employees, as well as passengers who
have gone through security screening, are allowed to stay.
– Motor-coaches carrying the airline passengers would enter the secure
area to load and unload passengers and luggage.
• Transfer between modes outside the airport secure
– Motor-coaches do not enter the airport secured area. Passengers are
loaded and unloaded outside.
– Implies an increase of workload, as ressources should be allocated out-
side the common area of work, but eliminates possible threads.
– No further screenings needed to ensure that the motor coaches have not
been altered since they were loaded at the spoke airport.
Both options proposed in [21] have been summarized above, and may be good
ways to ensure an efficient integration of inter-modal operations, as well as a secure
transfer of passengers between modes.
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Chapter 6
Mathematical programming -
Airport pairs optimisation model
6.1 Introduction
The optimisation model proposed here aims to assess the possibility of inter-
modal substitution as a rerouting option in the reaccommodation of diverted
flights. The validity of the model will be implemented in an Asiana crash Case
Study, in which the mathematical programming will determine the most cost-
effective reaccomodation of the diverted passengers that were not able to reach
SFO with their original flights.
If one recalls, Asiana Airlines Flight 214 was a scheduled transpacific passenger
flight from Incheon International Airport near Seoul, South Korea to San Francisco
International Airport (SFO) in the United States. On the morning of Saturday,
July 6, 2013, the Boeing 777-200ER aircraft operating the flight crashed on final
approach into SFO. As a consequence, two runways had to be closed on the 6th
and remain not operative on the 7th of July, triggering severe cancellations and
delays on the flights that were supposed to land in SFO on the 6th to 9th of July.
The novelty of the mathematical modeling lies in:
• The implementation of inter-modal operations in airline schedule recovery
from highly disruptive situations.
• The passenger-centric modeling of the rerouting costs, meaning the cost of
rerouting not only will take into account the operational costs that airlines
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will perceive, but also the monetary translation of delay times that passengers
will perceive.
The rerouting model is defined over pairs of airports (SFO -DivertedAirportn),
and the optimisation implementation has been performed over the busiest airports
involved in the diversions triggered by Asiana Crash. Thus, the mathematical
programming will analyse the diverted flights that landed in one specific airport,
and then, acording to the non-cancelled departure flights and surface modes of
transport available, the model will propose the most cost-effective rerouting con-
figuration, taking into account both passenger travel times and operational costs.
6.2 Nomenclature used in the model
This airport focused optimisation will use as input data the set of diverted
flights, departure flights and available ressources (motor coaches and aircrafts)
at one specific airport. The following section will define the variables that are
included along the mathematical optimisation problem:
6.2.1 Index variables
• F : Set of departure flights from the diverted airport to the Bay Area (SFO,
OAK, SJC) = {f1, f2, ..., fn}
• Γ : Set of discrete time periods = {t1, t2, ..., tT}
• P : Set of diverted passengers = {p1, p2, ..., pP}
• A: Set of aircraft available to affrete in the diverted airport
{ a1, a2, ..., aMaxAircraft }
• B: Set of available buses for inter-modal substitution in the diverted airport
{ b1, b2, ..., aMaxBuses }
6.2.2 Input time and delay variables:
• ATf : Scheduled arrival time of flight f
• DTf : Scheduled departure time of flight f
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• PaxATp : Scheduled arrival time of passenger p previous to the diversion.
• ActualDivATp : Arrival time of passenger p to the diverted airport.
• BDTOAK : Bus transportation time from OAK to SFO
• BDTSJC : Bus transportation time from SJC to SFO
• BDTDivAirport : Bus transp. time from the diverted airport to SFO
• FlightT imeDivAirport : Flight time from the diverted airport to SFO
6.2.3 Input capacity variables:
• Paxf : Total number of passengers on departure flight f .
• Capf : Maximum passengers capacity of flight f .
• CapAircrafta: Maximum passengers capacity of chartered flight a.
• CapBus: Maximum passengers capacity of buses available for inter-modal
substitution.
6.2.4 Input cost coefficients:
• CostAffrete: Cost of chartering a new aircraft. Defined in [ $ / hour ·
passenger ] in order to be able to scalate the cost of placing bigger aircrafts,
without having to separate the cost per type of aircraft.
• CostBV : Variable cost of utilizing ground transportation per passenger
[ $ / passenger ].
• CostP : Passenger delay cost per one time unit [ $ / hour · passenger ].
6.2.5 Other input coefficients:
• BetaWait: Weight coefficient for passenger waiting times.
• BetaTransp: Weight coefficient for passenger transportation times.
• MinloadBus: Percentage of the total bus capacity that establishes the min-
imum passenger load to be ready to leave.
• MinloadAffrete: Percentage of the total aircraft capacity that establishes
the minimum passenger load of an chartered flight to be ready to leave.
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• TimeFactor: Conversion factor used to convert time periods into minutes.
• MaxBuses: Maximum number of buses available to substitute flights.
• MaxAircraft: Maximum number of aircraft available to be chartered.
6.2.6 Binary variables
6.2.6.1 Input binary variables:
OAKf =

1 if the destination of departure flight f is OAK
0 otherwise
(6.1)
SJCf =

1 if the destination of departure flight f is SJC
0 otherwise
(6.2)
6.2.6.2 Output binary variables:
The first type of output binary variables are Squeezet(p,f), Substt(p,b) andAffretet(p,a).
These three variables that assign passengers to one of the three possible rerouting
options:
Squeezet(p,f) =

1 if passenger p is squeezed into flight f in
time period t
0 otherwise
(6.3)
Substt(p,b) =

1 if passenger p is rerouted with motor − coach b
in time period t
0 otherwise
(6.4)
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Affretet(p,a) =

1 if passenger p is rerouted in chartered flight a
in time period t
0 otherwise
(6.5)
The second type of output binary variables are DTBustb and DTAffreteta.
These two variables determine in which time period departs the bus used for inter-
modal substitution or the chartered aircraft respectively:
DTAffreteta =

1 if chartered aircraft a departs in time period t
0 otherwise
(6.6)
DTBustb =

1 if bus b departs in time period t
0 otherwise
(6.7)
Additionally, the mathematical programming uses the following auxiliary bi-
nary variables: y1, y2, y3, and y4.
6.3 Objective function
The objective of the mathematical model is to minimize the cost of reaccommo-
dation of diverted passengers who were stuck in their respective diverted airports
and could not reach SFO. Thus, it will be used as input data the final ASIANA
crash schedule (e.g. what flights were diverted, which flights were cancelled and
which ones could reach SFO), and the model will only assess the more cost-effective
rerouting back to SFO.
The rerouting options evaluated in the mathematical programming are as follows:
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(A) Squeeze the diverted passengers into flights to SFO
(B) Squeeze the diverted passengers into flights to OAK or SJC
(C) Ferry back the passengers to SFO by chartering a new aircraft
(D) Apply an inter-modal substitution from the diverted airport
In the rerouting options enumerated above, Option (B) implies rerouting pas-
sengers to the alternative airports in the Bay Area, and then implementing a short
inter-modal commute, transporting the passengers back to SFO by surface means
of transport. Furthermore, Option (D) implies that passengers are rerouted with
motor-coaches from the diverted airport back to SFO.
The following figure represents the four rerouting options for a given pair of
airports, in this case, from LAX to SFO:
Figure 6.1: Possibilities of rerouting from LAX.
LAX airport is one of the 4 airports from which a complete inter-modal substi-
tution is feasible, in the rerouting to SFO. Please notice that for diverted airports
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other than Reno Tahoe, Sacramento or McCarran Las Vegas, the complete inter-
modal subsitution may be infeasible, therefore figure A.1 could slightly differ.
6.3.1 Model Input Data
The input data for the mathematical programming is the following:
1. Set of diverted passengers to the airport of study.
2. Set of departure flights F from the diverted airport of study, with destination
either to SFO, OAK or SJC.
3. Number of passengers booked and maximum capacity of each flight f .
4. Scheduled departure and arrival times of each flight f .
5. Actual departure and arrival times of all the flights previously mentioned.
6. Surface transportation times between the diverted airport and SFO.
7. Remaining arrival flight capacities at SJC and OAK.
8. Remaining departure flights capacity in the diverted airport.
The following tables describe in detail the input matrix that will have to be
uploaded in matlab in order to be able to run the computations.
6.3.1.1 Diverted passengers data
The first input table contains the data regarding the diverted flights. Each
row of the table represents a diverted passenger. The data has to be formatted as
follows:
As it is described in 6.2, the data includes:
- Day of arrival: Integer from 1 to 4, corresponding to the 4-day period of study
(6th of July to 9th of July).
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Figure 6.2: Input table with the information of the diverted flights.
- Tail #: Tail number of the diverted flight in which passenger p arrived.
- Flight #: Flight number of the diverted flight in which they arrived.
- DTp: Departure time of the flight in which passenger p arrived.
- ActualDTp: Actual departure time of the flight in which passenger p arrived.
- PaxATp: Scheduled arrival time of the flight in which passenger p arrived.
- ActualDivATp: Scheduled arrival time of the flight in which passenger p arrived.
6.3.1.2 Departure flights data
The following input table corresponds to the data on the flights, that were not
cancelled, connecting the diverted airport to either SFO, SJC or OAK.
Figure 6.3: Input table with the information of the departure flights.
Table 6.3 contains the data regarding the departure flights, as specified previ-
ously. Each row of the table represents a departure flight f. The data includes:
- Day of arrival: Integer from 1 to 4, corresponding to the 4-day period of study
(6th of July to 9th of July).
- Tail #: Tail number of the diverted flight in which passenger p arrived.
- Flight #: Flight number of the diverted flight in which they arrived.
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- Capf : Passenger capacity of flight f.
- Paxf : Passengers booked in flight f.
- Destination Airport: Integer from 1 to 3, corresponding to SFO, OAK or SJC
respectively.
- DTf : Departure time of flight f.
- ActualDTf : Actual departure time of of flight f.
- ATf : Scheduled arrival time of flight f.
- ActualATf : Scheduled arrival time of flight f.
6.3.1.3 Airport destination binary variables
The two following tables correspond to the two binary variables that will be
used as input data for the model.
Figure 6.4: Input binary variables stating the landing airport of flight f.
The value of the above represented binary variables, as described in A.2.6, is
equal to 1 if flight f has destination SJC (in case of SJCf variable) or destination
OAK (in case of OAKf variable).
6.3.1.4 Capacity of aircraft available for chartering
The following table corresponds to the variable CapAircrafta that will be used
as input data for the model.
The value of the above represented variables, as described in A.2.3, is equal
to the maximum number of passengers that can be chartered into flight a.
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Figure 6.5: Input data on chartered aircraft’s passenger capacity.
6.3.2 Model assumptions
Airlines’ operations are complicated to optimize as a whole due to the interac-
tion of many factors and feasibility constraints of different resources. Four main
constraints affect the feasibility of airline planning and disruption management,
including aircraft maintenance checks, pilot work rules, fleet assignment and pas-
senger accomodation.
Therefore, the following assumptions regarding concrete modelisation aspects
have been made, in order to ensure an admissible problem complexity.
1. Connecting passengers will connect to their final destination from the Bay
Area.
2. When chartering new aircraft, there are limited amount of aircraft available,
and it has been assumed there is remaining arrival capacity for them at SFO.
3. When the rerouting is done through the alternative airports in the Bay Area,
it has been assumed a 100% of the passengers will be transported to SFO.
4. The model will not take into account aircraft maintenance checks and pilot
work rules, as these two constraints are less critical for disruption manage-
ment than they are for airline planning.
6.3.3 Costs to optimize
The cost-effectiveness of the new solution of reaccommodation will take into
account the following costs:
• Passengers delay cost
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• Squeezing cost: Cost of squeezing passengers into flights to either SFO,
SJC or OAK.
• Chartering cost: Cost of placing a new aircraft to ferry back diverted
passengers.
• Inter-modal substitution cost: Cost of transporting passengers with
motor-coaches, either from the diverted airport, or just within the Bay Area.
The mathematical programming will set the mix of squeezed passengers, pas-
sengers rerouted with inter-modal substitution, and passengers reaccomodated in
an chartered aircraft, that will minimizes the total rerouting cost.
6.3.4 Objective function
The optimisation problem will minimize the value of the following objective
function:
[MIN ]z =
∑
t
∑
p
[ CSqueezetp + CSubsttp + CAffretetp + CStucktp] (6.8)
As it can be seen in the formula above displayed, the mathematical program-
ming will evaluate at every time period t, if passenger p should be rerouted being
squeezed into a flight f , rerouted by complete inter-modal subsitution in a bus b,
ferried back with an chartered flight a, or otherwise continue stuck at the diverted
airport. The optimization will balance the cost of leaving the passengers stuck
and rerouting them with every option. At the end of the chosen time horizon, no
diverted passengers must remain in the diverted airport.
The following sections will describe how the costs attached to each rerouting
option are computed.
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6.3.4.1 Cost of squeezing passengers into departure flights
CSqueezetp =
∑
f
Squeezet(p,f) × [ (DTf −DivATp)× βwait × CostP+
+ (FlightT imeDivAirp +BDTOAK ·OAKf +BDTSJC · SJCf )× βtransp × CostP
+ CostBV × (SJCf +OAKf ) ]
(6.9)
In the computation of CSqueezetp, the first term calculates the passengers
waiting time for being rerouted, translated to economic terms with the passanger
value of time (CostP ) and weighted with the variable BetaWait. The second
term evaluates the economic value of the transportation times, weighted in this
case with the variable BetaTransp. Finally, the third term adds the operational
costs of using motor-coaches, in case the passenger is squeezed into flights to the
alternative airports in the Bay Area.
6.3.4.2 Cost of complete inter-modal substitution
CSubsttp =
∑
b
Substt(p,b) × [ (t · TimeFactor −DivATp) × βwait × CostP +
+ ( BDTDivAirp × βwait × CostP ) + CostBV ]
(6.10)
Equation 6.10 displayed above, represents the operating cost of applying a
complete subsitution of a flight, straight from the diverted airport. The first term
of the equation computes the cost of passengers waiting time, acording to the
passenger value of time (CostP). The time of arrival to the diverted airportDivATp
is substracted to the time of the assignment to the motor coach, time t. The second
term computes the cost of passenger transportation time, by multiplying the bus
transportation time BDTDiv per the passenger value of time (CostP), weighted
by the coefficient Betatransp. Finally, the third term of the equation computes the
cost per passenger of contracting the motor coach service (CostBV ).
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6.3.4.3 Cost of chartering an aircraft
CAffretetp =
∑
b
Affretet(p,a) × [ (t · TimeFactor −DivATp)× βwait × CostP +
+ ( FlightT imeDivAirp × βtransp × CostP ) + CostAffrete ]
(6.11)
Equation A.14 represents the total cost per passenger of chartering an aircraft
to ferry diverted passengers to SFO from the diverted airport. The first term of the
equation computes the cost of passengers waiting time, acording to the passenger
value of time (CostP), weighted by the coefficient Betawait. The time of arrival to
the diverted airport DivATp is substracted to the time of the assignment to the
aircraft a, time t. The second term computes the cost of passenger transportation
time, by multiplying the flight transportation time FlightT imeDivAirp per the
passenger value of time (CostP), weighted by the coefficient Betatransp. Finally,
the third term of the equation computes the cost per passenger of chartering an
aircraft (CostAffrete). This cost coefficient CostAffrete, as explained in section
6.2.4, has been defined in US$ per passenger.
Additionally, it has been assumed in this particular rerouting option:
- There is a limited amount of aircrafts available to affrete, as defined in re-
flimitations with the variable MaxAircraft.
- All the aircraft placed are assumed to transport the passengers to SFO and fly
back to their orginal airport, although they could remain in SFO until the end of
the period of study.
6.3.4.4 Cost of passengers remaining in the diverted airport
CStucktp = α× CostP × ( t · TimeFactor +DivPaxATp )×
× ( 1 −
t∑
τ=1
∑
f
Squeezet(p,f) −
t∑
τ=1
∑
b
Substt(p,b) −
t∑
τ=1
∑
a
Affretet(p,a) )
(6.12)
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Equation A.15 represents the cost of delay that passenges perceive if they
remain in the diverted airport for long time periods. It has only one term, cor-
responding to the cost of passenger delay. The delay time is computed as the
substraction between the time period t in minutes (t · TimeFactor) and the ar-
rival time of passengers to the diverted airport DivPaxATp. The variable CStucktp
can only have a value greater than zero if the passenger has not been assigned to
any mode yet. The constraints ensure that once the passenger has been assigned
to one rerouting option, the variable CStucktp will permanently be zero.
6.3.5 Constraints
6.3.5.1 Constraints of squeezing passengers into scheduled flights
1) The number of passengers squeezed into flight f in time period t+1, should
be less or equal to the number of remaining available seats in flight f at time t+1:
∑
p
Squeezet+1(p,f) ≤ Capf − Paxf −
t∑
τ=1
∑
p
Squeezeτ(p,f) ∀t,∀f (6.13)
2) The passengers can not be squeezed into flight f, if the flight has already
departed:
(t · TimeFactor − DTf ) × Squeezet(p,f) ≤ 0 ∀t,∀f, ∀p (6.14)
6.3.5.2 Constraints of the complete inter-modal substitution option
1) The number of passengers assigned to each motor coach must be less or equal
to the motor-coach capacity, at every time slot:
∑
p
Substt+1(p,b) ≤ CapBus−
t∑
τ=1
∑
p
Substτ(p,b) ∀b, ∀t (6.15)
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2) The motor coach b contracted for inter-modal substitution can only departure if
it is filled up to a minimum bus load (MinloadBus), as explained in A.2.5. This
restriction is guaranteed through 2 pairs of constraints:
Part A: Serves to fix the condition in which the bus must not departure.
MinloadBus · CapBus −
t∑
τ=1
∑
p
Substτ(p,b) < 0 +M1 · (1 − y1)
DTBustb − M1 · y1 ≤ 0
(6.16)
Equation A.19 must be valid ∀b,∀t. M1 is a very large number, and y1 is an
auxiliar binary variable. The underlying logic of the above presented statemtent
is as follows:
• (IF) ∑tτ=1∑p Substτ(p,b) ≥MinloadBus · CapBus
(THEN) y1 = 0 or y1 = 1
[y=0] implying DTBustb ≤ 0. Then DTBustb = 0
[y=1], implying DTBustb ≤M1. Then DTBustb = 1 or 0
(The bus can departure)
• (IF) ∑tτ=1∑p Substτ(p,b) < MinloadBus · CapBus
(THEN) y1 = 0, implying DTBustb ≤ 0. Then DTBustb = 0
(The bus must not departure)
Part B: Serves to fix the conditions for which the bus must departure.
t∑
τ=1
∑
p
Substτ(p,b) − MinloadBus · CapBus ≤ 0 +M2 · (1 − y2)
DTBustb + M2 · y2 > 0
(6.17)
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Equation A.20 must be valid ∀b,∀t. M2 is a very large number, and y2 is an
auxiliar binary variable. The underlying logic of the above presented statement is
as follows:
• (IF) ∑tτ=1∑p Substτ(p,b) ≤MinloadBus · CapBus
(THEN) y2 = 0 or y2 = 1
[y2 = 0] implying DTBustb > 0. Then DTBustb = 1
[y2 = 1], implying DTBustb ≤M2. Then DTBustb = 1 or 0
(The bus can departure)
• (IF) ∑tτ=1∑p Substτ(p,b) > MinloadBus · CapBus
(THEN) y2 = 1
[y2 = 0] implying DTBustb > 0. Then DTBustb = 1
(The bus must departure)
3) Passengers can only be assigned to a certain bus at the time slot that the
bus departures:
M1 · DTBustb ≥
t∑
τ=1
∑
p
Substτ(p,b) ∀b,∀t (6.18)
4) The motor coach b can departure at one time slot only, in between the
starting time slot to the time horizon:
∑
t
DTBustb ≤ 1 ∀b (6.19)
6.3.5.3 Constraints corresponding to chartering a new aircraft
1) The number of passengers assigned to each new chartered aircraft must be
less or equal to the aircraft capacity, at every time slot:
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∑
p
Affretet+1(p,a) ≤ CapAircrafta −
t∑
τ=1
∑
p
Affreteτ(p,a) ∀a, ∀t (6.20)
2) The aircraft a chartered can only departure if it is filled up to a minimum
aircraft load (MinloadAircraft), as explained in A.2.5. This restriction is guar-
anteed through two pairs of constraints:
Part A: Serves to fix the situations in which the new chartered aircraft a must
not departure.
MinloadAircraft · CapAircrafta −
t∑
τ=1
∑
p
Affreteτ(p,a) < 0 +M1 · (1 − y3)
DTAffreteta − M1 · y3 ≤ 0
(6.21)
Equation A.24 must be valid ∀a,∀t. M1 is a very large number, and y3 is an
auxiliar binary variable. The underlying logic is the equivalent to the one explained
for equation A.19.
Part B: Serves to fix the situations in which the chartered aircraft must
departure.
t∑
τ=1
∑
p
Substτ(p,a) − MinloadAircraft · CapAircrafta ≤ 0 +M2 · (1 − y4)
DTAffreteta + M2 · y4 > 0
(6.22)
Equation A.25 must be valid ∀a, ∀t. M2 is a very large number, and y4 is
an auxiliar binary variable. The underlying logic is equivalent to the previously
explained for equation A.20:
3) Constraint that ensures that passengers are assigned to chartered aircrafts in
the time slot that the Aircraft departures:
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M1 ·DTAffreteta ≥
t∑
τ=1
∑
p
Affreteτ(p,a) ∀a,∀t (6.23)
4) Every aircraft chartered (a), can departure at one time slot only, between the
starting time slot and the time horizon:
∑
t
DTAffreteta ≤ 1 ∀a (6.24)
6.3.5.4 Passenger conservation constraints
1) Each passenger can be assigned only to one of the rerouting options in every
time period:
∑
f
Squeezet(p,f) +
∑
b
Substt(p,b) +
∑
a
Affretet(p,a) ≤ 1 ∀p,∀t (6.25)
2) Each passenger must be assigned to only one rerouting option (Squeeze, Sub-
stitution or chartering) in all the time period of study. The equation also ensures
that no passengers will continue stuck at the time horizon.
∑
t
[
∑
f
Squeezet(p,f) +
∑
b
Substt(p,b) +
∑
a
Affretet(p,a) ] = 1 ∀p (6.26)
3) Passengers can start to be assigned to the rerouting options only 30 minutes
after their landing in the diverted airport:
[ t · TimeFactor − (30 + ActualDivATp) ] ×
× ( Squeezedt(p,f) + Substt(p,b) + Affretet(p,a) ) ≥ 0 ∀p,∀t,∀f, ∀b,∀a
(6.27)
Underlying logic:
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• (IF) t · TimeFactor ≥ (30 + ActualDivATp)
(THEN) [ Squeezedt(p,f) + Substt(p,b) + Affretet(p,a) ] = 0 or 1
(the passenger can be assigned to one rerouting option)
• (IF) t · TimeFactor ≤ (30 + ActualDivATp)
(THEN) [ Squeezedt(p,f) + Substt(p,b) + Affretet(p,a) ] = 0
(the passenger can not be assigned to a rerouting option)
6.4 Cost coefficents determination
6.4.1 Approaches in cost impact estimation of imperfect
operations
The current practices in estimating the cost impact of imperfect operational
performance on airlines can be classified into two approaches: Cost factor approach
and aggregate cost approach.
As Hansen & Zou explained in [27] the cost factor approach is based on assign-
ing unite costs to different categories of delay based on estimates of the resources
consumed when a given category of delay occurs. The total cost factor C, is equal
to the sum of the cost in each category:
C =
∑
i
Pi ·Xi (6.28)
Where Pi denotes the unit cost per minute for delay in the ith category, and
Xi represents the corresponding total delay minutes.
Determining cost factors rests on the assumption that delay causes additional
consumption of largely the same inputs as the airlines’ normal line production
process. Judgement must be made about which cost components (e.g. fuel, labor,
capital, airport charges) need to be included for a specific type of delay, and the
unit cost per delay minute for each cost component.
To determine these, two methods are most comonly adopted, both involving
some uncertainties due to the lack of flight-level cost data. One is to use more
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aggregated cost factors, e.g. cost for 1-min ground delay given an aircraft type,
often based upon aircraft block hour cost data. Such estimates may be highly
influenced by accounting conventions that often have little empirical basis. A
second approach relies on expert opinion. However experienced, the views of these
individuals are inherently subjective. Respondents will tend to incorprate cost
impacts that are obvious to them while neglecting those that are not directly
visible.
The other cost approach is the aggregate cost approach. This second venue is
built upon firm or industry level relationships between total operating cost and
delay. A simple version of this approach assumes that airline operating costs are
proportional to the total aircraft operating time, and estimates delay cost as the
fraction of total aircraft operating time that results from delay, multiplied by the
total airline operating cost.
This avoids the difficult task of determinig cost factors, and only requires
straightforward calculation of the aggregate delay time and the total operating
cost. Since overhead cost is part of the total operating cost, including not only
fuel, crew salaries, maintenance, and depreciation, but also advertising, ticket
agents, landing fees, legal fees, and other items that may be relatively insensitive
to delays, this simple version generally produces higher delay cost estimates than
the cost factor approach.
In order to estimate the value of the cost coefficients used as input in the model,
it has been applied the aggregated cost approach in the cases there was rigorous
data available. Estimations of the passengers value of time and the operational
costs of inter-modal substitution have been done using the aggregate cost approach.
Nevertheless, it has been used the cost factor approach in order to estimate the
operational costs of chartering a new aircraft, based on the study described in [7]
by the Economic counsel to the Transportation Industry, released in 2004.
The following sections summarize the computations of each cost coefficient
included in the mathematical programming.
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6.4.2 Model cost coefficients estimation
6.4.2.1 Passenger value of time
First it will be addressed how to translate the impact of delays on passengers
into monetary terms. Time is a valuable economic resource that may be devoted
to work or leisure activities. Because traveling consumes time, it imposes an
opportunity cost equal to the individual value of time in the forgone work or
leisure activity.
The Department of Transportation proposes in [7] an approach to measure the
hourly values of travel time for aviation passengers. These values are used by the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and are not to be updated for changes in
price levels.
The following table shows the recommended hourly values of travel time sav-
ings, proposed by the Department of Transportation (DOT) upon guidance fur-
nished by the Office of the Secretary of Transportation of the United States of
America (OST).
Figure 6.6: Recommended values for aviation passenger travel time.
As there is no specific data available on the travel purpose of the diverted
passengers, one will assume that all the passengers in the study can be embraced
by the category "air carrier, all purposes". Therefore, one can conclude that the
cost coefficient CostP that will be used in the mathematical model, to represent
the diverted passengers value of time, will be equal to 28,60 US$.
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6.4.2.2 Cost of chartering a new aircraft
In order to get a sense of the costs of chartering a new aircraft, it has been
used the estimations of aircraft operating costs done by the Economic counsel to
the Transportation Industry in [7]. The guide proposes cost data defined for air
carrier and general aviation aircraft as variable or fixed. Variable costs change in
proportion to aircraft usage, and include fuel and oil, maintenance and crew costs.
One could assume that crew costs are fixed in the short run, especially in the
case for entities that operate one or a small number of aircraft, but as the airlines
involved in the study are big air carriers, the cost of crew will be left as variable.
The U.S. airline industry has undergone considerable financial restructuring
following the events of September11, 2001. This, coupled with a shift in the
business cycle, caused severe losses for U.S. air carriers, and a situation where
the supply of seats in the industry well exceeded demand at existing price levels.
In response, carriers reduced fares to maintain traffic levels, or took aircraft out
of service. This in turn reduced airline revenues and caused carriers to enter
into significant cost reduction programs. Some carriers reorganized their finances
and obligations through the bankruptcy process. During this time, the "old line"
carriers actually reduced their level of output while the "low cost carriers" increased
market share.
Since then, the trend in air carriers shows the direct operating expenses to be
below the 50 percent of total costs for major air carriers. To support this fact,
the following table provides a perspective on overall carrier costs and the relative
magnitudes of each category of costs. The air carrier costs are shown per block
hour by objective grouping. The data is divided into passenger and all cargo
carriers and then into the groupings of Major, National, and Regional carriers.
Major air carriers have annual revenues of more than $1 Billion; whilst national
carriers have annual revenues of more than $100 milllion.
The source of cost data for carriers used in [7] was the Bureau of Transportation
Statistics (BTS) Form 41 and Form 298-C. Form 41 data covers large air carriers
(generally those with annual revenues of at least $ 100 million), although some
carriers have exemptions from reporting Form 41. Form 298-C data cover smaller
air carriers (generally smaller carriers operating under FAR 121 and / or FAR 135).
FAR 121 is a section of 14 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations). Basically, airlines
fall under FAR 121 regulations if they are a regularly scheduled air carrier. This
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Figure 6.7: Large air carrier operating expenses per block hour.
is compared to FAR 135 operators (generally on-demand charter-type services), or
Part 91 operators (general operators).
As shown in figure 6.7, the focus will be the category "Passengers", as they are
mainly the air carriers involved in the study. The last row of figure 6.7 summarizes
the total operating costs of aircraft per block hour, specified per type of air carrier
(Major, National or Regional). In the mathematical model, the cost coefficient
that represents the cost of operating a new aircraft chartered, CostAffreting,
is defined per passenger. The reason for specifying the cost of chartering per
passenger, is that it enables the model to escalate the cost of chartering an aircraft.
A great number of passengers will mean a linear greater cost, and thus embracing
a wider range of aircraft type that can be chartered without having to specify them
previously, as there is no data regarding which aircraft were available at every time
slot.
It will be assumed in the model that all the aircraft used for affretting will
be "passenger" aircraft from "Major" air carrier type. Therefore, one can observe
how the cost of chartering the aircraft will be 6.445 US$ per hour. Then, in
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order to make the chartering cost scalable, it has been assumed an average aircraft
passenger capacity. The average passenger capacity of aircraft will depend of every
airport, as airport facilities (such as runway length or taxi facilities) condition
the size of aircraft that can be operated in each airport. Nevertheless, it will be
established an average passenger capacity of 120 seats, roughly estimated according
to the aircraft type volume operated at SFO.
One can conclude finally that the CostAffreting coefficent that will be used
in the model, will be calculated dividing the 6.445 US$ per hour, per an estimated
average passenger capacity of 120 seats. Thus, CostAffreting coefficent it is
estimated as 53,70 US$ per passenger.
6.4.2.3 Cost of inter-modal substitution
It was analysed previously in the report "Operational issues in inter-modal
substitution" how the inter-modal substitution would be operated. Two separate
assessments were done, first the assessment of a partial inter-modal substitution,
within the Bay Area, and secondly a complete inter-modal substitution, apply-
ing the substitution straight from the diverted airports to SFO. The objective
of the assessments was to be able to compute the coefficents CostBVBayArea and
CostBVDivAirport, that are needed as input data for the mathematical programming
developed.
The inter-modal substitution within the Bay Area, as explained in the previous
report, would take part if passengers are squeezed into flights to the alternative
airports in the Bay Area (San Jose or Oakland), from where passengers would
be sent to SFO by surface means of transport. The conclusions of the assessment
showed how the most cost-effective substitution, in terms of passenger time savings
and airline operational costs, would be to contract local charter-companies for the
inter-modal service in an on-call basis. The variable cost estimated was of 7,50
US$ per passenger. Regarding the service fixed costs, one could think airlines
would have to pay a fixed amount to charter companies, in order to ensure charter
companies would prioritize the airlines demands in case they had already been
booked. Nevertheless, as it has not been possible to conduct surveys with local
charter companies to ask which fare would be charged, it will be assumed in the
model that the only cost of inter-modal service is the variable cost.
Therefore, one can conclude, that the cost coefficent CostBVBayArea used for
the model will be of 11 US$ per passenger.
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The second approach analysed the most cost-effective substitution correspond-
ing to the complete inter-modal substitution. If one recalls, only the Los Angeles
Intl. Airport, Reno Tahoe Intl. Airport and Sacramento Intl. Airport presented
feasible complete inter-modal subsitutions, therefore only the operational costs for
these 3 airports were computed. The assessment showed how the operational costs
of the inter-modal service at these 3 airports were similar to those in the Bay Area.
The difference resides in the frequency for which the same motor coach could be
used. For instance, within the Bay Area each motor coach was estimated to be
able to perform 3 substitution per day, whilst in Sacramento, motor coaches could
be used only for two substitutions. In the case of Reno Tahoe or Los Angeles, each
motor coach could perform only one subsitution, due to greater driving distances
to SFO. Evidently, a higher service frequency will lower the costs, making the
inter-modal service a better option for the airports that are closer to SFO.
Furthermore, the assumption on fixed costs of the inter-modal service would
apply, as there was no possibility of conducting surveys with local charter compa-
nies at Sacramento, Reno or Los Angeles.
Therefore, as for the study presented in previous reports, one can conclude
how the cost coefficent CostBVDivAirport would have the following values for the 3
airports in which this rerouting option is feasible:
• CostBVSacramento = 11 US $ per passenger.
• CostBVReno = 22 US $ per passenger.
• CostBVLosAngeles = 22 US $ per passenger.
6.4.2.4 Summary of cost coefficent estimations
After analysing each cost coefficent used in the mathematical programming
separately, one can now summarize all the values in the following table, in order
to have them present for the model implementation.
One can observe how the cost coefficents give us a sense of the cost-effectivenes
of each rerouting option. As expected, the operational costs of inter-modal service
are lower than the operational costs of chartering a new aircraft.
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Figure 6.8: Summary of values of cost coefficients.
However, one must have in mind that the mathematical programming will
balance the operational costs (associated with the cost coefficients shown in figure
6.8), with the cost savings that a lower delay may generate (associated with the
passanger value of time). Therefore, low operational costs will not always be an
indicator of the most cost-effective rerouting.
6.5 Representation of cost behaviour in rerout-
ing options
The following section will show, according to the cost coefficients previously
summarized, how the programming will trade-off the different costs in order to
decide which rerouting option is the most cost effective. As an example, two
scenarios have been built, to show two different situations that may arise during
the rerouting of diverted passengers:
All the scenarios will be assumed to be reroutings from Reno Tahoe Interna-
tional airport (RNO). Flights connecting RNO and SFO have an estimated length
of 55 minutes, whilst the bus driving time is about 120 minutes. The scenarios
do not include the option of being squeezed into flights to the alternative airports
in the Bay Area (SJC or OAK) and then transported through surface means of
transport to SFO. Having these assumptions in mind one can start analysing the
2 scenarios represented below.
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6.5.1 Scenario 1 - All airlines’ ressources available
The first scenario represents a diverted passenger being rerouted as soon as he is
available in the diverted airport. The cost representation of this scenario shows the
evolution with time of the cost per passenger attached to every rerouting option.
The scenario assumes that there are available buses for inter-modal substitution,
available aircraft to be chartered (and remaining capacity at SFO for their landing),
as well as available seats for the passenger to be squeezed into flights either to SFO
or the Bay Area.
Figure 6.9: Rerouting scenario 1
Please notice in figure 6.9 how the time value t starts the moment in which the
passenger lands in the diverted airport (t = 0). As it can be observed the passenger
is not available for being reaccomodated after 30 minutes after his landing (t = 30).
This is due to the fact that it takes approximately 30 minutes for passengers to
get out of the aircraft, pick their luggage, and follow the instructions to go to the
next boarding gate.
As it has been previously stated, the figure represents the evolution with time
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of the cost per passenger attached to every rerouting option. If one recalls from
Chapter 5, the rerouting options that passengers have are:
• Squeezing into flights to SFO
• Squeezing into flights to OAK or SJC
• Reaccomodation with an chartered aircraft
• Substitution from the diverted airport to SFO
• Remain stuck at the diverted airport
Figure 6.9 shows how in this first scenario, squeezing the passenger into a flight
to SFO is the most cost effective, as this rerouting option involves no additional
cost other than the passenger delay cost. The second most cost effective solution
would be to squeeze the passenger into a flight to either SJC or OAK, then would
come the complete inter-modal substitution, and finally the least cost effective
option would be to affrete an aircraft to send passengers to SFO.
The mathematical model developed performs the trade-off between the different
options and will select the rerouting that is more cost-effective. Paying closer
attention to figure 6.9, the linear behaviour of each cost function can be understood
when having in mind the costs that every rerouting option has attached:
• Squeezing into flights to SFO: Linear function. Only computes the cost
of passenger delay (time dependent).
• Squeezing into flights to OAK or SJC: Linear function with a fixed
cost. Computes the cost of passenger delay (time dependent), and adds the
operational cost of contracting motor-coaches (fixed amount per passenger).
• Reaccomodation with an chartered aircraft: Linear function. Com-
putes the cost of passenger delay (time dependent), and adds the operational
cost of chartering an aircraft (modeled time dependent to be scalable).
• Substitution from the diverted airport to SFO: Linear function with
a fixed cost. Computes the cost of passenger delay (time dependent), and
adds the operational cost of contracting motor-coaches (fixed amount per
passenger).
• Remain stuck at the diverted airport: Linear function. Only computes
the cost of remaining stuck in the diverted airport (time dependent).
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As it has previously been stated, this Scenario assumes that the airline would
have all the ressources necessary to implement the 5 rerouting options at t =
30. This hypothesis it is rarely true, and therefore some rerouting options would
require longe waiting time for passengers, and thus and increase in the delay cost
component. The next scenario shows this situation.
6.5.2 Scenario 2 - Not all airlines’ ressources available
The first scenario representeds a diverted passenger being rerouted as soon as
he is available in the diverted airport, as it has been hypothesized that Airlines’
had all the ressources needed for each rerouting option (motor coaches, chartered
aircrafts, remaining capacity in outgoing flights to the Bay), thus they had only
to pick the most cost-effective one. Nevertheless, this situation is not realistic.
The second scenario represents a new situation, in which the airline does not
dispose of all these mentioned ressources at the arrival of the diverted passenger.
For instance, scenario 2 assumes the following lack of ressources:
• There are no ressources available from t = 0 to t = 120.
• At t = 120 the airline disposes of an aircraft to affrete, and a motor-coach
to perform a complete inter-modal substitution.
• At t = 180 two flights departure with remaining capacity for diverted pas-
sengers to be squeezed in, one with destination to SFO and the other with
destination OAK.
According to the ressources’ availability previously detailed, it can be observed
how in Scenario 2, the minimum waiting time for this diverted passenger will be
2 hours. After the two hours the passenger has the possibility to be reaccomo-
dated into an chartered aircraft or a contracted motor-coach. Furthermore, if the
passenger prefers to wait 3 hours, he/she could be squeezed into a flight either to
SFO or to OAK.
The following figure shows how the computing of the costs would be in Scenario
2, taking into account the previously detailed ressources’ availability.
108
6 – Mathematical programming - Airport pairs optimisation model
Figure 6.10: Rerouting Scenario 2
It can now be observed how the change in the ressources’ availability modifies
the whole picture. In Scenario 2, the most cost effective option would be to squeeze
the passenger in the flight with destination to SFO, although it would involve the
passenger to wait for 3 hours in the diverted airport. The second most cost-effective
option would be to reaccomodate the passanger in a motor-coach with destination
SFO. The third option would be to squeeze the passenger into a flight to OAK,
and finally the least cost-effective option would be to reaccomodate the passenger
in an chartered aircraft.
In this new Scenario, the mathematical programming will reaccomodate the
passenger in the squeezed flight, as it is the most cost-effective rerouting option.
Nevertheless, it can also be seen how the passenger would perceive a longer trip
in this option, and would have to be stuck a longer period in the airport, than if
he/she is rerouted with a contracted motor-coach.
6.5.3 Scenarios conclusion
First, the two different scenarios show how the mathematical programming will
select the rerouting option that is most cost-effective, according to the ressources
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available in that particular time period.
Secondly, the cost representation shows how the cost of each rerouting option
will be a trade-off between the cost of passengers’ delay and the operational costs
attached to that particular rerouting option. For instance, a faster rerouting will
mean less delay costs but it may involve also greater operational costs, transforming
it into a not so efficient rerouting option.
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Implementation Analysis
7.1 Introduction
The objectivse of the implementation performed was to; first give a better un-
derstanding of how the model parameters interact in the decision-making of the
rerouting of passengers, through a sensistivity analysis on some of the parame-
ters of the model. Secondly, and most important, was to prove how an efficient
and systematic inter-modal rerouting could help airlines to recover their schedules
faster in critical situations. In order to correctly understand the implementation
scenarios, two main assumptions must be defined:
• The rerouting of passengers will be aggregated. In such disruptive
situations as Asiana Crash, where SFO remained nearly closed for more than
one day and where more than 7.000 passengers must be rerouted, airlines may
be obliged to collaborate even out of their alliances, in order to ensure a cost-
efficient recovery from the disruptions. Therefore, no distinction between
airlines has been performed in the rerouting of passengers, imposing the rule
First-Arrived-First-Served.
• BTS represents a realistic set of flight data. Although BTS data
does not contain information regarding international flights, as the number
of international diverted flights as consequence of Asiana Crash was low, it
has been assumed that the data provided by the Bureau of Transportation
Statistics is representative enough to ensure a realistic implementation of the
mathematical model developed.
• Rerouting of the flights that could not reach SFO. Acording to the
BTS data, the implementations will only take into account the flights that
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had as scheduled destination SFO, but after being diverted have no reported
arrival to SFO.
• One-day rerouting. In coherence with the airlines behaviour in the rerout-
ing of passengers, the inter-modal and charter rerouting options have only
been taken into account within the day of arrival of the passengers. The
overnight of passengers in hotels to wait for next day flights has not been
considered.
As for the analysis performed on the feasibility of an inter-modal substitution
between the airports involved in the absortion of diverted flights during the 4-
day period of study, the implementation has only been performed in the four
airports for which it was feasible. Due to a extremely high driving times to SFO,
the rerouting from Phoenix, Denver, Salt Lake City, Seattle and Mississipi has
not been performed. Therefore, the implementations that will be shown in this
chapter are as follow:
1. Reno Tahoe Intl. Airport
• Sensitivity analysis on βwait, βtransp and available ressources
• Sensitivity analysis on Minimum Aircraft and Bus passenger loads.
2. Sacramento Intl. Airport
• Sensitivity analysis on βwait, βtransp and available ressources
3. Reno Tahoe Intl. Airport
• Sensitivity analysis on βwait, βtransp and available ressources
• Comparison with a non-intermodal rerouting
4. Mc Carran Intl. Airport (Las Vegas)
• Sensitivity analysis on available ressources
• Comparison with a non-intermodal rerouting
The different implementation scenarios have been defined to grow in the number
of rerouted passengers and available ressources, being able to apply the feedback
of the implementations of smaller samples to the greater reroutings. The objective
of the implementation scenarios can be understood as follows:
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The first implementation performed was the rerouting from Reno Tahoe Intl.
Airport, located 230 miles from SFO and absorbing only two diverted flights. It
was aimed basically to give a better understanding of the correct performance of
the model, and a first insight on a sensitivity analysis, although the low volume was
not very representative. Secondly, the rerouting from Sacramento Intl. Airport
has been performed, to give a broader insight on the senstivitiy analysis after the
conclusions from the first implementation.
The third rerouting optimised has been from Los Angeles Intl. Airport, with a
greater amount of passengers diverted, and a diverse scope of ressources available,
with the objective of giving a real image of the trade-off between modes in the
decision-making process of the mathematical model. Finally, the last optimisation
has been from Mc Carran Intl. Airport, aims to give a Worst Case Scenario due
to its distance to SFO, in order to understand how higher driving times influence
the priorisation for air modes of transportation.
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7.2 Case Scenario 1: Rerouting from Reno-Tahoe
International Airport
7.2.1 Input Data
7.2.1.1 Set of diverted flights
The model implementations have been performed on a real set of data, as
specified in Chapter 1. The first implementation corresponds to the rerouting of
the diverted passengers to Reno-Tahoe International Airport (RNO).
Figure 7.1: Location of Reno Tahoe Intl. Airport
As it has been introduced in Chapter 1, during the 4 day period of study, RNO
International Airport only absorbed diversions the 6th of July, which accounted for
a 4% of the total diverted flights on the date. Furthermore, these flights were not
able to reach their final destination (SFO) after the diversion to RNO. Therefore,
the mathematical programming will try to assess the most cost-effective solution
for the rerouting of these diverted passengers back to SFO. Extracted from the
database available from BTS, the following table shows the set of flights with
destination SFO that were diverted to RNO. The table has been also used as
input data for the optimizations.
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Figure 7.2: Set of diverted flights to RNO
Where the columns of the table corresond to:
• DAY: Day of the 4-day period of study. In this case 6th of July.
• TAIL_NUM: Tail number of the diverted flight.
• FL_NUM: Flight number of the diverted flight.
• Pass. load: Estimated passenger load.
• DT: Departure time.
• ActualDT: Actual departure time.
• AT: Scheduled arrival time.
• ActualDivAT: Actual arrival time to the diverted airport.
As it can be observed, only two flights were diverted to RNO on the 6th of
July, landing between 1pm and 2:30 pm. The total number of passengers that will
need to be rerouted is 211 passengers.
7.2.1.2 Set of departure flights to the Bay Area
The first rerouting possibility of diverted passengers, as seen in Chapter 5,
is to be squeezed into flights to the Bay Area. Particularly, Reno-Tahoe is a
small airport with no flights connecting to OAK or SJC, but only with SFO. The
following figure shows the set of flights that have been used as input data.
Most of the columns of table 7.3 contain the same variables as the input data
for the diverted flights. Additionally, the following data is provided specifically for
departure flights:
• DEST: Destination airport of the departure flight.
• Capacity: Maximum passenger capacity of the aircraft assigned to the tail
number.
• ActualAT: Actual arrival time of the departure flight.
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Figure 7.3: Set of departure flights from RNO to the Bay Area
7.2.1.3 Aircraft and bus capacities
The last input data required by the mathematical programming is the passenger
capacities of the aircraft available to be affreted, as well as for the motor coaches
used for inter-modal substitution.
After the study performed on the operational issues in inter-modal substitu-
tion, please see section Chapter 5, it has been assumed that all the motor-coaches
available for inter-modal substitution have the same capacity: 40 passengers. Re-
garding the passenger capacity of the aircraft affreted, as it is impossible to know
which aircraft were available at every time period for the 4-day period of study, it
has been assumed that there is a mixture of the more commonly used aircraft in
domestic flights. The following table shows passenger capacity of the fleet assumed
to be available:
Figure 7.4: Aircraft data used as input.
In figure 7.21, the aircraft with a maximum capacity of 60 passengers could
correspond to a Bombardier CL-600-2C10 Regional Jet in a small configuration,
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typically operated by Sky West Airline. Aircraft with maximum load of 70 passen-
gers could correspond to the Bombardier model CL-600-2D15 (Regional Jet Series
705) or a CL-600-2C10 in a large configuration. Finally, the aircraft with seating
capacity of 120 passengers represent the Airbus A319, typically operated by Virgin
America, United Airlines or US Airways, or the Boeing 737, typically operated by
SouthWest Airlines, United Airlines, Delta or US Airways.
7.2.2 Implementation Scenario
Because the linear program formulation grows almost linearly with the number
of passengers, it has been decided to perform an implementation using passenger
aggregation by batches. In this first implementation, passengers have been grouped
in batches of 10 passengers. This measure reduces 10 times the number of variables
of the program, and therefore the computational time required to optimize every
scenario, making feasible a sensitivity analysis on a larger number of cases.
7.2.2.1 General optimization context
The optimization scenario has the following general input variables:
Figure 7.5: General optimization input variables.
7.2.3 Sensitivity Analysis on βwait, βtransp and available ressources
The first implementation analysis has been to perform a sensitivity analysis
over the input variables βWait, βTransp, Max_buses and Max_Affrete. The
aim of this first sensitivity analysis was to analyse how these variables condition
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the assignment to the rerouting options in this first RNO based scenario. The
optimization has been performed on 539 different scenarios, in which previously
described input values were modified according to the following ranges:
• βWait: From 0.5 to 1.35 in steps of 0.05
• βTransp: From 1.5 to 0.65 in steps of 0.05. (βTransp = 2 − βWait)
• Max_Buses : From 5 to 10 in steps of 1
• Max_Affrete: From 1 to 5 in steps of 1
In this second analysis, all the scenarios were feasible. The results for every
optimization were computed and can be summarized in the following figure:
Figure 7.6: Feasibility analysis of the optimizations
As one can observe in figure 7.6, only a 20% of the optimizations had a feasible
solution. This is due to the fact that in the rerouting of RNO passengers the 6th of
July, the available departure flights to squeeze in passengers had already departed
before diverted passengers landed . Furthermore, the restrictions in the minimum
bus and aircraft load make some scenarios infeasible, as there is no configuration
in which the buses and aircraft can be filled up to its minimum load and reroute
the 100% of the passengers at the same time. The following figure shows how
only feasible solutions were obtained for the scenarios with 5 aircraft available to
be affreted, in which the mathematical programming finds an optimal solution by
rerouting passengers through two aircraft carrying a total of 130 passengers and 2
buses loaded with 80 passengers in total.
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Figure 7.7: Cost objective function against number of buses and aircraft available.
Figure 7.7 shows how the value of the cost objective for the different opti-
mizations differs. Nevertheless, one can observe how the value is constant for any
given maximum number of buses. This is due to the fact that the optimal solu-
tion computed uses only two buses. Furthermore, one can see how there are only
feasible solutions when airlines’ have 5 aircraft available. This is a result of the
combination of the input data displayed in figure 7.21 and the minimum load
for aircraft (90%) and bus (100%). The following figure displays the rerouting
departure times of the diverted passengers in the different modes to which they
were assigned.
As it has been mentioned previously, all the feasible solutions provided the
same rerouting configuration due to the minimum load constraints, as figure 7.8
shows. Nevertheless, figure 7.7 denotes how the objective function value obtanied
differs for the different feasible scenarios differs. This is result of the variation of
βwait and βtransp values.
The following figure shows the distribution of the objective function values
obtained for the feasible scenarios, against βwait.
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Figure 7.8: Rerouting departure times.
Figure 7.9: Cost objective distribution against BetaWait
As it can be inferred from this first sensitivity analysis, the influence of βwait
and βtransp in the assignment to the different rerouting modes is constrained by
the minimum loads of the buses and aircraft affreted. Furthermore, as this first
rerouting involved only 210 passengers, the margin for variations of the optimal
solutions was very low. Thus, another sensitivity analysis has been performed in
the RNO rerouting case scenario, to try to assess the influence of the variables
MinimumBusLoad and MinimumAircraftLoad.
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7.2.4 Sensitivity Analysis on minimum Aircraft and Bus
loads
This second sensitivity analysis has been performed over the input variables
MinimumBusLoad and MinimumAircraftLoad. The aim of this second sen-
sitivity analysis was to analyse how these variables condition the assignment to
the rerouting options in this first RNO based scenario by fixing βwait, βtransp,
Max_buses and Max_Affrete values. The optimization has been performed on
12 different scenarios, in which the previously described input values were modified
according to the following ranges:
• βWait = 1 (Fixed)
• βTransp= 1 (Fixed)
• Max_Buses = 6 (Fixed)
• Max_Affrete= 7 (Fixed)
• MinimumBusLoad: Vary from 80% to 100% in steps of 10%.
• MinimumAircraftLoad: Vary from 85% to 100% in steps of 5%.
The results now show certain variation in the assignment of passengers:
As it can be observed, two different rerouting configurations are obtained for
the corresponding input data. In this case, as the value of βwait and βtransp is fixed
to be equal to one, the difference between the values of the cost objective function
is only attributed to the allocation of more ressources. The two optimal solutions
that were obtained in this new analysis are presented in the following histograms:
As it can be observed in figure 7.11a, the first optimal rerouting allocates
two buses with a total of 80 passengers, and two affreted aircraft with 60 and 70
passengers respectively, whilst the second optimal configuration shown in figure
7.11b, the mathematical programming allocates one bus filled with 40 passengers
and two aircraft with a total of 170 passengers.
Although this second sensitivity cost analysis has been performed on a small
sample, only 12 optimization scenarios, it can still be infered how the minimum bus
and aircraft loads impact in the assignment of passengers in the different modes.
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Figure 7.10: Cost objective distribution against the minimum bus and aircraft
loads
(a) 1st optimal assignment (b) 2nd optimal assignment
Figure 7.11: Optimal solutions of the sensitivity cost over the minimum bus and
aircraft loads.
Airlines could for instance prioritize the time of their passengers, by letting buses
leave being not fully booked, or otherwise they could decide to lower the rerouting
costs to the maximum level, by not permitting the buses or aircraft leave unless
they have been fully filled with diverted passengers.
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7.2.5 Conclusions
From the first sensitivity analysis on βwait, βtransp and available ressources no
relevant conclusions can be extracted. The low number of diverted passengers,
added to the restriction of the minimum bus and aircraft loads, make infeasible
to obtain many different rerouting configurations. Nevertheless, it can be inferred
how the variation of βwait and βtransp influence the value of the cost objective
function.
The second sensitivity analysis, performed on minimum aircraft and bus loads,
shows how the minimum passenger load to departure conditions in an earlier de-
parture of the vehicles, as well as in the rerouting configuration. As shown in the
results, a lower minimum bus loads impacts in the assignment of less passengers
to chartered aircrafts.
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7.3 Case Scenario 2: Rerouting from Sacramento
International Airport
7.3.1 Input Data
7.3.1.1 Set of diverted flights
The second rerouting scenario corresponds to the reaccomodation of the di-
verted passengers from Sacramento International Airport (SMF). SMF is located
100 miles from SFO, northwest from the Bay Area. SMF absorbed 676 diverted
passengers in 7 flights. The first 5 flights landed in SMF the 6th of July, with a
total passenger load of 540 passengers, whilst the other two flights landed the 9th
of July, with a passenger load of 136 passengers. Only the flights in the 6th of
July were not able to reach their final destination SFO, therefore this scenario will
reaccomodate efficiently the 540 passengers that were not able to reach SFO on
the 6th of July.
Figure 7.12: Location of Sacramento International Airport
Extracted from the database available from BTS, the following table shows the
set of flights with destination SFO that were diverted to SMF, and could not reach
SFO. The table has been also used as input data for the optimizations.
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Figure 7.13: Set of diverted flights to SMF
7.3.1.2 Set of departure flights to the Bay Area
The first rerouting possibility of diverted passengers, as seen in Chapter 5, is
to be squeezed into flights to the Bay Area. In this case, Sacramento is a medium
airport with low traffic. Half of their flights account for South West Airlines, and
they do not operate to SJC or OAK. Furthermore, there is a low frequency of
flights connecting SMF with SFO. The 6th of July there were only 45 available
seats for passengers to be squeezed spread in 3 flights, and all of them took off
before the diverted passengers landed at SFO.
Figure 7.14: Set of departure flights from SMF to the Bay Area
7.3.1.3 Aircraft and bus capacities
The Aircraft and Bus capacities used as input data are the equal to the input
data used for the Reno-Tahoe scenario (section 7.2.1).
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7.3.2 Implementation Scenario
In the case of Sacramento implementation, it has been decided to perform an
implementation using passenger aggregation by batches. In this third implemen-
tation, passengers have been grouped in batches of 5 passengers.
7.3.2.1 General optimization context
The optimization scenario has the following general input variables:
Figure 7.15: General optimization input variables.
7.3.3 Sensitivity Analysis on βwait, βtransp, and available ressources
The analysis performed over the input variables βwait, βtransp,Max_Buses and
Max_Affrete. In order to distinguish closely how the number of the variables
impact the distribution between modes, they have been modified according to the
following ranges:
• βWait= From 0.5 to 1.5 in steps of 0.2
• βTransp = 2 - βWait
• Max_Buses : From 10 to 14 in steps of 1
• Max_Affrete: From 0 to in steps of 5
The scenarios with no aircraft available and 10 or 11 buses available were
not feasible, accounting for an 8% of the optimizations performed. The following
figure shows the percentual distribution between modes in every scenario, in order
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to distinguish how the rerouting costs are taken into account when assigning the
rerouting mode.
Figure 7.16: Rerouting assignment distribution modes.
As the available flights to the Bay Area had already departed when the diverted
passengers landed, no passengers have been squeezed. Furthermore, it can be
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observed how the more aircraft available are placed, the passengers are assigned to
the new affreted aircraft increases, to the detriment of the substitution passengers.
The next figure shos how the amount of passengers assigned to each rerouting
mode:
Figure 7.17: Number of passengers assigned to each rerouting mode
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Once analysed the distribution between modes, the impact of the betas in the
allocation of ressources has also been analysed. The following figure shows the
objective function values grouped by the βwait value used in each implementation:
Figure 7.18: Objective function value per BetaWait groupings
As mentioned previously, the scenarios with only 1 Aircraft and 10 to 11 buses
are not feasible, as no passengers can be squeezed. It can also be inferred how the
cost increases the scenarios were the number of buses available is increased and the
number of aircraft available is low. The rerotuing costs ranges from a minimum
of $26.341 with 14 buses and 5 aircraft available, to a maximum of $64.772 with 1
aircraft and 12 to 14 buses available.
7.3.4 Conclusions
This second rerouting shows the best case scenario for the inter-modal substi-
tution, as is the closest airport to SFO. Furthermore the sensitivity analysis on
βwait, βtransp and available ressources on a rerouting of a greater amount of passen-
gers, in relation to the previous implementation, permits to extract the following
consequences:
• βwait and βtransp have apparently no influence in the assignment of passengers
to rerouting modes.
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• The increase in the available aircraft to be chartered directly increases the
affreted passengers.
• The passanger value of time is considerably high, making the rerouting
through surface modes of transport a less cost-effective option, due to the
longer travel times
The second sensitivity analysis, performed on minimum aircraft and bus loads,
shows how the minimum passenger load to departure conditions in an earlier de-
parture of the vehicles, as well as in the rerouting configuration. As shown in the
results, a lower minimum bus loads impacts in the assignment of less passengers
to chartered aircrafts.
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7.4 Case Scenario 3: Rerouting from Los Ange-
les International Airport
7.4.1 Input Data
7.4.1.1 Set of diverted flights
The third rerouting scenario corresponds to the reaccomodation of the diverted
passengers from Los Angeles International Airport (LAX). LAX is the airport
within the largest distance from SFO, and therefore the trade-off of the costs
between the different modes of transportation will be notorious. Furthermore,
LAX absorbed more than 1100 passengers on the 6th of July, making the rerouting
within the same day particularly challenging.
Figure 7.19: Location of Los Angeles Intl. Airport
As it has been shown in Chapter 2, during the 4 day period of study, LAX
International Airport only absorbed diversions the 6th of July, which accounted
for a 11% of the total diverted flights on the date. Furthermore, these flights were
not able to reach their final destination (SFO) after the diversion. Therefore, the
mathematical programming will try to assess the most cost-effective solution for
the rerouting of these diverted passengers back to SFO.
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Extracted from the database available from BTS, the following table shows the
set of flights with destination SFO that were diverted to LAX, and could not reach
SFO. The table has been also used as input data for the optimizations.
Figure 7.20: Set of diverted flights to LAX
All the columns of table 7.20 represent the same variables as for the previous
scenarios (please see section 7.2.1). As it can be observed, all the flights were
diverted to LAX on the 6th of July, landing between 1pm and 9pm. In this case
scenario, the total number of passengers that will need to be rerouted is 1.156
passengers.
7.4.1.2 Set of departure flights to the Bay Area
The first rerouting possibility of diverted passengers, as seen in Chapter 5, is
to be squeezed into flights to the Bay Area. In this case, Los Angles intl. aiport
has a great frequency of connecting flights to the Bay Area. Particularly, 45 flights
departured the 6th of July with destination the Bay Area. After estimating their
passenger loads, and extracting the flights passenger capacity from FAA registry,
it could be computed the remaining capacity of the flights. The 6th of July there
were 835 available seats for passengers to be squeezed, although a some part of
the flights took off before the diverted passengers landed at SFO.
7.4.1.3 Aircraft and bus capacities
The last input data required by the mathematical programming is the passenger
capacities of the aircraft available to be affreted, as well as for the motor coaches
used for inter-modal substitution.
In this third rerouting scenario, as stated in section 7.2.1, all motor-coaches
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available for inter-modal substitution will also be defined to have 40 seats capacity.
Regarding the aircraft affreted, the assumption as for the previous two scenarios
will apply. The following table shows the passenger capacity of the fleet assumed
to be available:
Figure 7.21: Aircraft data used as input for LAX rerouting scenario.
As explained in section 7.2.1, the aircraft with a maximum passenger capacity
of 60 passengers intend to resemble the capacity of a Bombardier CL-600-2C10 Re-
gional Jet in a small configuration, aircraft with capacity of 70 passengers represent
the Bombardier model CL-600-2D15 (Regional Jet Series 705) or a CL-600-2C10
in a large configuration, and finally, the aircraft with a seating capacity of 120
passengers represent the Airbus A319 or Boeing 737.
7.4.2 Implementation Scenario
As for the previous implementation scenarios, it has been decided to perform
an implementation using passenger aggregation by batches. In this third imple-
mentation, passengers have been grouped in batches of 5 passengers.
7.4.2.1 General optimization context
The optimization scenario has the following general input variables:
7.4.3 Sensitivity Analysis on βwait, βtransp and available ressources
In the first implementation analysis, a sensitivity analysis over the input vari-
ables Max_buses and Max_Affrete has been performed. The aim of this first
analysis was to assess the trade-off between transportation modes in a greater
passenger sample. In order to distinguish closely how the number of Buses and
Aircraft available affect the distribution between modes, βWait and βTransp have
been fixed to 1. The optimization has been performed on 12 different scenarios,
133
7 – Implementation Analysis
Figure 7.22: General optimization input variables.
in which the previously described input values were modified according to the
following ranges:
• βWait=1 (fixed)
• βTransp =1 (fixed)
• Max_Buses : From 20 to 30 in steps of 5
• Max_Affrete: From 0 to 6 in steps of 2
All the scenarios were feasible. The results for every optimization were com-
puted and can be summarized in the following figure:
As it can be inferred, the allocation of more aircraft lowers the cost of the
rerouting. This is due to the fact that LAX is located aproximately 400 miles from
SFO, making a rerouting through surface means of transport little expensiver than
the rerouting through affreted aircraft. In order to clearly identify the distribution
between modes in this first LAX rerouting analysis, the following figure has been
computed:
As stated previously, it can be observed how the more aircraft available are
placed, the passengers are assigned to the new affreted aircraft increases, to the
detriment of the substitution passengers. Furthermore, it can be observed in figure
7.24 how the amount of passengers squeezed remains aproximately constant. This
is due to the fact that the squeezing option has no operational cost added, and
therefore is most of the times the most cost-effective option.
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Figure 7.23: Optimization results
Figure 7.24: Rerouting assignment distribution modes.
Nevertheless, some of the departure flights already took off when the diverted
passengers landed in LAX, and another group of flights departured in the late after-
noon, making some times cost-effectiver to reaccomodate the diverted passengers
in other modes.
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Figure 7.25: Number of passengers assigned to each rerouting mode
7.4.4 Comparison of rerouting times with a non inter-modal
rerouting
In order to correctly compare to a realistic airline rerouting, and having in mind
that no data regarding the actual rerouting of Asiana Crash diverted passengers
was available, two assumptions have been performed, in order to analyse two
possible scenarios:
• Hypothesis A: Best case scenario. Diverted passengers will be squeezed
in the first seat available, without taking into account if the rerouting is
performed with the same operator.
• Hypothesis B: Realistic case scenario. Diverted passengers will only be
squeezed into available seats from their arrival flights’ airline
Both analysis have been performed previously for RNO and SMF reroutings,
but the figures were alarming due to a low frequency of flights between these
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airpots and the Bay Area, reason why airlines may had to proceed with special
operations. Nevertheless, the same analysis for LAX airport shows a different
picture, as every given day there are 50 to 60 flights scheduled to the Bay Area,
making the rerouting definitely faster.
7.4.4.1 Hypothesis A: Rerouting in first seat available
In order to correctly assess the effectiveness of the mathematical model de-
veloped, the comparison must be performed under the same conditions. As it
has been stated in the assumptions of the implementation, please see Chapter 6,
the implementation has been performed under an aggregated rerouting, meaning
the rerouting has not been grouped by airlines. Thus, the results obtained with
the model should be compared to a non inter-modal rerouting under the above
presented hypothesis A.
In this case, the route between LAX and SFO is highly operated, making
LAX a good candidate for the diversion of flights with destination SFO. After
analysing the schedule between these two cities in the 4-day period of study, it can
be observed how there was a high daily traffic between LAX and the Bay Area,
with 48 flights scheduled and not cancelled on the 6th of July, and raising a 16%
up to 63 flights on the 7th of July. The available seats to squeeze in passengers
has been computed acording to the estimated load factors provided by BTS, for
departure flights from LAX during July 2013. The next figure shows the estimated
load factors separated by airline:
Figure 7.26: Estimated load factors separated by airline.
Acording to the previously shown estimated load factors ( 7.26), the following
figure shows the available slots in the departure flights to squeeze in passengers,
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together with the arrival of the diverted flights, in order to get a sense of the
possibilities of rerouting that airlines had on the 6th of July.
Figure 7.27: Scheduled and diverted flights per time slot on the 6h of July.
It can be observed in figure 7.27 a high concentration of available seats during
the afternoon. In the time bracket 4pm to 10pm the 65% of the available seats
are placed. Nevertheless, aproximately a 30% of the flights had already departed
when the diverted passengers landed in LAX, making the entire rerouting on the
6th of July infeasible. Therefore, airlines probably offered hotel vouchers for their
passangers to overnight nearby the airport and wait until the 7th of July to be
rerouted. The following figure shows the available slots during the 7th of July:
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Figure 7.28: Scheduled and diverted flights per time slot on the 7th of July.
Then, once the available slots are computed, if the diverted passengers are
aggregated at their arrival to LAX and rerouted with the first flight available, the
total delays can be computed. The results obtained are as follows:
Then, computing the weighted average block delays for all the diverted pas-
sengers, the results are as follows:
As one can observe, the average delay minutes incurred by the diverted pas-
sengers that landed in LAX, under the hypothesis that they were rerouted on the
first flight flying back to the Bay Area, is 10 hours and 24 minutes.
It must be taken into account, that the delay minutes computed do not take
into account the additional trip time that the passengers rerouted through SJC
and OAK would perceive, as they would have to take another mean of transport
to get to their final destination that was SFO. Thus, having in mind that this is
the best scenario possible, as passengers are squeezed into flights independently to
their origin airline flight and that they are sent to the Bay Area and not straight
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Figure 7.29: Detail of delays minute incurred by every passanger.
Figure 7.30: Block weighted delay minutes.
to SFO, 10h and 24 minutes is a very high delay.
7.4.4.2 Hypothesis B - Passengers rerouted with flights within the
same airline
Although in highly critical situations airlines may be forced to collaborate, in
order to succeed in a fast recovery from the disruption, hypothesis A differs from
the normal operational behaviour of airlines in schedule disruptions. Therefore,
as airlines may not likely let their competitors reroute the diverted passengers
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using their flights, hypothesis B has also been computed to offer a more realistic
approach of the Asiana crash situation. Thus, the following results show a non-
collaborative and non-inter-modal rerouting, meaning that passengers will only
be squeezed into flights of the same airline, and having in mind also that airlines
placed no new aircrafts to ferry back the passengers to SFO.
In the case of diversions to LAX, the affected air carriers were United Airlines,
American Airlines and Sky West Airlines. Thus, the analysis will be performed
case-by-case, looking at the flights that each airline company had scheduled for
the Bay Area on the 4-day period of study, and computing the available slots in
each of them, to assess if the rerouting would have been possible. In the case of
American Airlines:
Figure 7.31: American Airlines scheduled flights.
It can be observed how AA diverted one flight on the 6th of July with an
estimated load of 152 passengers, whilst it had only scheduled 2 flights from LAX
to the Bay Area on the 6th and 7th of July. In this case the flights went straight
to SFO, but their estimated available seats to squeeze in diverted passengers was
28 seats. Furthermore, the diverted flight landed in LAX at noon, and at that
time the first AA flight had already departed. That means that only a 11% of
the diverted passengers could be rerouted in less than 1 day, and consequently the
90% remaining will suffer a more than 2 days delay if another AA flight is not
placed to reroute them.
With only one scheduled flight per day, the rerouting will last so long that one
can conclude how the hypothesis B seems totally unfeasible for American Airlines
carrier. Let’s analyse United Airlines now:
The case of United Airlines is also delicate, as one of the flights that were
diverted was a Boeing 777 carrying an estimated number of 312 passengers, mak-
ing the total number of diverted passengers for UA raise up to 492 passengers.
Analysing the scheduled flights for the 6th and 7th of July, one can observe how
only a 38% of the diverted passengers could have been rerouted with UA flights
with less than 1 day delays. Consequently, more than a 60% of the passengers
would have to stay in a hotel for 2 days or more waiting for another flight. It can
also conclude how the hypothesis B seems also unfeasible for United Airlines if no
other UA flights are placed to reroute the remaining passengers.
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Figure 7.32: United Airlines scheduled flights.
Finally, if analysing the same situation for Sky West airlines case:
Figure 7.33: Sky West Airlines scheduled flights.
Sky West Airlines is in the best position between the affected airlines at LAX,
having 22 scheduled flights from LAX to the Bay Area after their one and only
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diverted flight landed in LAX the 6th of July. Furthermore, the diverted flight was
a Bombardier CL-600-2B19 with an estimated load of only 41 passengers, thus the
amount of disrupted passengers was significantly lower than for UA and AA.
Figure 7.34: Sky West Airlines rerouting flights.
Analysing the schedule, it can be observed how within less than 4h all the
diverted passengers would have been on their way to the Bay Area, with a total
average delay of 5 hours and 15 minutes.
Therefore, under hypothesis B, only in the Sky West case it would make prob-
ably economic sense not to do a multimodal substitution for the rerouting, and
even then passengers would perceive an average of 5 hours and 15 minutes delay
without taking into account the transportation time between OAK or SJC and
SFO, in the respective cases. In the cases of UA and AA, the passengers would
perceive extremely high delays, reason why these airlines may had to apply critical
measures to ensure a less disruptive journey.
7.4.5 Conclusions of the implementation
This third rerouting offers a broader picture of the model behaviour, as the
rerouting is performed over a greater passenger sample, enabling the model to try
more configurations within the rerouting constraints. Thus, the following conclu-
sions can be extracted from the sensitivity analysis on βwait, βtransp and available
ressources:
• Even in greater passenger samples, βwait and βtransp have apparently no in-
fluence in the assignment of passengers to rerouting modes.
• The passenger time value has a high weight in the rerouting costs, making
even in some cases the squeezing option non-optimal, as it holds passengers
in the diverted airport longer periods than other faster but operationally
more expensive rerouting options.
• The increase in the available aircraft to be chartered directly increases the
affreted passengers, diminishing proportionally the number of substituted
passengers.
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• The inter-modal service is not the most cost-effective due to the long distance
between LAX and SFO.
Furthermore, the comparison with a non-inter-modal rerouting gives a reference
of the effectiveness of the model. From the comparative analysis the following
conclusions can be extracted:
• Hypothesis A, (collaborative rerouting and non-inter-modal rerouting), shows
an average delay close to the 11 hours, making the inter-modal rerouting a
good solution for most disrupted passengers.
• Hypothesis B, (non-collaborative rerouting and non-inter-modal rerouting),
shows how most of the airlines may be forced to apply new solutions such as
inter-modal operations, to ensure their diverted passengers do not have to
overnight and suffer such unpleasant delays.
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7.5 Case Scenario 4: Rerouting from McCarran
International Airport
7.5.1 Input Data
7.5.1.1 Set of diverted flights
The fourth rerouting scenario corresponds to the reaccomodation of the di-
verted passengers from McCarran International Airport (LAS). LAS is located
more than 550 miles from SFO, southwest from the Bay Area, and absorbed a
10% of the diverted flights during the 6th of July, with a total passenger load of
571 passengers.
In the case of LAS, including it in the Regional Airport System of SFO would
mean to increase the range only up to 560 miles as one can observe in figure 7.35.
Up to this moment the greater distance from SFO had been given by LAX, which
is 400 miles from SFO, thus LAS will give us a reference of the maximum distance
for cost-effectiveness in this multimodal substitution within the SFO Regional
Airport System. The mathematical programming will trade-off the travel times
for surface means of transport and their lower operational costs, against squeezing
or affreting aircrafts, which would higher the operational costs but considerably
lower the rerouting times.
Figure 7.35: Location of McCarran International Airport
145
7 – Implementation Analysis
Extracted from the database available from BTS, the following table shows the
set of flights with destination SFO that were diverted to LAS, and could not reach
SFO. The table has been also used as input data for the optimizations.
Figure 7.36: Set of diverted flights to LAS
All the columns of table 7.36 represent the same variables as for the previous
scenarios (please see section 7.2.1). As it can be observed, the total number of
passengers that will need to be rerouted is 570 passengers.
7.5.1.2 Set of departure flights to the Bay Area
LAS is the 9th busiest airport in the US in terms of total passenger boardings,
and has a high frequency of flights to SFO, reaching the 15 to 26 daily flights per
day in peak seasons. Furthermore, the airlines operating in LAS also offer flights
connecting with SJC and OAK. The following figure shows the total departure
flights connecting LAS and the Bay Area during the 6th of July.
7.5.1.3 Aircraft and bus capacities
The last input data required by the mathematical programming is the passenger
capacities of the aircraft available to be affreted, as well as for the motor coaches
used for inter-modal substitution. In this McCarran Intl. Airport based scenario,
the bus and aircraft capacities implemented are equal to the input data used for
the other implementations (please see section 7.2.1).
7.5.2 Implementation Scenario
As for the previous implementation scenarios, it has been decided to perform
an implementation using passenger aggregation by batches. In this third imple-
mentation, passengers have been grouped in batches of 5 passengers.
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Figure 7.37: Set of departure flights to LAS
7.5.2.1 General optimization context
The optimization scenario has the following general input variables:
Figure 7.38: General optimization input variables.
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As it can be observed, the bus driving time from LAS to SFO is over 8 hours,
making the rerouting through surface means of transport a not so efficient option.
Moreover, the flight time between both airports, including boarding times, is ex-
pected to be of 135 minutes, making a huge difference with the subsitution option.
Presumably, the affreting and squeezing options will take an important role in this
rerouting scenario, reducing the amount of passengers rerouted by inter-modal
substitution.
7.5.2.2 Results of sensitivity Analysis on available ressources
The analysis performed over the input variables βwait, βtransp, Max_buses and
Max_Affrete. In order to distinguish closely how the number of the variables
impact the distribution between modes, they have been modified according to the
following ranges:
• βWait = 1 (Fixed)
• βTransp = 1 (Fixed)
• Max_Buses : From 10 to 14 in steps of 2
• Max_Affrete: From 0 to 6 in steps of 2
Therefore, 16 scenarios have been implemented for McCarran Intl. Airport
rerouting optimization, all of them being feasible. The results for every optimiza-
tion were computed and can be summarized in the following figure:
As it can be inferred, the allocation of more aircraft lowers the cost of the
rerouting. This is due to the fact that LAS is located 560 miles from SFO, mak-
ing a rerouting through surface means of transport expensiver than the rerouting
through affreted aircraft. In order to clearly identify the distribution between
modes, the following figure has been computed:
As stated previously, it can be observed how if the number of aircraft available
is increased, the number of passengers assigned to these new chartered aircraft
proportionally increases, to the detriment of the substitution passengers. This
situation already was shown in the rerouting scenario of Los Angeles International
Airport, and it is even more persistent in the LAS scenario due to the greater
distance to SFO. Furthermore, it can be observed in figure 7.40 how the amount
of passengers squeezed does not remain constant. Although the squeezing option
has no operational cost added, in this case scenario the available departure flights
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Figure 7.39: Optimization results
Figure 7.40: Rerouting assignment distribution modes.
had late departures, increasing the passenger waiting cost, and making more cost-
effective an earlier rerouting through other modes.
As it can be observed, the number of passengers squeezed fluctuates between
285 and 345 passengers. The number of passengers substituted has the minimum
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Figure 7.41: Number of passengers assigned to each rerouting mode
at 280 passengers, in the scenario with 6 aircraft available, and rises up to 800
passengers for the scenario with no aircaft available. Contrary, the number of
affreted passengers reaches the maximum at 560 passengers, and the minimum
with 0 passengers.
As it has been previously mentioned, Mc Carran Las Vegas is an extreme case
scenario, due to its long distance with respect to San Francisco, therefore, the
passengers rerouted through surface means of transport are particularly impacted.
It is clear that the inter-modal substitution enables a fast and systematic rerouting,
making the passengers perceive the least time stuck at the airport with no clue of
how will they be rerouted, nevertheless the average rerouting time grows due to the
use of slower modes of transport. The next figure shows the rerouting departure
times agains the arrival times of the diverted passengers at LAS:
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Figure 7.42: Departure against arrival times of las vegas diverted passengers
As it can be observed, the rerouting times raise up to an average of 8 hours and
6 minutes, whilst the average waiting time is little over 30 minutes. Although it
must be taking into account that this is a worst case scenario, as LAS is located 560
miles from SFO, resulting in aproximately 9 hours of motor-coach driving times,
this difference raise the question about what is more important; do passengers
perceive less disruptions if they are quickly set into their way home? or passengers
would rather prefer to overnight and wait over a day to be rerouted in a more
pleasant mode of transport? Customer experience in inter-modal services differ
within age and economic power, nevertheless this study still shows how passengers
would suffer no irritation while waiting for a response as they would be quickly
and systematically be placed again into their journey back home.
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7.5.3 Comparison of rerouting times with a non inter-modal
rerouting
Being McCarran International Airport an extreme case scenario, it is partic-
ularly interesting to compare the optimal rerouting computed with the mathe-
matical programming, with how the rerouting would have been with no aircraft
nor buses available for the rerouting of passengers. As it has been previously
stated for LAX rerouting case scenario, two hypothetical airline scenarios have
been computed:
• Hypothesis A: Best case scenario. Diverted passengers will be squeezed
in the first seat available, without taking into account if the rerouting is
performed with the same operator.
• Hypothesis B: Realistic case scenario. Diverted passengers will only be
squeezed into available seats from their arrival flights’ airline
First, the following figure shows the cumulative rerouting of diverted passengers
in the optimal rerouting configuration computed by the mathematical program-
ming, against a passenger rerouting computed under hypothesis A.
The optimised rerouting shown in figure 7.43 corresponds to the optimization
scenario #14, in which airlines would have 16 buses and 2 aircraft available for
the rerouting of their diverted passengers. It can be observed how the inter-modal
rerouting would enable passengers to be rerouted within the same day, whilst under
Hypothesis A, altough it is a best case scenario, as passengers would be rerouted
independently to their origin ticket provider, passengers would have to wait more
than two days to be rerouted back to SFO.
Again, it must be emphasized that the average travel time with the inter-modal
rerouting would raise up to 8 hours, whilst a conventional rerouting would have an
average of 2 hours travel times. Nevertheless, the passengers would suffer 20 hours
more delay if they are hold in the diverted airport waiting for an available seat in
the subsequent flights. As mentioned previously, this difference raises the question
about what is less disruptive for passengers; do passengers find less irritating to
avoid to overnight nearby the airport, although it would mean longer travel times?
or passengers would rather prefer to wait on average 30 hours to be rerouted in a
more pleasant mode of transport?
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Figure 7.43: Comparison of cumulative passenger reroutings.
Mc Carran Las Vegas Intl. Aiport is not the best candidate for inter-modal
operations with destination SFO, but still the effectiveness of the implementation
of this new rerouting option must be taken into account.
What is more, performing the same analysis but applying hypothesis B, mean-
ing passengers will only be squeezed into flights from their original flight operator,
the delays perceived by passengers are even greater. The following figure shows
the available seats in the airlines involved in the diversions to LAS on the 6th of
July.
Having in mind that the airlines involved in the diversions to LAS had on
average close to 140 passengers on board, it can be inferred how only Virgin
America would have been able to squeeze all their diverted passengers within two
days from the Asiana Crash. Moreover, it can be observed how some of the airlines
had all their flights canceled during the 6th of July, and a low flight frequency on
the 7th of July, directly impacting in the rerouting possibilities of the diverted
passengers. It can be concluded that the delays that most of the passengers would
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Figure 7.44: Cumulative reroutings under hypothesis B
perceive are inadmissible, and thus airlines must have applied crisis measures to
solve the problem, therefore may this situation serve as a prove of how inter-
modal reroutings offer an efficient and necessary measure to help airlines recover
from operational disruptions.
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Chapter 8
Suggestions for further research
There is many research performed in flight delay management, or optimisation
of aircraft and crew schedulings, but few research has been on passenger-centric
recovery from highly disruptive situations. Until great disruption events as the
Eyjafjallajokull volcanic eruption in 2010, the low frequency of highly disruptive
situations supported the fact that few researchers focused in the efficient handling
of these situations. Nevertheless, as the airlines’ trend is to optimise the flight
schedules to leave the minimum idle time possible, when such huge disruptions
occur, airlines are surpassed, ressources are inefficiently allocated, and the impact
of the disruption snowballs becoming very costly for airlines.
Since some decades airports realized the importance of an optimal Access Inter-
modality, putting efforts to integrate rail transportation and shuttle bus services
to efficiently connect airports with the city centers. These measures have helped
to reduce congestion in roads close to the airports, as a result of the permently
increasing air transportation demand, and have enabled to smoothly link airports
to the real final destination of the passengers. Nevertheless, the implementation
of inter-modal operations at a network level is starting to be tackled recently by
academia, since disruption recovery is becoming increasingly difficult for airlines,
due to the planification of flight schedules with the minimum idle time possible.
It is reasonable to decide to use buses in highly disruptive situations, never-
theless, airlines are performing reactively in these cases, without a systematic way
to integrate airfield and ground operations. Thus, the mathematical programming
proposed in chapter 6 aims to offer a optimisation model that may serve as a future
tool to ensure a cost-efficient network integration of inter-modal operations in the
rerouting of diverted passengers, after highly disruptive situations. Nevertheless,
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the model proposed has been built as an airports pairs model, where the optimi-
sation of the rerouting is performed over the pairs SFO - DivertedAirportn, and
not optimising at a whole network level.
Although the optimality of a rerouting may be understood as the most cost-
efficient transportation of passengers from the diverted airport to their original
destination, if the model was expanded to a whole network level, the optimisation
could open more possibilities for airlines to manage their diverted passengers. For
instance, some airlines may want to prioritise their international passengers, al-
though placed in diverted airports further than their original destination. Further-
more, working at whole network level could be assess with more realistic capacity
time constraints.
In Appendix 1 a first whole network optimisation model is proposed, built
upon an expansion of the first model presented in chapter 6, with the objective of
rerouting all the diverted passengers in the airports involved in the asiana crash
at the same time. Therefore, the author of this master thesis proposes the further
development of this whole network optimisation model, that may serve as a starting
point for the development of a real tool for airline control centers, with the ultimate
objective that airlines start to apply inter-modal operations to systematically and
cost-efficiently recover from highly disruptive situations.
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Appendix A
Whole Network Rerouting Model
A.1 Introduction
The optimisation model proposed here aims to assess the possibility of inter-
modal substitution as a rerouting option in the reaccommodation of diverted
flights. The validity of the model will be implemented in an Asiana crash Case
Study, in which the mathematical programming will determine the most cost-
effective reaccomodation of the diverted passengers that were not able to reach
SFO with their original flights.
This second mathematical modeling is motivated by the previous model Airport-
pairs rerouting optimisation. Therefore, this new model proposed will expand the
previous model to embrace the rerouting from all the diverted airports involved in
the Asiana Crash disruption at the same time.
The novelty of the mathematical modeling lies in:
• The implementation of inter-modal operations in airline schedule recovery
from highly disruptive situations.
• The passenger-centric modeling of the rerouting costs, meaning the cost of
rerouting not only will take into account the operational costs that airlines
will perceive, but also the monetary translation of delay times that passengers
will perceive.
• The optimisation of the rerouting of diverted passengers from a global net-
work perspective.
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The rerouting is performed from all the diverted airports of study to SFO.
Thus, the mathematical programming will analyse the diverted flights that landed
at every airport, and then, acording to the non-cancelled departure flights and sur-
face modes of transport available, the model will propose the most cost-effective
rerouting configuration, taking into account both passenger travel times and op-
erational costs.
A.2 Nomenclature used in the model
The optimisation will not try to assess if the diversions and cancellations could
have been better handled, but will focus on finding the most cost-effective solution
to reroute the passengers that were diverted. The input data corresponds to the
current diversions situation in the period of study, and then, knowing the flights
that were cancelled, diverted and the ones that could follow the schedule, the
programming will find the most cost-effective The programming
I will now define the variables that will build the mathematical optimization
problem:
A.2.1 Index variables
• F : Set of departure flights from the diverted airports to the Bay Area (SFO,
OAK, SJC) = {f1, f2, ..., fn}
• Γ : Set of discrete time periods = {t1, t2, ..., tT}
• P : Set of diverted passengers = {p1, p2, ..., pP}
• O : Set of diverted airports of study = {o1, o2, ...}
• D : Set of destination airports of departure flights f = {d1, d2, ...}
• A: Set of aircraft available to affrete in the diverted airport
{ a1, a2, ..., aMaxAircraft }
• B: Set of available buses for inter-modal substitution in the diverted airport
{ b1, b2, ..., aMaxBuses }
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A.2.2 Time and delay input variables:
• ATf : Scheduled arrival time of flight f
• DTf : Scheduled departure time of flight f
• PaxATp : Scheduled arrival time of passenger p in his original flight
• ActualDivATp : Arrival time of passenger p to the diverted airport
• BDTo : Bus transportation time from the diverted airport o to SFO
• FlightT imeo : Flight time from the diverted airport o to SFO
A.2.3 Input capacity variables:
• Paxf : Total number of passengers on departure flight f .
• Capf : Maximum passengers capacity of flight f .
• CapAircrafta: Maximum passengers capacity of affreted flight a.
• CapBusb: Maximum passengers capacity of buses available for inter-modal
substitution.
A.2.4 Input cost coefficients:
• CostAffrete: Cost of affreting a new aircraft. Defined in [ $ / hour ·
passenger ] in order to be able to scalate the cost of placing bigger aircrafts,
without having to separate the cost per type of aircraft.
• CostBV : Variable cost of utilizing ground transportation per passenger
[ $ / passenger ].
• CostP : Passenger delay cost per one time unit [ $ / hour · passenger ].
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A.2.5 Other input coefficients:
• BetaWait: Weight coefficient for passenger waiting times.
• BetaTransp: Weight coefficient for passenger transportation times.
• MinloadBus: Percentage of the total bus capacity that establishes the min-
imum passenger load to be ready to leave.
• MinloadAffrete: Percentage of the total aircraft capacity that establishes
the minimum passenger load of an affreted flight to be ready to leave.
• TimeFactor: Conversion factor used to convert time periods into minutes.
A.2.6 Binary variables
A.2.6.1 Input binary variables:
The following binary variables define if the departure flights f have as destina-
tion the alternative airports in the Bay Area (SJC, OAK), or otherwise they will
land in SFO.
OAKf =

1 if the destination of departure flight f is OAK
0 otherwise
(A.1)
SJCf =

1 if the destination of departure flight f is SJC
0 otherwise
(A.2)
The following binary variables define which is the origin airport of the departure
flights f , contracted motor-coaches b, or affreted aircrafts a.
OriginF lightfo =

1 if airport o is the origin airport of flight f
0 otherwise
(A.3)
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OriginBusbo =

1 if airport o is the origin airport of motor − coach b
0 otherwise
(A.4)
OriginAircraftao =

1 if airport o is the origin airport of affreted aircraft a
0 otherwise
(A.5)
A.2.6.2 Output binary variables:
The first type of output binary variables are Squeezet(p,f), Substt(p,b) andAffretet(p,a).
These three binary variables define the rerouting option to which the passengers
are assigned, if it is the case, in every time slot:
Squeezet(p,f) =

1 if passenger p is squeezed into flight f in
time period t
0 otherwise
(A.6)
Substt(p,b) =

1 if passenger p is rerouted with motor − coach b
in time period t
0 otherwise
(A.7)
Affretet(p,a) =

1 if passenger p is rerouted in affreted flight a
in time period t
0 otherwise
(A.8)
The second group of output binary variables are DTBustb and DTAffreteta.
These two binary variables define the time period in which the contracted motor-
coaches b or affreted aircraft a departure:
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DTBustb =

1 if bus b departs in time period t
0 otherwise
(A.9)
DTAffreteta =

1 if affreted aircraft a departs in time period t
0 otherwise
(A.10)
Additionally, the mathematical programming uses the following auxiliary bi-
nary variables: y1, y2, y3, and y4.
A.3 Objective function
The objective of the mathematical model is to minimize the cost of reaccommo-
dation of diverted passengers who were stuck in their respective diverted airports
and could not reach SFO. Thus, it will be used as input data the final ASIANA
crash schedule (e.g. what flights were diverted, which flights were cancelled and
which ones could reach SFO), and the model will only assess the more cost-effective
rerouting back to SFO.
The rerouting options evaluated in the mathematical programming are as follows:
(A) Squeeze the diverted passengers into flights to SFO
(B) Squeeze the diverted passengers into flights to OAK or SJC
(C) Ferry back the passengers to SFO by affreting a new aircraft
(D) Apply an inter-modal substitution from the diverted airport. (Only fea-
sible from some diverted airports)
In the rerouting options enumerated above, Option (B) implies rerouting pas-
sengers to the alternative airports in the Bay Area, and then implementing a short
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inter-modal commute, transporting the passengers back to SFO by surface means
of transport. Furthermore, Option (D) implies that passengers are rerouted with
motor-coaches from the diverted airport back to SFO.
The following figure represents the rerouting from all the airports that absorbed
diversions as a result of the Asiana Crash in SFO.
Figure A.1: Rerouting from all the diverted airports of study to SFO.
A.3.1 Model Input Data
The mathematical programming will have as input the following data:
1) Set of diverted passengers in the operational day of study.
2) Set of departure flights F taking off from diverted airports of study, with des-
tination either to SFO, OAK or SJC.
3) Number of passengers booked and maximum capacity of each flight f.
4) Scheduled departure and arrival times of each flight f.
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5) Actual departure and arrival times of all the flights previously mentioned.
6) Surface transportation times between the diverted airport and SFO.
7) Remaining arrival flight capacities at SJC, OAK and SFO.
8) Remaining departure flights capacity in the diverted airport.
The following tables describe in detail the input matrix that will have to be
uploaded in matlab in order to be able to run the computations.
A.3.1.1 Diverted passengers data
The first input table contains the data regarding the diverted flights. Each
row of the table represents a diverted passenger. The data has to be formatted as
follows:
Figure A.2: Input table with the information of the diverted passengers.
As it is described in A.2, the data includes:
- Day of arrival: Integer from 1 to 4, corresponding to the 4-day period of study
(6th of July to 9th of July).
- Tail #: Tail number of the diverted flight in which passenger p arrived.
- Flight #: Flight number of the diverted flight in which they arrived.
- DivAirpp: Airport to which the passenger p has been diverted. - DTp: Departure
time of the flight in which passenger p arrived.
- ActualDTp: Actual departure time of the flight in which passenger p arrived.
- PaxATp: Scheduled arrival time of the flight in which passenger p arrived.
- ActualDivATp: Scheduled arrival time of the flight in which passenger p arrived.
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A.3.1.2 Departure flights data
The following input table corresponds to the data on the flights, that were not
cancelled, connecting the diverted airport to either SFO, SJC or OAK.
Figure A.3: Input table with the information of the departure flights.
Table 6.3 contains the data regarding the departure flights, as specified previ-
ously. Each row of the table represents a departure flight f. The data includes:
- Day of arrival: Integer from 1 to 4, corresponding to the 4-day period of study
(6th of July to 9th of July).
- Tail #: Tail number of the diverted flight in which passenger p arrived.
- Flight #: Flight number of the diverted flight in which they arrived.
- Paxf : Passengers booked in flight f.
- Capf : Passenger capacity of flight f.
- OF : Origin airport of flight f, defined by an integer.
- DestF : Destination airport of flight f, defined by an integer.
- DTf : Departure time of flight f.
- ActualDTf : Actual departure time of of flight f.
- ATf : Scheduled arrival time of flight f.
- ActualATf : Scheduled arrival time of flight f.
A.3.1.3 Airport destination binary variables
The two following tables correspond to the two binary variables that will be
used as input data for the model.
The value of the above represented binary variables, as described in A.2.6, is
equal to 1 if flight f has destination SJC (in case of SJCf variable) or destination
OAK (in case of OAKf variable).
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Figure A.4: Input binary variables stating the landing airport of flight f.
A.3.1.4 Capacity of aircraft and buses available
The following input data is modeled as a table containing the information re-
garding the available flights to be affreted (variable CapAircrafta andOAircrafta).
Figure A.5: Input data on affreted aircraft’s passenger capacity.
The value of CapAircrafta, as described in A.2.3, is equal to the maximum
number of passengers that can be affreted into flight a. Furthermore, OAircrafta
defines the airport in which the aircraft a is located.
As the optimization is now performed at a global network level, and in order
to make the model more realistic, it must be defined also the number of buses
that are available, which capacity they have, and the airport in which they are
available:
Figure A.6: Input data on the motor coaches’s passenger capacity.
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A.3.1.5 Bus distance times from the diverted airports to SFO
The following input table corresponds to the input variable BDTo.
Figure A.7: Bus driving times from airports o to SFO
Table A.7 represents the input variable BDTo, that describes the bus driving
times to SFO from all the airports involved in the model (SJC, OAK and the
diverted airports). Each row corresponds a one airport. This table will be uploaded
as an array, corresponding each position of the array of a distance Airporto to SFO.
A.3.1.6 Flight times from the diverted airports to SFO
The following input table corresponds to the input variable FlightT imeo.
Figure A.8: Flight times from airports o to SFO
Table A.8 represents the input variable BDTo, that describes the bus driving
times to SFO from all the airports involved in the model (SJC, OAK and the
diverted airports). Each row corresponds a one airport. This table will be uploaded
as an array, corresponding each position of the array of a distance Airporto to SFO.
A.3.2 Model assumptions
Airlines’ operations are complicated to optimize as a whole due to the interac-
tion of many factors and feasibility constraints of different resources. Four main
constraints affect the feasibility of airline planning and disruption management,
including aircraft maintenance checks, pilot work rules, fleet assignment and pas-
senger accomodation.
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In order to ensure an admissible problem complexity, the following assumptions
have been made:
1. Connecting passengers will connect to their final destination from the Bay
Area.
2. When affreting new aircraft, there are limited amount of aircraft available,
and that they will always make the way back to the original airport from
which they were placed.
3. When the rerouting is done through the alternative airports in the Bay Area,
as shown in the previous inter-modal service analysis, it has been assumed
only a 80% of the passengers will be rerouted to SFO.
4. The model will not take into account aircraft maintenance checks and pilot
work rules, as these two constraints are less critical for disruption manage-
ment than they are for airline planning.
5. The model does not take into account that pilots and crew are eligible to
continue their scheduled tasks, acording to FAA regulation pt. 135 maximum
hours of service.
6. It is assumed there is remaining arrival flight capacity for the affreted flights.
A.3.3 Costs to optimize
The cost-effectiveness of the new solution of reaccommodation will take into
account the following costs:
• Passengers delay cost
• Squeezing cost: Cost of squeezing passengers into flights to either SFO,
SJC or OAK.
• Affreting cost: Cost of placing a new aircraft to ferry back diverted pas-
sengers.
• Inter-modal substitution cost: Cost of transporting passengers with
motor-coaches, either from the diverted airport, or just within the Bay Area.
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The mathematical programming will set the mix of squeezed passengers, pas-
sengers rerouted with inter-modal substitution, and passengers reaccomodated in
an affreted aircraft, that will minimizes the total rerouting cost.
A.3.3.1 Objective function
The optimisation problem will minimize the value of the following objective
function:
[MIN ]z =
∑
t
∑
p
[ CSqueezetp + CSubsttp + CAffretetp + CStucktp] (A.11)
As one can see in the formula above displayed, the mathematical programming
will evaluate at every time period, if passenger p should be rerouted by being
squeezed into a flight, rerouted by complete inter-modal subsitution, ferried back
with an affreted flight, or otherwise continue stuck at the diverted airport. The
optimization will balance the cost of leaving the passengers stuck and rerouting
them with every option. At the end of the chosen time horizon, no diverted
passengers should remain in the diverted airport.
A.3.3.2 Cost of squeezing passengers into departure flights
CSqueezetp = Squeezet(p,f) ×
∑
f
[ CostP × βwait × ( DTf −DivPaxATp)+
+ CostP × βtransp × (FlightT imeo ·OFlightfo +
+
∑
o=OAK
BDTo ·OAKf +
∑
o=SJC
BDTo · SJCf ) +
+
∑
o=OAK
(BDTo · CostBVo ·OAKf ) +
∑
o=SJC
( BDTo · CostBVo · SJCf ) ]
(A.12)
In computation CSqueezetp, the first term calculates the passengers delay cost,
acording to the passanger value of time (CostP). The calculation is divided in
two, first the calculation of the delay to the flight in which the passengers were
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squeezed, and then, it adds the driving time from SJC or OAK to SFo, in case it
applies. The second term of the equation adds the cost of motor coaches used to
transport passengers from the other airports in the Bay to SFO, in case it applies.
A.3.3.3 Cost of complete inter-modal substitution
CSubsttp = CostP ×
∑
b
[ Substt(p,b) × ( DTBustb · t · TimeFactor +
+
∑
b
∑
o
BDTo ·OBusbo − DivPaxATp ) ]
+
∑
b
∑
o
CostBVo ·OBusbo ·
∑
b
Substt(p,b)
(A.13)
The equation above represents the operating cost of applying a complete subsi-
tution of a flight, straight from the diverted airport. The first term of the equation
computes the cost of passengers delay, acording to the passenger value of time
(CostP). The delay is computed by adding the departure time of the bus b plus
the bus driving time from the diverted airport to SFO, and then substracting the
scheduled arrival time of passenger p. The second term of the equation computes
the cost of renting the motor coaches service per passenger (CostBV ).
Additionally, it has been assumed in this particular rerouting option that there
is a limited amount of buses available for the inter-modal substitution, as defined
in reflimitations with the variable MaxBuses.
A.3.3.4 Cost of affreting an aircraft
CAffretetp = CostP ×
∑
a
[ Affretet(p,a) × ( DTAffreteta · t · TimeFactor
+
∑
a
∑
o
FlightT imeo ·OAircraftao − DivPaxATp ) ]
+ CostAffreting ×∑
a
Affretet(p,a)
(A.14)
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Equation A.14 represents the total cost of affreting an aircraft to ferry diverted
passengers back to SFO, straight from the diverted airport. The first term of the
equation computes the cost of passengers’ delay, acording to the passengers’ value
of time (CostP). The delay is computed by adding the departure time of the
affreted aircraft a plus an estimated FlightTime from the diverted airport to SFO,
and then substracting the scheduled arrival time of passenger p. The second term
of the equation computes the operating cost of placing the new aircraft. This
cost coefficient CostAffreting, as explained previously, it has been defined in US$
per passenger, in order to be able to scalate the cost of placing bigger aircrafts,
without having to separate the cost per type of aircraft.
Additionally, it has been assumed in this particular rerouting option:
- There is a limited amount of aircrafts available to affrete, as defined in re-
flimitations with the variable MaxAircraft.
- All the aircraft placed are assumed to transport the passengers to SFO and fly
back to their orginal airport, although they could remain in SFO until the end of
the period of study.
A.3.3.5 Cost of passengers remaining in the diverted airport
CStucktp = α× CostP × ( t · TimeFactor +DivPaxATp )×
× ( 1 −
t∑
τ=1
∑
f
Squeezet(p,f) −
t∑
τ=1
∑
b
Substt(p,b) −
t∑
τ=1
∑
a
Affretet(p,a) )
(A.15)
Equation A.15 represents the cost of delay that passenges perceive if they
remain in the diverted airport for long time periods. It has only one term, cor-
responding to the cost of passenger delay. The delay time is computed as the
substraction between the time period t in minutes (t · TimeFactor) and the ar-
rival time of passengers to the diverted airport DivPaxATp. The variable CStucktp
can only have a value greater than zero if the passenger has not been assigned to
any mode yet. The constraints ensure that once the passenger has been assigned
to one rerouting option, the variable CStucktp will permanently be zero.
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A.3.4 Constraints
A.3.4.1 Constraints of squeezing passengers into scheduled flights
1) The number of passengers squeezed into flight f in time period t+1, should
be less or equal to the number of remaining available seats in flight f at time t+1:
∑
p
Squeezet+1(p,f) ≤ Capf − Paxf −
t∑
τ=1
∑
p
Squeezeτ(p,f) ∀t,∀f (A.16)
2) The passengers can not be squeezed into flight f, if the flight has already
departed:
(t · TimeFactor − DTf ) × Squeezet(p,f) ≤ 0 ∀t,∀f, ∀p (A.17)
A.3.4.2 Constraints of the complete inter-modal substitution option
1) The number of passengers assigned to each motor coach must be less or equal
to the motor-coach capacity, at every time slot:
∑
p
Substt+1(p,b) ≤ CapBus−
t∑
τ=1
∑
p
Substτ(p,b) ∀b, ∀t (A.18)
2) The motor coach b contracted for inter-modal substitution can only departure if
it is filled up to a minimum bus load (MinloadBus), as explained in A.2.5. This
restriction is guaranteed through 2 pairs of constraints:
Part A: Serves to fix the condition in which the bus must not departure.
MinloadBus · CapBus −
t∑
τ=1
∑
p
Substτ(p,b) < 0 +M1 · (1 − y1)
DTBustb − M1 · y1 ≤ 0
(A.19)
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Equation A.19 must be valid ∀b,∀t. M1 is a very large number, and y1 is an
auxiliar binary variable. The underlying logic of the above presented statemtent
is as follows:
• (IF) ∑tτ=1∑p Substτ(p,b) ≥MinloadBus · CapBus
(THEN) y1 = 0 or y1 = 1
[y=0] implying DTBustb ≤ 0. Then DTBustb = 0
[y=1], implying DTBustb ≤M1. Then DTBustb = 1 or 0
(The bus can departure)
• (IF) ∑tτ=1∑p Substτ(p,b) < MinloadBus · CapBus
(THEN) y1 = 0, implying DTBustb ≤ 0. Then DTBustb = 0
(The bus must not departure)
Part B: Serves to fix the conditions for which the bus must departure.
t∑
τ=1
∑
p
Substτ(p,b) − MinloadBus · CapBus ≤ 0 +M2 · (1 − y2)
DTBustb + M2 · y2 > 0
(A.20)
Equation A.20 must be valid ∀b,∀t. M2 is a very large number, and y2 is an
auxiliar binary variable. The underlying logic of the above presented statement is
as follows:
• (IF) ∑tτ=1∑p Substτ(p,b) ≤MinloadBus · CapBus
(THEN) y2 = 0 or y2 = 1
[y2 = 0] implying DTBustb > 0. Then DTBustb = 1
[y2 = 1], implying DTBustb ≤M2. Then DTBustb = 1 or 0
(The bus can departure)
• (IF) ∑tτ=1∑p Substτ(p,b) > MinloadBus · CapBus
(THEN) y2 = 1
[y2 = 0] implying DTBustb > 0. Then DTBustb = 1
(The bus must departure)
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3) Passengers can only be assigned to a certain bus at the time slot that the
bus departures:
M1 · DTBustb ≥
t∑
τ=1
∑
p
Substτ(p,b) ∀b,∀t (A.21)
4) The motor coach b can departure at one time slot only, in between the
starting time slot to the time horizon:
∑
t
DTBustb ≤ 1 ∀b (A.22)
A.3.4.3 Constraints corresponding to affreting a new aircraft
1) The number of passengers assigned to each new affreted aircraft must be less
or equal to the aircraft capacity, at every time slot:
∑
p
Affretet+1(p,a) ≤ CapAircrafta −
t∑
τ=1
∑
p
Affreteτ(p,a) ∀a, ∀t (A.23)
2) The aircraft a affreted can only departure if it is filled up to a minimum air-
craft load (MinloadAircraft), as explained in A.2.5. This restriction is guaranteed
through two pairs of constraints:
Part A: Serves to fix the situations in which the new affreted aircraft a must
not departure.
MinloadAircraft · CapAircrafta −
t∑
τ=1
∑
p
Affreteτ(p,a) < 0 +M1 · (1 − y3)
DTAffreteta − M1 · y3 ≤ 0
(A.24)
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Equation A.24 must be valid ∀a,∀t. M1 is a very large number, and y3 is an
auxiliar binary variable. The underlying logic is the equivalent to the one explained
for equation A.19.
Part B: Serves to fix the situations in which the affreted aircraft must depar-
ture.
t∑
τ=1
∑
p
Substτ(p,a) − MinloadAircraft · CapAircrafta ≤ 0 +M2 · (1 − y4)
DTAffreteta + M2 · y4 > 0
(A.25)
Equation A.25 must be valid ∀a,∀t. M2 is a very large number, and y4 is
an auxiliar binary variable. The underlying logic is equivalent to the previously
explained for equation A.20:
3) Constraint that ensures that passengers are assigned to affreted aircrafts in
the time slot that the Aircraft departures:
M1 ·DTAffreteta ≥
t∑
τ=1
∑
p
Affreteτ(p,a) ∀a,∀t (A.26)
4) Every aircraft affreted (a), can departure at one time slot only, between the
starting time slot and the time horizon:
∑
t
DTAffreteta ≤ 1 ∀a (A.27)
A.3.4.4 Passenger conservation constraints
1) Each passenger can be assigned only to one of the rerouting options in every
time period:
∑
f
Squeezet(p,f) +
∑
b
Substt(p,b) +
∑
a
Affretet(p,a) ≤ 1 ∀p,∀t (A.28)
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2) Each passenger must be assigned to only one rerouting option (Squeeze, Substi-
tution or Affreting) in all the time period of study. The equation also ensures that
no passengers will continue stuck at the time horizon.
∑
t
[
∑
f
Squeezet(p,f) +
∑
b
Substt(p,b) +
∑
a
Affretet(p,a) ] = 1 ∀p (A.29)
3) Passengers can start to be assigned to the rerouting options only 30 minutes
after their landing in the diverted airport:
[ t · TimeFactor − (30 + ActualDivATp) ] ×
× ( Squeezedt(p,f) + Substt(p,b) + Affretet(p,a) ) ≥ 0 ∀p,∀t,∀f, ∀b,∀a
(A.30)
Underlying logic:
• (IF) t · TimeFactor ≥ (30 + ActualDivATp)
(THEN) [ Squeezedt(p,f) + Substt(p,b) + Affretet(p,a) ] = 0 or 1
(the passenger can be assigned to one rerouting option)
• (IF) t · TimeFactor ≤ (30 + ActualDivATp)
(THEN) [ Squeezedt(p,f) + Substt(p,b) + Affretet(p,a) ] = 0
(the passenger can not be assigned to a rerouting option)
A.3.4.5 Constraints ensuring coherence in allocation of passengers to
modes
1) If the passenger is diverted to airport oi, he can only be squeezed, affreted or
substitution into a vehicle that departs from the same airport.
(The constraint will be replicated for Affreting and Substitution assignments:)
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DivAirportp − OFlightf < 0 + M1 · (1− y5)
0 < Squeezedt(p,f) + M2 · y (A.31)
The underlying logic of the above displayed constraint is as follows:
• (IF) DivAirportp − OFlightf > 0
(THEN) y=0
[y=0] implying ( Squeezedt(p,f) = 1 )
• (IF) DivAirportp − OFlightf < 0
(THEN) y=0 or y=1
[y=0] implying ( Squeezedt(p,f) = 1 )
[y=1] implying ( Squeezedt(p,f) = 0or1 )
• (IF) DivAirportp − OFlightf = 0
(THEN) y=0
[y=0] implying ( Squeezedt(p,f) = 1 )
PROBLEM: There is two cases in which squeezed is 1, and it should only be 1
in the second case.
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